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Summary
The present thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of labour economics in
Mexico. In particular, the decisions of individuals to enter a job in the formal or informal
sector and how workers differ in terms of wage and time spent unemployed. Also analysing
the effect of high levels of violence on wages.
In the first chapter, search channels are analysed. The results reveal that women be-
nefit more in securing formal jobs when searching on-line, newspaper and via allocation
offices. Men benefit from friends and family to secure informal jobs. Searching online
for jobs implies a wage premium of 12.3% for formal workers and 7.0% for informal ones.
Searching for jobs in the newspaper, implies a wage penalty of 5.24%. These results are
robust after the correction for the potential issue of selection bias.
In the second chapter, the duration of unemployment is analysed. Both the single and
multiple destination models permit us to conclude that going directly to the workplace
and searching for jobs via newspaper reduce the time unemployed for those exiting into
a formal job. Asking friends and relatives increases the hazard for those securing an in-
formal job. These results are robust to the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the
estimation.
The third chapter offers an explanation of the impact that the presence of Drug Traf-
ficking Organizations in Mexican municipalities on the wages of individuals. It also offers
an explanation of the impact for both formal and informal workers. The estimation results
of the preferred specification after instrumenting violence and the presence of DTOs to
address reverse causality, yields a positive effect of the presence of DTOs, but no effect of
violence. More specifically, an additional DTO per municipality increases wages by 5.7%.
The impact on wages is not statistically different for formal and informal workers.
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1Introduction
The analysis of the duality of the labour market in Mexico has been the subject of interest
of many researchers. This duality is defined as the type of jobs taken by workers which
are classified as formal and informal. Informality, often referred as the underground or
illegal economy, in its most simple definition refers to the lack of access to public social
security and health services provided by the government.
In Mexico, informality is not considered an illegal activity. It is common to see people
setting up street stalls outside their home and selling food or any other item to earn some
money and this would not have any legal consequence. The facility to engage in this activ-
ities has led to approximately 60% of the total workforce to be employed as informal.1 This
sector accounts for nearly 25% of the Gross National Product according to the National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Furthermore, the government in an effort
to understand the composition and dynamics of these jobs conducts household surveys
which include questions to aid in the identification and quantification of informal workers.
For example, since its creation, one of the objectives of the National Survey of Occupation
and Employment (ENOE) is to quantify the proportion of workers considered as informal,
their earnings and personal characteristics.
The focus of the research on the labour market that is composed of these two sectors,
has been on whether the informal labour market is beneficial to the economy because it
diversifies the employment opportunities or it is simply the result of market failures. On
the one hand, it is claimed that informality is perfectly integrated in the labour mar-
ket. Workers deliberately choose these jobs because the characteristics associated to them
(such as flexible working schedule, proximity to home, to avoid paying taxes) make it an
attractive option (Maloney, 1999, 2004; Gu¨nther and Launov, 2006; Bargain and Kwenda,
1This is only one type of informal job, we can also mention that a person can be employed in both
formal and informal firms as informal.
22010; Carlo et al., 2015). On the other hand, there are studies claiming that the informal
sector is the result of the barriers to the entry to the formal sector, the lack of jobs in this
sector creates an oversupply of labour that spills into the informal one (Serneels, 2008;
Mondrago´n-Vele´z et al., 2010).
More specifically, the literature on the search channels and duration of unemployment
has focused only on the formal sector of the economy (Addison and Portugal, 2002; Wolter-
mann, 2002; Ma´rquez and Ruiz-Tagle, 2004; Meliciani and Radicchia, 2011). However, if
the motives to access informal jobs are different to formal ones, understanding the de-
cision of individuals to engage in one sector compared to the other can help in the design
of policies to promote the formalization or to increase the productivity in the informal
sector. Key aspects that can help in the understanding of this phenomena include the
duration of unemployment and how wages in both sectors respond to external shocks,
such as high levels of violence. Studies have documented that high levels of violence do
have an effect on employment outcomes, affecting the proportion of employed individuals,
the total number of hours worked and productivity (Robles et al., 2013; Cabral et al.,
2016). Most of this comes from self-employed and the effect is even stronger for female
workers (BenYishay and Pearlman, 2013; Ferna´ndez et al., 2014; Vela´squez, 2014). In
other cases, it is precisely the self-employment that serves as a coping mechanism Bozzoli
et al. (2013). But the evidence on the impacts on salaried employees until now is scarce.
This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of labour economics in Mexico,
analyzing the interaction between the formal and informal sectors and how workers choose
to engage in each of these. The availability of information at the household and individual
level makes the Mexican case particularly apposite for this analysis. The National Sur-
vey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE), is the most complete source of information
regarding employment and education for Mexican workers. It is conducted quarterly and
it constitutes a nationally random sample of individuals. The period of the survey used
here spans from 2005-2015. Additionally, the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) was
conducted in three waves, between 2002 and 2009. This survey is nationally representative
at the household level. The timing of the survey permits the analysis of the exposure of
workers to the levels of violence before and after 2006 the year in which several factors
increased the homicide rates in Mexico.
3Given the availability of information, in the first chapter the following questions can
be addressed: What is the impact of different job search channels and the means by which
a person finances job search on the probability of transitioning to formal vs informal jobs?
Do job searchers have any preference for the sector they wish to work in? and what is the
magnitude of the gender wage gap and which factors explain the gap in formal and in-
formal jobs? Furthermore, for the second chapter the following question can be addressed:
what is the impact of search channels and means to finance job search on the duration
of unemployment of formal and informal workers? Finally, for the third chapter the we
enquire about the effects of the violence and presence of Drug Trafficking Organizations
on wages.
In the first chapter the factors that determine the exit rates of unemployed individuals
into formal and informal jobs are examined. Specifically, exploring if severance payments,
government aid and assistance from family in conjunction with the search channels used
have an impact on the probability of exiting unemployment. The analysis is then enriched
by examining the impact of the use of different search channels on the wages of formal
and informal workers. This is done correcting for selection bias in the estimation.
Some interesting findings arise from the analysis of the transitions of job searchers in
the Mexican labour market. There seems to be a positive and strong correlation between
being formally employed and transitioning to formal employment in period t+1. Asking
directly in the workplace and asking friends or relatives to recommend for a job are the
most used channels, but not the most productive in terms of securing a job. Searching
on-line, via newspaper ads and using allocation offices help female workers to secure formal
jobs. On the other hand, asking friends is more effective for male workers when accessing
informal jobs.
The results also reveal that workers that self-select earn, on average, 16.0% and 8.2%
higher wages in formal and informal jobs, respectively, than an average worker drawn at
random would earn. Moreover, the results yield a positive effect of searching online for
jobs of 12.3% on wages of formal workers and 7.0% on wages of informal workers. Those
that secure jobs via newspaper ads experience a wage penalty of 5.24%. These results can
be explained by the type of job that are secured via these channels.
4The second chapter contributes to this literature by examining the overall effects of
a set of personal characteristics, search channels and financial variables on the duration
of unemployment. Using micro-level labour market data for Mexico the overall effects of
a set of personal characteristics, search channels and financial variables on the duration
of unemployment are analyzed. Individual-level heterogeneity is also accounted for in the
estimation. Furthermore, given that the factors influencing the choice of one employment
state impact differently the choice of another, a multiple destination or competing risk
model is estimated.
Using a discrete setting model and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, the dur-
ation of unemployment is found to be shorter for those that were previously informal
workers compared to formal ones. It can be concluded that there is presence of wait un-
employment, for those that are formal workers. The coefficients of the variables measuring
the presence of a financial cushion yield mixed results. On the one hand, those that had
access to a lump sum payment from a previous job, experience shorter unemployment
duration. On the other hand, those receiving support from a government program exhibit
longer unemployment periods. The results of the multiple destination model allow us to
further understand that the shorter duration for those in possession of a lump sum pay-
ment happens when they exit into formal jobs. Those in receipt of a government program
have a higher probability of exiting the labour force.
Regarding the search channels, those that went directly to the workplace and replied to
newspaper ads experience shorter duration of unemployment when securing formal jobs.
Asking friends and relatives reduces the time unemployed for individuals that exit into
informal jobs. The use of other channels rather than reducing the search time seem to
prolong it.
The third paper offers an explanation of the impact that the presence of DTOs in
Mexican municipalities and violence have on the wages of individuals. It also explains the
impact for both formal and informal workers. Given the availability of individual inform-
ation from the Mexican Family Life survey (2005-2010), data from homicide rates and a
unique dataset that reflects the presence of drug cartels in Mexican Municipalities from
Coscia and R´ıos (2012), I am able to address how the violence associated with the War
on Drugs and the presence of DTOs in Mexican municipalities impacts wages. Ex-ante
5the effect is unknown as the impact of violence and criminal presence on labour markets
is multidimensional and varies depending on whether the worker is employed as formal or
informal. For example, the presence of such groups can signal the absence of the rule of
law in Municipalities pushing firms to re-locate to avoid the risk of attacks, extortion or
theft, thus pushing wages down. It can also mean that because these groups inject illegal
money into the local economy, this could create employment opportunities and push wages
up.
The estimation results of the preferred specification after instrumenting violence and
the presence of DTOs to address reverse causality, yields a positive effect of the presence
of DTOs, but no effect of violence. More specifically, an additional DTO per municipality
increases wages by 5.7%. On further dissagregation, wages for informal workers increases
by 4.9% and 3.4% for formal workers. However, it is important to highlight that these
results are not statistically different, which leads to conclude that both sectors react in a
similar way to these shocks.
Understanding what drives the decisions of individuals to engage in formal or informal
jobs and their characteristics aids in the understanding of the mechanism through which
workers access both formal and informal jobs. This ultimately leads to the design of
policies to promote the formalization of jobs. One of the main characteristics of informal
workers is that they do not pay taxes and this is income that the government is not receiv-
ing. Considering that almost 60% of the total workforce in Mexico is employed as informal,
the loss of revenue for the government via tax avoidance is non trivial. This thesis aims
to provide empirical evidence to further understand the dynamics of the Mexican labour
market.
6Chapter 1
Job Search Channels, employment
and wages: Empirical application
to Mexico’s formal and informal
sectors
1.1 Introduction
The Mexican labour market is widely known for having low levels of unemployment com-
pared to other countries in the OECD (3.74% on average since year 2000). However, such
rates are partially explained by the fact that much of the workforce is employed in the
informal sector.1 To understand the dynamics of a labour market with dual nature, one
has to analyse how individuals allocate between the two sectors, if they have preference
for one sector over the other and if so, to what extent this preferences impacts wages. Fur-
thermore, there is a wage gap for male and female workers, but this gap is not necessarily
the same for formal and informal jobs as the motives to join one sector or the other may
be different by gender.
A number of studies have analysed how different search channels impact on exits out of
unemployment, its duration, and the type of jobs individuals find. (Addison and Portugal,
2002; Woltermann, 2002; Meliciani and Radicchia, 2011). It is also an endogenous process
1According to the most recent labour report from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography,
(INEGI) 57.4% of the total workforce is considered informal, which means that these individuals do not
possess social security or any of the job benefits that come with being formally employed.
7so most of the job searchers rely on asking directly employers for job or via friends and
relatives. And these channels are also the most effective in securing a job (Addison and
Portugal 2002; Woltermann 2002; Caldero´n-Madrid 2008; Meliciani and Radicchia 2011).
There is somehow a general consensus that these search channels do not imply jobs that
account for the workers personal characteristics, are low paid and short term (Addison
and Portugal, 2002; Woltermann, 2002).
However, most of the existing evidence is for the formal labour market and less atten-
tion has been drawn to how search channels impact the probability of securing an informal
job. If individuals face an entry barrier to formal jobs then informality can serve as “cush-
ion” to finance job search. Alternatively, individuals might choose to be informal workers
as they value certain characteristics offered by these jobs. In this sense, the literature
has documented that to some extent individuals explicitly choose in which sector to work
and that these are perfectly integrated (Maloney, 1999, 2004; Gu¨nther and Launov, 2006;
Carlo et al., 2015).
The present study contributes to the literature by examining the factors that determ-
ine exit rates into formal and informal jobs. Specifically, I explore if severance payments,
government aid (via training scholarships, aid from a government program and financial
aid to start a new business) and assistance from family (via remittances or cash transfer)
in conjunction with the search channels2 used have an impact on the probability of exiting
unemployment. The analysis is then enriched by examining impact of the use of different
search channels on the wages of formal and informal workers. This analysis is done cor-
recting for selection bias in the estimation using the methodology proposed by Lee (1983).
Given the availability of self-reported information in the survey I am able to address
the following questions: What is the impact of different job search channels and the means
by which a person finances job search on the probability of transitioning from unemploy-
ment into formal or informal jobs? Do job searchers have any preference for the sector
they wish to work in? What is the magnitude of the wage returns from different search
channels?
Some interesting findings arise from the analysis of the transitions of job searchers in
2These search channels are: asking directly in the workplace, searching on-line, replying to advertise-
ments, asking friends and relatives, using allocation services and others.
8the Mexican labour market. There seems to be a positive and strong correlation between
being formally employed and transitioning to a formal employment in period t+ 1. There
is a “wait unemployment”, reflected by the fact that those with lower levels of education
experience more transitions relative to more educated individuals. This indicates that
individuals with more education have higher reservation wages and prefer to wait for a
formal job offer rather than accepting an informal one.
Asking directly in the workplace and asking friends or relatives to recommend a job
are the most used channels, but not the ones giving the highest returns. Searching on-line,
via newspaper ads and using allocation offices help female workers to secure formal jobs.
On the other hand, asking friends proves to be more productive for male workers when
accessing informal jobs. The results of the selection bias correction, using the methodo-
logy proposed by Lee (1983), reveals that workers do not select randomly into jobs and
earn 16.0% and 8.2% higher wages, for formal and informal respectively, than an average
worker drawn at random would earn.
Regarding the wage returns of using different search channels, the results yield a pos-
itive effect of searching online for jobs of 12.3% on wages of formal workers and 7.0% on
wages for informal workers. On the other hand, those securing formal jobs via newspaper
ads experience a wage penalty of 5.24%. Moreover, this result is confirmed when the ana-
lysis is done separate by gender. Formal males experience a wage premium of 16.2% but
experience a penalty of 4.9% when using the newspaper. These effects can be explained by
the type of jobs that are secured via these channels. Jobs advertised on-line are correlated
positively with the schooling level of the individual and thus are better paid. On the
other hand, the jobs advertised through the newspaper are often low paid with temporary
contracts.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 1.2 the existing literature on
search channels and job outcomes in developed and developing countries is reviewed. In
section 1.3, The background to Mexican labour market is described, as well as the data
used and the summary statistics are presented. In section 1.4, the econometric methodo-
logy is detailed and section 1.5 reports the empirical results of the multinomial logit model,
the selection bias correction and wage differentials. Section 1.6 provides some conclusions.
91.2 Literature Review
The theoretic framework for job search derives from the economics of information and
uncertainty (Mortensen, 1986). It is the modelling of the behaviour of the unemployed
who are actively looking for employment. Job offers will arrive randomly from a known
distribution according to a Poisson process. According to the settings of the basic model,
the worker’s decision problem is to maximize utility by choosing the best possible job
offer. If the worker accepts, they will receive a wage continuously over the tenure of the
employment and the job will last forever. If a worker rejects a job offer it cannot be
recalled. A crucial implication of the Poisson arrival assumption for the basic model is
that offers arrive one at a time and the probability of receiving an offer does not depend
on the duration of the unemployment spell (Devine and Kiefer, 1991).
The basic model of job search can be extended and the assumption of offers that are
exogenous and arrive randomly according to a Poisson process can be relaxed. One can
argue that search intensity of the worker has an effect on the probability of receiving a job
offer. This is because as the worker searches more intensively, the probability increases.
But increasing this effort represents additional costs (Bong Joon, 1981).
Not only can the search intensity increase the arrival of job offers, the channels also
have a positive impact on the probability of getting a job, as some search channels can be
more effective when searching for a specific type of job, compared to others. One of the
studies that provides an insight into the importance of search intensity and of the differ-
ent channels used by unemployed individuals is Holzer (1988). This analysis of different
search methods used by unemployed individuals aged between 16-23 years old, presents
a model of job search which suggests that search method choices are related to their un-
derlying costs and expected productivity as well as to other factors. Holzer’s empirical
results suggest that the search channels used more frequently are the ones associated with
friends and relatives and going directly in person to the workplace and these are the more
productive ones in generating job offers.
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) for the US in 1981, Holzer
(1988) estimates using OLS an equation that captures the number of methods used and
a probit model to estimate the equation that captures the specific search methods used.
The results suggest that the number of methods used is affected by personal characteristics
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and being on lay-off. The latter presumably reflects the market opportunities as well as
income sources and needs. The overall search intensity and its allocation across methods
is chosen by unemployed individuals who balance the relative productivity and costs. In
other words, search intensity leads to a higher job offer probability.
One would anticipate that specific methods have specific outcomes. In this sense,
Chirinko (1982) analyses the impact of direct (asking for a job directly in the workplace)
and indirect search methods (through friends and advertisements) on the returns to job
search on the US using the Current Population Survey (CPS). Using a maximum likeli-
hood technique, he finds that direct methods exert a positive impact on the returns to job
search, whilst indirect methods yield a negative impact. There appears to be diminishing
returns in the job search process when using indirect methods of job search.
Using the same dataset (CPS), Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) test for the incidence and
diffusion of internet job search investigating who searches for jobs on-line and the outcomes
of looking for a job through this channel. The authors use a probit model and conclude
that internet job search is more common among workers with observed characteristics that
are usually associated with more rapid re-employment, i.e., occupations with low unem-
ployment rates, young and well educated workers and persons that became unemployed
after finishing school or had previous job experience.
Addison and Portugal (2002), using Portugal’s Labour Force Survey, assess the effects
of different job search strategies on escape rates from unemployment, and measure the
effectiveness of the job search strategies on obtaining a job. They find evidence indicating
that the most successful methods in finding a job are approaching the employer directly
and informal methods (i.e., friends and family networks). One of the implications of their
empirical results is that the effectiveness of the public employment service in Portugal is
low. This might be because employers tend to avoid employment service placement. Their
major finding is that the public employment service has a low success rate and leads to
jobs that do not last, where the pay is low and the rewards for observed human capital
attributes as well as other job-finding routes are small.
The channels used for job search can be further subdivided into formal and informal
ones. Presumably there are certain channels that would be more effective in ensuring a job
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offer given a worker’s characteristics and the desire to access these type of jobs. Ma´rquez
and Ruiz-Tagle (2004) suggest that workers who come from formal jobs are more likely to
use more formal methods relative to those who come from jobs in non-regulated segments
of the labour market. Using a logit model and the Venezuelan Household Survey, they
analyse the impact of a set of different search strategies in determining whether a worker
will experience a transition into employment. They conclude that the search process is a
crucial element in the functioning of the Venezuelan labour market. More effective search
methods increase the efficiency of job-worker matches and certain methods would work
better than others for a specific type of worker and a specific type of job. Personal char-
acteristics (such as education, age and gender) have an impact on the choice of search
strategy.
The authors also use a multinomial model to estimate the probability of individuals
exiting unemployment into inactivity or employment conditional on search methods, per-
sonal characteristics and previous job status. In their findings, almost three quarters of
job seekers in their sample are using either informal networks of family and friends or
direct contact with employers. They find that previous job status (being employed or
unemployed) has a dominant impact on transitions into employment.
The study by Meliciani and Radicchia (2011) investigate if being recruited through
informal channels in the Italian labour market has both a wage penalty for job searchers.
Dividing the search channels into friends and relatives and professional ties. Estimating
a Mincerian wage equation and controlling for observable characteristics, they find that
there is a wage penalty for those hired through the friends and family channels and a wage
premium for those hired through professional ties.
Woltermann (2002) examines the effects of various job search methods on the labour
market transitions of workers in Brazil (considered as a segmented developing economy)
focusing particularly on the impact of search methods on exit rates into different labour
force states. Part of the segmentation of the labour market originates from the lack of
information on the vacancies available in the formal sector. Different search methods lead
to different occupational states and that part of the labour force that enters the informal
sector would be better off in a formal job if they had access to more information on la-
bour market and assistance on application procedures. Using multinomial logit models,
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the study estimates the effect of the choice of a search method on the exit rates to dif-
ferent occupational states (informally employed, self-employed, searching and inactive)
controlling for search channels, gender, position in the household, and education.
According to Woltermann (2002) most job search in Brazil relies on methods that in-
volve directly asking either an employer or friends and family. The effects of search chan-
nels on exit rates on different labour force states are also differentiated. For example, the
category ‘asked employer’ is the most effective in transitioning into employment, followed
by ‘advertisement’ and ‘friends and family’. The categories ‘examination’ and ‘agency or
union’ do not appear to have a significant impact. According to the findings of all the
search channels only ‘asked employer’ and ‘advertisement’ yield significant effects for a
transition to a formal job. In addition, ‘asked employer’ and ‘asked friends and family’
also seem to be highly significant in influencing the odds of getting an informal job against
‘searching’.
Not all the empirical evidence supports the fact that increasing search intensity leads
to a greater probability of job offer arrival and hence a shorter unemployment spell. One
of the main reasons for this is that a worker must devote the time and resources to this
process, hence it becomes costly. In this sense, Keeley and Robins (1985) findings for
the US suggest that the most productive forms of job search are those that are directly
associated with direct employer contacts. Search intensity and search channels used can
also vary depending on personal characteristics and the type of job a worker is looking for.
For example, Weber and Mahringer (2002) for the case of Austria find that, on average,
unemployed individuals use two methods of job search. They report that search effort
decreases with age and that more educated individuals search harder compared to lower
educated ones. Going directly to the workplace accounts for more than half of the jobs
found. Women and persons with higher level of career motivation have a higher probability
of getting a job through the public employment office. Moreover, they find no significant
effect of increasing search effort on higher wages.
As can be observed throughout the literature review, different methodologies for dif-
ferent countries have been used to analyse labour market transitions and the duration
of unemployment for unemployed workers. The review of what has been done becomes
important to provide a framework in which to place this study, given that the same meth-
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odology can be applied to the case of Mexico in order to shed light on how different search
channels affect the transition of unemployed job searchers to different labour force states
in the Mexican context. The aim of this research is to analyse a two episode transition
over ten years (i.e., transition from quarter one to quarter two for the period 2005-2015),
given the information provided by the Mexican Employment Survey (ENOE). We now
turn to a description of the Mexican labour market and the data used.
1.3 The Mexican Labour Market and Data
In Mexico there is no national unemployment insurance program.3 However, the govern-
ment provides training scholarships, and advice for finding a job through the National
Employment Service (SNE in Spanish to unemployed individuals). Individuals that be-
come unemployed, and were previously formal workers, have the right by law (Federal
Labour Law for dismissals) to a severance payment that will vary with the type of worker
contract they possessed. If the contract was for less than a year, the payment consists
of an amount that equals the monthly wage of half the time for which the employee was
hired. If the contract was for more than a year the amount consists of six months of
wages for the first year and 20 days for each of the years the worker was employed. If the
contract was for an indefinite time, the payment consists of 20 days for each of the years
worked.
Quitting a job affords no right to a worker in terms of severance payment. Workers in
the formal sector have access to fringe benefits that are partly financed by payroll taxes.
These benefits (provided mainly by the two major health institutions IMSS and ISSSTE)
consist of health care, life insurance, housing loans, retirement pension and severance pay-
ment.4 In contrast, workers in informal jobs do not have a legal right to any of these fringe
benefits. Their work conditions and wages are a matter of personal agreement between
the employer and employee.
A formal worker in Mexico is defined as a wage earning person that is registered and
3The only Mexican state that has an unemployment insurance scheme is Mexico City. This was im-
plemented in 2010 as a state policy by the Local Labour Office. It consists of financial aid for up to six
months to finance job search and enhance the transition to formality.
4IMSS provides social security and health services to workers employed in the private sector whilst
ISSSTE provides these services to workers in the public sector.
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has access to public social security and health services provided by the government. A
person that owns a small business with employees has to formally register his business to
provide these services to all his workers to be considered as formal. In this way, using the
self-reported information from the survey, workers are classified as formal, if at the time
of the interview, they report being employed and are entitled to access health service from
the government. They are defined as informal workers otherwise. It is worth noting that
a worker can be hired by a formally constituted firm but have informal worker status.
In this paper, the Mexican National Employment Survey (ENOE in Spanish) is used
from 2005 to 2015. This survey constitutes a nationally representative random sample
of individuals. The National Statistical Office in Mexico (INEGI) asks individuals in this
survey about different socio-economic characteristics and their current employment status.
This survey is designed to be a rotating panel where the interviewed individuals remain in
the sample for five periods and then exit. Two types of questionnaires are used in this sur-
vey: the basic and the extended version. The basic version is used in the second to fourth
quarters of each year and the extended version is only used in the first quarter of each year.
The extended version contains questions on financial and other types of support. The
objective of this set of questions is to capture if a person receives any form of financial aid
from the government or from friends and relatives regardless of their employment status.
As the sample represents only unemployed job searchers, it is of interest to determine if this
aid (pecuniary or not) assists a person in exiting unemployment. Since this information is
only available on the extended versions of the questionnaire, the analysis is limited to the
first and second quarter of each year from 2005 to 2015. In this way, given the limitations of
the data, the panel dimension of the data is not exploited but only the cross-section is used.
The survey includes questions regarding the job search channel used by individuals.
These questions are asked in both surveys (basic and extended) and they capture the al-
ternative search methods used by job searchers. Responses are divided into 11 categories
and these are not mutually exclusive. The categories comprise: directly, private place-
ment agency, government placement agency, job government program, formalities to start
a new business, on-line job advertisement, published or answered a newspaper or other
printed source advertisement, went to a union or guild, asked relatives to recommend or
inform about a job, check advertisements on newspapers and others. Due to the similarity
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between categories, the responses were merged into six broader categories in the following
way: Ask for job directly, on-line job advertisement, advertisement (printed, newspaper,
radio, and television), social networks, allocation services (public and private allocation
service, went to union or guild) and other (arrangements to start a new business and other).
The identification of sources of income to finance job search are also included in the
survey. According to the questions, income is from three main sources: financial aid
from friends and relatives, financial aid from a government program and income after em-
ployment (e.g., severance payment). Financial aid from friends can come from: someone
abroad, someone in another Mexican state or someone in the same state. In the same way,
aid from government may come from the following sources: fellowship, financial aid to
start a new business, financial aid from any other government program. Finally, income
after employment can come from either a severance payment, sale of a former business, a
retirement pension, unemployment insurance or private unemployment insurance.
As the number of people that did not have access to any of the three sources of income
to finance job search is relatively small, the categories are merged to create three binary
variables that capture whether they had access to income or not. Hence, a zero captures
if a person did not have access (to aid from government, friends or income from a previous
job) and one captures if the person did have access to any of the above.
The survey is a rotating panel of five interviews and for the purpose of the analysis
I only considered those individuals that by the first quarter of each year were in their
first to fourth interview. This allows tracking them to the next quarter of the survey and
identify which channels they used to find a job in the first quarter and their labour market
status in the second quarter. All these individuals state that by the first quarter they
were unemployed and actively looking for a job. I also drop all those that appear only
in one quarter of the sample and only retain those cases that had previous job experience.5
Having no unemployment insurance in place at the national level makes the informal
sector the ideal ‘scape mechanism” for workers who are in need of a steady source of
income whilst they find a suitable job. This complementarity is also possible for two
reasons, there is a lack of infrastructure to ensure that workers secure a formal well paid
5These individuals only comprise 7.0% of the total sample of job searchers.
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job. The current public allocation service is often not used by workers. If we observe in
table 1.1 most of the job searchers either go directly to the workplace or rely on friends and
relatives to secure a job. So this means that the current system is failing to bring down
matching costs for both employers and employees. The effectiveness of some channels over
others reflects how the labour market is composed. For example, public funds are devoted
to government placement agencies and if job searchers are not using these channels or
the type of jobs found through these channels are temporary or low paid. Then these
public funds can be more efficiently spent in other public programs such as training or
scholarships for unemployed individuals
The second reason for the complementarity between the formal and informal sectors is
that informality in Mexico is not an illegal activity, so there is no restriction to enter this
sector. There is a large debate on the segmentation of the Mexican labour market. Some
argue that individuals have to work in informal jobs because the formal sector cannot
offer sufficient jobs and thus individuals have to engage in informal activities to secure
an income. This in part can be observed in graph 3.1, which plots the unemployment
and informality participation rate for the period 2005-2015. There are marked periods of
increasing trends in both the unemployment and informality rate. The period after the
great recession in the late 2008 is the more clear example of this. Whenever there are
periods of rising unemployment, this will spillover into the informal sector. When the
unemployment rate is going down as in the period after 2010, the participation rate in the
informal sector also goes down.
There is another argument about informality in developing countries, and is that work-
ers choose freely in which sector to work and the choice only depends on the wage and
other factors that are preferred by them. Whether the Mexican labour market is seg-
mented or perfectly integrated and the result of personal choice, it is important to shed
light on the job search returns to the use of different search channels by individuals and
whether this channels are also the ones helping them secure a high paid job.
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for the variables of interest in the selected
sample for the first quarter of each year. It can be observed that 70% of the sample is
comprised of male job searchers, 65% are heads of household and the proportion that has
access to any type of income to finance job search is relatively small. The sample is evenly
distributed among educational categories, although it is worth reporting that, on average,
secondary schooling has the highest proportion of job searchers (30%). Approximately 6%
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of the sample has access to income after work or financial aid from friends and relatives
and only 2% to aid from government. When looking at the stated reasons for job loss, it
can be seen that being dismissed or finishing a job accounts for 60%, whereas 31% of job
searchers reported that dissatisfaction with the previous job was the main reason for exit-
ing their job. Regarding the search channels, three are worth highlighting: going directly
to the workplace (74%), social networks (14%) and advertisements (13%). For the case of
the five Mexican regions, the north and center comprise approximately 59% of the sample
and the east, west and south regions the remaining 41%.
It is important to acknowledge that the search channels used by job searchers are en-
dogenous to personal characteristics of the individual and previous work experience in a
given sector. Moreover, an unemployed individual will use the channels that are more
likely to help secure a job. For this reason, the results presented here in section 1.3 should
be interpreted with care as I am not claiming causality. Instead, this exercise aims at
looking how one search channel increases the probability of securing a job relative to oth-
ers. Looking at how different search channels affect the probability of securing a job is
by itself an interesting exercise that enables us to draw conclusions on the dynamics of a
labour market that is characterized by being segmented along two dimensions (i.e. formal
and informal).
1.4 Econometric Methodology
For the case where more than two destinations in the dependent variable are possible, the
ordering among the destinations is irrelevant and regressors do not vary over alternatives,
the multinomial logit model is more appropriate.
Let yij = 1 if the i
th individual in t experiences a transition in t + 1 into one of the
four labour market states (unemployed, formal job, informal job, out of the labour force)
and yij = 0 otherwise, and where j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
P rob[yij = 1] = piij and since the individual probabilities sum one we have:
pii1 + pii2 + pii3 + pii4 = 1
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The multinomial logit can be re-expressed in a general form as:
piij =
exp[x′iβj ]∑k
j exp[x
′
iβj ]
(1.1)
Where k is the number of outcomes being modelled which are four in this case. This
equation expresses the probability that an individual with characteristics xi experiences a
transition into the jth labour force state. However, a normalization is required for iden-
tification and this is achieved by arbitrarily setting the elements of the β1 vector to zero.
This is referred to as Theil normalization.
For this four-outcome model of labour force transitions described by equations (1) to
(4), the restriction implies that the probabilities are re-expressed as:
pii1 =
1
1 + exp[x′iβ2] + exp[x
′
iβ3] + exp[x
′
iβ4]
(1.2)
pii2 =
exp[x′iβ2]
1 + exp[x′iβ2] + exp[x
′
iβ3] + exp[x
′
iβ4]
(1.3)
pii3 =
exp[x′iβ3]
1 + exp[x′iβ2] + exp[x
′
iβ3] + exp[x
′
iβ4]
(1.4)
pii4 =
exp[x′iβ4]
1 + exp[x′iβ2] + exp[x
′
iβ3] + exp[x
′
iβ4]
(1.5)
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The parameters of the multinomial logit model are estimated by specifying the follow-
ing log likelihood function after substituting for piij .
L =
n∑
i
k∑
j
yijlog(piij)
Finally, for this multinomial logit model there is no single conditional mean of the
dependent variable, y. Instead one has to model the probabilities of the different outcomes,
because we have an interest in how these probabilities change as regressors change. In
other words, if a change in x increases the probability of attachment to one category, it
must reduce the probability in one or more of the other categories to ensure the underlying
probabilities sum to one. In the case of having discrete binary variables as regressors, as
in this case, one would estimate impact effects rather than marginal effects.6
1.5 Empirical results
1.5.1 Transitions out of unemployment
The effects of personal characteristics, search channels and financial aid on the probability
of transitioning from unemployment in the first quarter of the survey to either a formal or
informal job or even out of the labour force is estimated. It is acknowledged that the results
presented here can be influenced by seasonality in the Mexican labour market, because we
are specifically working on a transition from the first quarter of the year to the second over
a period of 10 years. However, due to the limitations of the data this is the best that can
be done in terms of explaining the sectoral choice unemployed individuals prefer to work in.
As described before, the categories of analysis are: unemployed, employed in a formal
job, employed in an informal job and out of the labour force. All of the individuals of
this sample are unemployed in the first quarter. Therefore they transition to these four
different labour market states. The multinomial logit model controls for age7, gender,
marital status, position in the household (i.e., being the head), regional dummies (north,
south, east, west, center), educational categories (elementary school, secondary school,
high school and more than high school) if the previous job was formal, reason for job loss
(dismissed, dissatisfaction, left previous business and others).
6See chapter 15 of Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details on the estimation of impact effects.
7The age categories include 5 year cohorts. These are only used as controls so are not reported in the
main estimation. The same criteria is also used for the estimation of the multinomial logit by gender.
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Additionally, three variables to capture if a person is in receipt of any sort of financial
aid (i.e., financial aid from friends and relatives, financial aid from government or any sort
of income after work which can be considered as a “financial cushion”) are introduced.
The different search channels used by workers to find a job are also included (i.e., directly
to the workplace, job offer on line, advertisement in newspaper or classifieds, friends and
relatives, used public or private allocation service and others).
As part of the econometric analysis of the model, the Independence of Irrelevant Al-
ternatives (IIA) proposition is tested for the four outcomes of the model. The result of
the Small-Hsiao test supports the null hypothesis. This means that the alternatives are
independent of each other vindicating the use of the multinomial logit model.
The results of the multinomial logit estimation are presented in table 1.2 with robust
standard errors reported in parenthesis. The coefficient for the gender variable indicates
that being male increases the probability of experiencing a transition to employment for
both formal and informal sectors. This is not surprising, given that the majority of the
sample is comprised of male job searchers and traditionally in Mexican households the
head is often male and the main provider for the family. This is consistent with the negat-
ive coefficient of the out of the labour force category, male job searchers are more likely to
continue actively searching for a job rather than not working at all compared to women,
even if this means remaining unemployed for an additional period. This is supported by
the positive coefficient of the unemployed category.
Regarding marital status or being a head of household, the results yield a a strong pos-
itive effect on the probability of transitioning to employment for both formal and informal
jobs. As mentioned previously, regardless of the gender, the head of household is often the
main provider even more so if this means that they have to support a family in the case
when they are married. Moving on to the educational categories, introducing this variable
with multiple options entails using one of these categories as base for the comparison.
In this case, “more than high school” was used as base. Two aspects are worth noting
here, lower educational levels such as elementary and secondary school have a strong and
positive impact on the probability of securing a formal or informal job but the effect is
opposite for the case of formal jobs. High school on the other hand, does not appear to
have an impact on the probability of securing either a formal or informal job. It actually
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increases the probability of going out of the labour force. This might indicate that highly
educated individuals would have higher reservation wages relative to less educated workers
and hence would experience higher levels of “wait unemployment”, whereas less educated
are willing to take informal jobs.8 This result is consistent with Caldero´n-Madrid (2008)
in the sense that those with low levels of education become informal employees faster than
more educated employed workers and these same job searchers require longer job search
spells to secure formal jobs.9
Being previously employed in the formal labour market has a positive impact on the
probability of transitioning into employment in a formal job and has a negative impact
on the probability of transitioning into an informal job. The fact that the effect is the
opposite for those that transition into informal jobs is a signal that there are certain char-
acteristics in the formal sector that are desired by formal workers. There are a number
fringe benefits that come with a formal job such as housing loans, daycare, paid holidays
and health care. The effect is such that unemployed individuals in this setting would
prefer to remain unemployed for an additional period. This is confirmed from the positive
and strong coefficient for the unemployed category.
Looking at the reasons for being unemployed, relative to the base category “dissatis-
faction with previous job”, it is more likely for individuals to choose an informal job in t+1
regardless of the reason for being unemployed. The effect is opposite for the case of those
that secure a formal job. One can imagine a scenario where the informal sector is more
dynamic and re-employment is easier than in the formal sector. Hence, the coefficients are
actually reflecting this fact.
Regarding the variables that capture the effect of a“financial cushion” or aid to fin-
ance job search either through friends and relatives or from the government, the estimates
reveal that, as expected, individuals that received a severance payment from a previous
8The model was calculated changing the schooling base category to elementary, results show that having
more than high school, on average, increases the probability of remaining unemployed by 8.4 percentage
points, which means that they are still actively looking for a job as opposed to going out of the labour
force, where job hunting ceases.
9“Wait unemployment” among highly skilled individuals is common as their reservation wage is higher
compared to non skilled individuals. This is more common if job searchers have a preference for the sector
they wish to access. For an analysis of wait unemployment in public sector jobs for highly skilled workers
see Reilly and Hyder (2006).
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job are more likely to secure a formal job. Considering that one of the many benefits of
a formal job is receiving this payment, the estimates are consistent. This does not mean
that informal workers do not receive this benefit, but the quantity presumably would be
much lower than a formal job. Other forms of financing job search such as friends and
relatives decrease the probability of transitioning to employment in the formal sector and
at the same time increases the probability of going out of the labour force. Similar results
are registered for the case when individuals receive financial support from the government
via scholarships, training or any other government program that is not unemployment
insurance. The results presented here, are in line with Caldero´n-Madrid (2008) findings
on the effect of a financial cushion on the duration of unemployment, which suggests that
those who are without this income would transit to employment faster. This implies that
those with access to a “financial cushion” will be able to finance a longer job search.
It is important to briefly comment about the results presented above. Despite the small
number of those having access to the three types of financial help. It is not surprising to
have statistically significant results for those that had access to a severance payment and
end up finding a formal job. As previously explained, by law, previous formal workers have
access to this benefit. Regarding those that had access to government aid and considering
the lack of an unemployment insurance program in Mexico during the years of analysis
here it can be concluded that the effect is coming from government training programs
instead. The evidence from Caldern-Madrid and Trejo (2002) highlights the effectiveness
of programs such as PROBECAT (Labour training scholarship program, in Spanish) in
the successful re-employment of individuals in more long term jobs. However, these indi-
viduals also take longer to get a job compared to non-participants in the program. This
because those that have access to training are not allowed to have a job until the training
is completed. And this will have a positive impact on the probability of them going out
of the labour force. Finally, it is not uncommon to receive financial help from relatives
in times of economic hardship, so even with a small sample these statistically significant
results are also not surprising. 10
10The number of workers per state is even across the whole sample. So one state being over-represented
is not what it is driving the statistical significance of the results. The explanation just presented above,
also applies to the results found in the second chapter. As the dataset for the analysis is the same and
results are expected to be consistent. The duration component introduced in chapter 2 will give us a
deeper understanding of unemployment transitions in this market.
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It is common in the literature to assign a base category to interpret the coefficients of
independent binary variables when estimating a multinomial logit model. However, in this
setting the unemployed individuals used many search channels to secure a job. Creating
a variable to differentiate between the channels using one base category could lead to the
incorrect estimation of the true effect of the channels independently. However, to avoid
the issue known as the dummy variable trap, the estimation is done dropping the constant
or intercept variable in this estimation and the following ones, including chapter 2.
In this study, the descriptive statistics suggest that going directly to the workplace
and the ‘friends and relatives’ channels were the most used by job searchers. The results
of the estimation suggest that going directly to the workplace, searching for a job on-line,
looking for a job in the newspaper and using allocation services, increases the probability
of securing formal jobs but has the opposite effect for informal jobs. For the case of asking
friends, broadly interpreted as a network effect, the results yield a positive effect on the
probability of securing an informal job but has no effect on securing a formal job. This
effect might be different for male and female workers and that is discussed below. In
contrast, Caldero´n-Madrid (2008) finds that those that rely on newspaper, radio and the
internet escape faster from unemployment compared to those relying on social networks.
1.5.2 Gender differences in transitions out of unemployment
To test whether there are gender effects in the model. I conducted a Chow form of the
likelihood ratio test to see if there are systematic differences between the fit of the full
model against the model with only male workers and the model with only female workers.
The null hypothesis is that there are no systematic gender differences. The result of the
test rejects the null hypothesis with Prob > chi2 = 0.0001. Following the result of the test,
I estimate the model with sub-samples for male and female job searchers. It is of interest
to see if there are different results between the job search methods used by men and women.
Table B.2 presents the results of the estimation for the male sample. Alternatively,
the same procedure is followed for the sample of female workers, and the results are dis-
played in table B.3. The results for the male sample reveal that receiving financial aid
from friends and relatives has a negative impact on the probability of transitioning to a
formal job and at the same time it increases the probability of going out of the labour
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force. This result is consistent with the discussion in subsection 1.5.1 and traditionally in
Mexico, family support in monetary terms is not unusual in times of economic hardship.11
This result sheds light on a particular aspect of the family support as a way to finance
job search. Specifically, for male job searchers, such support is enabling them to finance
unemployment and stop searching for jobs. In contrast, family support does not seem to
have any impact on the employment outcomes of female job searchers.
Having access to a severance payment for males has the same effect for the full sample
discussed in subsection 1.5.1. For female workers, on the other hand, the means to finance
job search do not seem to be benefiting them in securing a job in either the formal and in-
formal sectors. There is evidence to conclude that for the case of both female and male job
searchers, receiving support from the government increases the probability of experiencing
a transition out of the labour force. Given that this support can come through many of
the governmental programs in Mexico, out of which many of them are cash transfers, the
result presented here is not surprising.12
Moving on to search channels, the results reveal that going directly to the workplace
increases the probability of transition to a formal job for both male and female job search-
ers. However, this also has a negative impact on the probability of males securing an
informal job. Given that this channel is the most widely used by job searchers the neg-
ative coefficient for males is somewhat surprising. An explanation for this may be that
there are some characteristics associated with informal jobs that hinder the probability of
securing a job if males go directly to the workplace to hand in a resume or job application.
Such characteristics have to be very specific to the informal sector as this is not reflected
for the case of formal jobs.
Searching for a job on-line increases the probability of females securing formal jobs but
not so for informal jobs. For males, the effect of using this search channel is not different
from zero. This result is not surprising because formal firms are usually big and these are
the ones that in an effort to target a larger population, advertise jobs on-line. Moreover, it
11It is specifically called family support as we can think of an situation where a person, who does not
possess any way to earn an income, receives a cash transfer from a family member on a regular basis
compared to receiving it from a friend, which would most likely be a one time loan.
12One example of a Mexican government cash transfer program is what is currently known as “Prospera”.
This program targets low income households and is available throughout the country.
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is possible that a large percentage of the vacancies on-line are targeting women, explaining
why this might help females more to leave unemployment. Alternatively, when a person
replies to a job offer found in the newspaper, the probability of securing a formal job
increases for both males and females. The opposite effect is found for the case of informal
jobs for males, which is not surprising given that informal job vacancies are not often
advertised in the newspaper.
The second most used way to search for a job is via friends and networks. The res-
ults demonstrate that this channel is effective when used by male job searchers to secure
informal jobs. The effect is also positive for females, although is weak. Comparing these
results with those in table (1.2) it can be concluded that in Mexico, when an unemployed
individual uses networks to search for a job, this channel proves to be more effective for
the case of informal jobs, this effect is stronger for male job searchers. Alternatively, this
channel has a negative effect when used to secure a formal job for the case of males but
no effect for females.
In the case of using employment allocation services, this channel seems to benefit fe-
male jobs searchers in securing formal jobs. For male job searchers the effect of using such
channels is not different from zero. This channel, despite being one of the least used by
job searchers, seems to be of benefit when trying to access a formal job. This effect is
also found to be stronger for females. It has the opposite effect for informal jobs, which is
expected, as allocation services do not advertise informal jobs.
The results discussed above reveal that both male and female job searchers benefit
more from a different number of channels13 if trying to access formal jobs. Male job
searchers on the other hand, seem to benefit more from networks to access informal jobs.
The fact that most channels have a negative effect on the probability of being employed
as informal can indicate a possible preference to be employed in the formal sector. If this
is true, and is reflected by unobservables the issue of selection bias is likely to beset the
estimation of wage equation.
13These channels are: going directly to the workplace, searching for a job on-line, newspaper ads and
allocation offices.
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1.5.3 Wage returns from search channels and selection bias
Until now the focus of the analysis has been on the returns to job search by different chan-
nels used by unemployed individuals. However, given that the ENOE includes information
on wages, it is used to determine to what extent search channels have an effect on the wage
of individuals. Furthermore, the wage equation is estimated introducing the six categor-
ies of search channels to disentangle their effect on wages for both formal and informal jobs.
The occupational choice of individuals in this setting, entails a selection process to
either remaining unemployed, the formal or informal sector conditional on personal char-
acteristics and search channels used to secure jobs. The choice of the sector can bias the
estimation of the wage for individuals if not accounted for.
Moreover, one can argue that the wage of a workers is higher just because they chose
a job that matches precisely his personal characteristics and offers certain conditions that
are more appealing and this could be reflected when estimating the wage equation. For
example, Some workers might prefer to be formal as often the wages and benefits associ-
ated are higher compared to informal jobs. On the other hand, individuals might prefer
informal jobs due to the flexibility of working hours, the proximity to their homes even
if this means sacrificing income. In the sample used here, unemployed individuals get to
choose in which sector they are to be employed in from one period to the other. In this
way, personal, household characteristics and preference for a certain sector determine this
choice.
For this exercise the variable that captures labour market states is recoded to reflect if
a person is unemployed formal or informal.14 Following the specification detailed in Reilly
(1991), an individual chooses between three mutually exclusive options, the probability of
a given occupational attachment is captured in a vector X that can be expressed in terms
of a reduced form model that is estimated with a multinomial logit model as follows:
pij =
exp(Xγj)
1 +
k−1∑
j=1
(Xγj)
(1.6)
14As opposed to having four categories like in subsection (1.5.1), to estimate the wages for formal and
informal workers the information of active job search by an individual becomes irrelevant as they would
not report income that is used to estimate difference between sectors.
27
where pij is the probability of attachment of the individual i to the option j, Xi is
the vector containing the variables that determine the attachment and γ is a vector of
unknown occupational coefficients. The parameters of k − 1 of the k employment choices
can be identified imposing the normalization
∑
γk = 0.
In the second stage the information resulting from the estimation of the reduced form
model in equation 1.6 is used to correct for the potential effects of selection bias. The
wage equation conditional on the jth category being chosen can be detailed as follows:
Wj = Zjβj − σjρj φ(J(Xjγj))
F (Xjγj)
+ ζj (1.7)
where φ is the standard normal density function, J is a monotonic increasing trans-
formation of the random variable associated with the occupational attachment equation
into a standard normal variable where J = Φ−1F , Φ is the standard normal distribution
function and F is the probability distribution function. σj is the standard error of the dis-
turbance term in the wage equation in the wage equation and ρj the correlation between
both the error terms of the wage equation and the occupational attachment equation.
The coefficient vector γˆ obtained after estimating the reduced form equation through
maximum likelihood in equation 1.6 are inserted in equation 1.7. This equation can be
re-written as:
Wj = Zjβj + θj λˆj + ζj (1.8)
where θj = σjρj and λˆj =
φ(J(Xiγˆj))
F (Xiγˆj)
and ζ is an error term.
The term λˆ in the equation controls for the effects of selectivity bias in the wage
equation. Equation 1.8 yields consistent estimates for the jth sector’s wage equation after
applying an OLS procedure.
1.5.4 Empirical specification to correct for selection bias
The estimation of equations (1.6) and (1.8) are specified here. In the first stage, a similar
multinomial logit model to the one presented in table 1.2 is estimated to predict employ-
ment outcomes to either remain unemployed the formal or informal sectors and is specified
as follow:
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Pj =f(Age,Gender, Schooling level,Marital status,
previous job, reason for unemployment,
Option to finance job search), j = 1, 2, 3,
(1.9)
ln(wages) =f(Age,Age squared,Gender,
Schooling level,Regional controls,
Search channels,Correction term), iffj = 3,
(1.10)
Equation (1.9) represents the first stage of the estimation and is the employment se-
lection function. This is a slightly different specification to the one reported in table 1.215.
This specification contains variables that are commonly used in the literature to predict
employment decisions. Additionally, the identifying instruments for the selection effects
used are marital status, if previous job was formal, options to finance job search and reas-
ons for unemployment in period t. The ways to finance job search determine the type of
job a worker secures, if the worker has access to a severance payment then it is more likely
to secure a formal job, receiving financial aid from relatives increases the likelihood of re-
maining unemployed. In the same way, the reasons for unemployment impact differently
the employment decision of individuals.
The results for the first stage will not be discussed as this has already been done in
subsection 1.5.1 but the results are reported in table A.1 of the appendix. Equation (1.10)
is the wage equation, this specification includes the correction term from the first stage,
personal characteristics controls and the search channels for the purpose of determining if
search channels have any influence on the wages of individuals. Those that work without
pay are dropped from the analysis.16
15The specification is different from the first multinomial presented because here the interest lies on
estimating the wage returns to the use of different search channels. The search channels then are omitted
from the first stage equation and instead the reasons for being unemployed and personal characteristics
are used as identifying instruments in the first stage.
16These individuals constitute 10% of the total sample. It is a common feature of the Mexican labor
market to have individuals working in a family business without a pay. The motivation of these individuals
to work under such circumstances is different from a common worker.
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One aspect worth noting here, the reason why the information for unemployed was
used to correct for selection bias is that the information for whether the unemployed in-
dividual chose to remained unemployed is also important and influences the employment
outcome in t+1. More specifically, given that to correct for selection bias in one outcome,
the wage of the remaining options are assumed as zero, the information for unemployed
has a potential effect on the magnitude of the bias. Additionally, there is evidence that
some individuals choose to remain unemployed as noted when the effects of “wait unem-
ployment” were discussed.
Some results after correcting for selection bias are presented in table 1.5 are important
to highlight. On average, compared to females, being male increases the worker’s wage
by 17.8% and 36.5% for formal and informal sectors respectively. A more detailed gender
analysis is presented in table 1.6. Compared to just having elementary school, those with
higher levels of education earn more. In specific, having more than high school, increases
the wage by 30.0% and 28.4% for formal and informal workers, respectively. Compared to
those in the center region of the country, those in the south working informally earn less,
but the opposite effect on wages appears if working with a formal contract.
Regarding the search channels, the results yield that those searching on-line for a job,
on average, earn 12.3% more in the case for formal jobs and 7.0% more for the case of
informal jobs. This can be attributed to the type of jobs advertised through the web,
which presumably would be better paid jobs targeting more skilled workers. A similar
finding is presented by Kuhn and Skuterud (2004) who conclude that searching on-line for
a job is associated with being highly skilled. On the other hand, those using newspaper
adds as a channel to search for a job experience a wage penalty. It is common knowledge,
the type of jobs advertised in the newspaper are often low paid and for non-skilled workers.
Finally, looking at the results for the selection term and its interpretation it can be
used to ascertain evidence of non-randomness if workers to either the formal or informal
sector. The coefficient at the bottom of the table reports the selectivity bias. It is stat-
istically significant and negative for both the formal and informal sectors of the labour
market (imr2 and imr3).17
17The interpretation of this coefficient follows Gyourko and Tracy (1988) and Reilly (1991) and it refers
to the effect of the selection variable on the wage. The effect is obtained multiplying minus the selection
variable coefficient by the mean value of the selection variable.
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For the case of formal jobs, the calculation suggests that those self-selecting into the
formal sector earn, on average, 16.0% higher wages that an individual drawn at random
from the labour force with identical observable characteristics would be expected to earn.
For the case of informal workers that self-select into this sector earn, on average, 8.2%
higher wages than an average informal workers drawn at random would earn. Evidence
is provided that workers are non randomly selected into either formal or informal jobs.
Instead, they decide in which sector they prefer to work and this process eventually means
higher earnings for them.
In table 1.6 the results are presented by gender. The results suggest that compared
to only having elementary school, men employed as formal and that have more than high
school on average earn 27.4% higher wages. The other schooling levels are not statistically
significant, which suggests that there is not difference in earnings for those with up to high
school when employed in the formal sector. In contrast, those with more than high school
experience a wage premium.18 Compared to living in the centre region, workers in the
South earn 6.1% higher wages as formal workers. Men that search for jobs on-line earn
16.2% higher wages but experience a wage penalty of 4.9% when using the newspaper to
find a job.
This result confirms the findings in table 1.5 that the wage premium from searching
for jobs on-line and the penalty from searching via newspapers is explained by the type
of jobs that are advertised through these means. Regarding the selection term, there is
evidence of selection of male formal workers. Specifically, those that select into formal jobs
earn on average 14.4% wages than an average worker drawn at random would earn.This
result is slightly higher in magnitude but consistent with the results for the pooled sample
in table 1.5.
For the case of male informal job searchers, there is difference in the earnings of work-
ers by schooling level. Having elementary school as the base, those with secondary, high
school and more than high school earn 6.6%, 7.97% and 28.4% higher wages, respectively.
Moreover, there are also notable differences in earnings depending on the region of res-
idence. Compared to living in the centre region, workers that live in the north and west
18This category is composed of those with bachelor, master and PhD degree.
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earn 3.7% and 4.2% higher wages and those living in the east and south earn 1.2% and
4.4% lower wages. These regional wage differences can be explained by the prevalence of
manufacturing industries in the north and access to the many of the Mexican ports in the
west. On the other hand, according to the National Comission for the Minimum Wage
(Conasami) which reports wages by geographic area in Mexico, the south and east part of
the country are characterized by having the lowest wage levels in the country.19
Regarding search channels for male informal workers, there is only one channel that re-
mains statistically significant. More specifically, those using allocation services experience
a wage penalty of 9.2% and this result is consistent with the one presented for the pooled
sample. Finally, in terms of the selection effect it can be concluded that there is presence
of selection bias, those that select into informal jobs earn on average 12.5% higher wages
than a worker with similar characteristics drawn at random.
We now turn to the interpretation for female workers. It can be observed that in
general terms the effect of some of the variables on the wage is not different from zero
and this can be explained by the sample size that is reduced significantly when only the
women are analyzed. Compared to having only elementary school, formal female workers
earn 7.5% and 35% more if they have high school or more than high school, respectively.
This result suggest that in a similar way to male, female workers earn more with a higher
degree of education. However, magnitude of the premium is higher for females (35.4% vs.
27.4%). It is important to remember that women in Mexico still bear the traditional role
of housewives and their motivations to work are different from men. In this sample, of the
total of workers only 30% are women so this means that their marginal returns are higher
when they enter the labour market.
The results on the regional wage differences yield a wage penalty of 6.5% for formal
female workers living in the East compared to living in the centre. Women in formal jobs
also earn 5.0% lower wages when they use newspapers to get a job, which is consistent
with the effect for men and the pooled sample. The coefficient for the selection bias is sig-
nificant which suggest that women also self-select into formal jobs and earn 20.8% higher
wages that an identical women drawn at random.
19Although the informal sector does not adjust its wages following the national minimum wage standards,
it serves as a reference to this sector.
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Finally, for informal women the coefficient for more than high school suggests that
women earn 21.0% higher wages compared to only having elementary school. Looking
at the coefficient for the selection bias it can be concluded that women that select into
informal jobs experience a wage penalty of 19.1% compared to those drawn at random.
This result is consistent with the argument that female workers would sacrifice income for
other benefits offered by informal jobs.
1.6 Conclusions
The aim of this study was twofold: to disentangle the effects of a set of personal char-
acteristics and different search channels on the probability of an individual experiencing
a transition to different labour market states and to analyse the effect of these search
channels on the wages of formal and informal workers by gender.
Some interesting findings arise from the analysis of labour market transitions. The
results of the estimation reveal that there is a strong and positive correlation between
being formally employed and transitioning to employment in the formal sector in period
t+ 1. There is“wait unemployment” by highly skilled individuals given their higher reser-
vation wage and this makes them wait for an offer in the formal sector and discard those
offers from the informal sector. In comparison, less skilled individuals experience more
transitions to informal jobs. This result is confirmed by the positive impact of the variable
which captures if a person was previously a formal worker on two outcomes: remaining
unemployed and experiencing a transition into a formal job.
There are also gender differences when using the search channels. Women appear to
benefit more when using various types of search channels such as uploading or replying
to a job offer on-line, using newspaper or classified ads and allocation offices (public and
private). On the contrary, asking friends for recommendations seems to help male job
searchers more in securing informal jobs.
After correcting for the presence of selection bias in the estimation of the wages for
those that reported a transition into employment in t + 1. The results reveal that those
searching on-line for a job, experience a wage premium of 12.3% and 7.0% for formal and
informal jobs, respectively. On the other hand, those that secured a job via advertise-
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ments in newspapers experience a wage penalty of 5.24%. The wage premium of searching
on-line for jobs can be partly explained by the type of jobs that are advertised through
the web and that presumably are better paid. Alternatively, jobs advertised through the
newspaper are often low paid with temporary contracts so the wage penalty is a reflection
of the working conditions offered by these type of jobs.
Furthermore, the results are presented by gender. Male that search for formal jobs
on-line earn 16.2% higher wages but 4.9% and 9.2% lower wages, respectively, when using
newspaper or allocation services. On the other hand, formal female workers also earn 5.0%
lower wages when using the newspaper to search for jobs.
The results presented here shed light on the returns to job search used by workers who
exit into formal and informal jobs in Mexico. Moreover, there are differences in the re-
turns to job search by gender and not always the most used channels are the ones that are
helping unemployed workers secure high paid jobs. Higher paid jobs instead are secured
via the channels that correlate positively to the schooling level of the worker.
Although the informal sector employs approximately 60% of the total workforce and
contributes to almost 24% of the Gross Domestic Product, it is also well known that the
prevalence of the informal sector harms the tax base and this implies less government in-
come via taxes. The informal sector is characterized by low levels of productivity and no
innovation. Moreover, it is a subsistence level that emerged as a consequence of the inab-
ility of the formal sector to cope with the demand of employment from Mexican workers,
the difficulty for small firms to register as formal, the skill mismatch and in last instance
the preference of individuals. In this sense, reducing the informal sector has to be a result
of the combination of various policies that address all the factors that help to its pro-
liferation. There are already some programs in place such as the formalization program
from the International Labor Organization (ILO) but its effectiveness its heterogeneous
and depends on the structure already in place in every Mexican State.
Tables and figures
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for independent variables
Head of Household 0.65
Married or free union 0.56
Male 0.70
No financial cushion 0.94
No government aid 0.98
No Financial aid from friends or relatives 0.95
Previous job formal 0.45
Education
Elementary school 0.21
Secondary School 0.30
High School 0.22
More than high school 0.27
Reason for job loss
Dismissed of finished previous job 0.60
Dissatisfaction with previous job 0.31
Left or closed previous business 0.06
Other 0.03
Search Channel
Directly 0.74
On-line job advertisement 0.08
Advertisement 0.13
Social networks 0.14
Allocation service 0.04
Other forms of job search 0.04
Number of observations 30320
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Table 1.2: Multinomial Logit Estimation-Marginal and Impact Effects
Outcome employment status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployed Formal Informal Out of labour force
Gender 0.0578*** 0.0406*** 0.102*** -0.201***
(0.00511) (0.00483) (0.00624) (0.00591)
Married -0.0704*** 0.0173*** 0.0268*** 0.0263***
(0.00576) (0.00547) (0.00683) (0.00514)
Head of household -0.00757 0.0247*** 0.0617*** -0.0788***
(0.00672) (0.00651) (0.00785) (0.00561)
Elementary school -0.0845*** -0.0908*** 0.141*** 0.0343***
(0.00659) (0.00629) (0.00944) (0.00767)
Secondary school -0.0632*** -0.0180*** 0.0878*** -0.00657
(0.00614) (0.00604) (0.00831) (0.00638)
High School -0.0413*** 0.0109* 0.0115 0.0190***
(0.00648) (0.00657) (0.00888) (0.00686)
Previous job formal 0.0388*** 0.158*** -0.163*** -0.0342***
(0.00513) (0.00508) (0.00583) (0.00460)
Dismissed or finished previous job 0.0229*** 0.00234 0.0149** -0.0401***
(0.00538) (0.00497) (0.00644) (0.00499)
Left or closed previous business -0.00927 -0.0529*** 0.0789*** -0.0167*
(0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0138) (0.00960)
Other reasons for unemployment -0.00792 -0.0464*** 0.0432** 0.0111
(0.0153) (0.0131) (0.0173) (0.0133)
Financial cushion 0.00884 0.0304*** -0.0247** -0.0145
(0.00985) (0.00907) (0.0121) (0.00948)
Financial aid from government -0.0472*** -0.0332** -0.0181 0.0985***
(0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0189) (0.0163)
Financial aid from relatives 0.00791 -0.0249** -0.0197 0.0366***
(0.0113) (0.0101) (0.0129) (0.0106)
Went directly to the workplace 0.0105 0.0338*** -0.0210** -0.0233***
(0.00731) (0.00668) (0.00924) (0.00731)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online 0.0122 0.0225** -0.0262** -0.00847
(0.00961) (0.00944) (0.0121) (0.00904)
Used advertisement in newspaper 0.0335*** 0.0364*** -0.0423*** -0.0276***
(0.00790) (0.00768) (0.00906) (0.00661)
Asked friends or relatives to recommend a job -0.0251*** -0.0121 0.0311*** 0.00608
(0.00781) (0.00761) (0.00965) (0.00762)
Allocation services to get job (public of private) 0.0550*** 0.0368*** -0.0623*** -0.0295***
(0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0104)
Used other channels to find a job 0.00213 -0.0151 0.0284 -0.0154
(0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0173) (0.0122)
Region controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30320 30320 30320 30320
Pseudo R-squared 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.3: Multinomial Logit Estimation Male sample
outcome employment status
Unemployed Formal Informal Out of labour force
Married -0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗ -0.0684∗∗∗
(0.00809) (0.00740) (0.00958) (0.00623)
Head of household -0.0301∗∗∗ 0.00579 0.0361∗∗∗ -0.0118∗
(0.00880) (0.00812) (0.0104) (0.00693)
Elementary school -0.0899∗∗∗ -0.0923∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.00563
(0.00802) (0.00768) (0.0112) (0.00710)
Secondary school -0.0674∗∗∗ -0.0122 0.114∗∗∗ -0.0342∗∗∗
(0.00771) (0.00762) (0.0105) (0.00643)
High school -0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0204∗∗ 0.0243∗∗ -0.00122
(0.00818) (0.00845) (0.0114) (0.00701)
Previous job formal 0.0485∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.0354∗∗∗
(0.00632) (0.00627) (0.00721) (0.00477)
Dismissed or finished previous job 0.0178∗∗∗ -0.00692 0.0226∗∗∗ -0.0335∗∗∗
(0.00682) (0.00623) (0.00823) (0.00542)
Left or closed previous business -0.00459 -0.0516∗∗∗ 0.0842∗∗∗ -0.0280∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0168) (0.00884)
Other reasons for unemployment -0.00679 -0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0467∗∗ 0.00570
(0.0185) (0.0154) (0.0210) (0.0131)
Financial cushion 0.00984 0.0301∗∗∗ -0.0397∗∗∗ -0.000236
(0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0145) (0.00988)
Financial aid from government -0.0686∗∗∗ 0.0163 -0.0395 0.0918∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0255) (0.0302) (0.0238)
Financial aid from relatives 0.0103 -0.0377∗∗∗ -0.00785 0.0352∗∗∗
(0.0163) (0.0136) (0.0189) (0.0132)
Went directly to the work place 0.0115 0.0258∗∗∗ -0.0306∗∗∗ -0.00674
(0.00910) (0.00840) (0.0115) (0.00731)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online 0.00711 0.0137 -0.0286∗ 0.00785
(0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0160) (0.0105)
Used advertisement in newspaper 0.0460∗∗∗ 0.0347∗∗∗ -0.0660∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00946) (0.0115) (0.00722)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend job -0.0218∗∗ -0.0186∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.00951
(0.00949) (0.00895) (0.0117) (0.00759)
Allocation services to get job (public of private) 0.0496∗∗∗ 0.0246 -0.0538∗∗∗ -0.0204∗
(0.0167) (0.0155) (0.0192) (0.0117)
Used other channels to find a job 0.00700 -0.0202 0.0324 -0.0192
(0.0186) (0.0169) (0.0223) (0.0128)
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20648 20648 20648 20648
Pseudo R2 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4: Multinomial Logit Estimation Female sample
outcome employment status
Unemployed Formal Informal Our of labour force
1 if married or free union -0.0912∗∗∗ -0.0510∗∗∗ -0.0375∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.00868) (0.00840) (0.0101) (0.0115)
Head of household 0.0116 -0.00358 0.0547∗∗∗ -0.0627∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0143) (0.0144)
Elementary school -0.0688∗∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0164) (0.0180)
Secondary school -0.0521∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗
(0.00984) (0.00961) (0.0125) (0.0135)
High School -0.0368∗∗∗ -0.00684 -0.00716 0.0508∗∗∗
(0.00996) (0.0101) (0.0125) (0.0138)
Previous job formal 0.0200∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.110∗∗∗ -0.0418∗∗∗
(0.00832) (0.00835) (0.00938) (0.0102)
Dismissed or finished previous job 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗ -0.00660 -0.0387∗∗∗
(0.00840) (0.00793) (0.00949) (0.0101)
Left or closed previous business -0.0279 -0.0565∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0123
(0.0203) (0.0206) (0.0227) (0.0233)
Other reasons -0.0106 -0.0518∗∗ 0.0311 0.0314
(0.0260) (0.0226) (0.0272) (0.0304)
Financial cushion 0.00309 0.0205 0.0160 -0.0396∗
(0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0216) (0.0215)
Financial aid from government -0.0334∗ -0.0657∗∗∗ 0.00876 0.0904∗∗∗
(0.0194) (0.0171) (0.0212) (0.0241)
Financial aid from relatives 0.00492 -0.00686 -0.0287∗ 0.0306∗
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0153) (0.0184)
Went directly to the work place 0.00838 0.0425∗∗∗ -0.00210 -0.0488∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0106) (0.0140) (0.0157)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online 0.0193 0.0375∗∗ -0.0181 -0.0386∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0166) (0.0178)
Used advertisement in newspaper 0.0140 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.00403 -0.0568∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0137) (0.0141)
Asked relatives and friends to recommend job -0.0338∗∗ 0.00120 0.0293∗ 0.00333
(0.0133) (0.0141) (0.0167) (0.0175)
Allocation services to get job (public of private) 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0619∗∗∗ -0.0520∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0190) (0.0221)
Used other channels to find a job -0.00371 -0.00279 0.0299 -0.0234
(0.0220) (0.0225) (0.0250) (0.0259)
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9672 9672 9672 9672
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Effect on wages correcting for selection bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
OLS OLS Corrected Corrected
Age 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0365∗∗∗ 0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗
(0.00368) (0.00349) (0.00370) (0.00352)
Age squared -0.000311∗∗∗ -0.000451∗∗∗ -0.000282∗∗∗ -0.000441∗∗∗
(0.0000543) (0.0000479) (0.0000548) (0.0000480)
Gender 0.194∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0168) (0.0131) (0.0195)
Secondary School -0.00155 0.0365∗∗ -0.0296 0.0467∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0151) (0.0196) (0.0159)
High School 0.0722∗∗∗ 0.0533∗∗∗ 0.0402∗ 0.0791∗∗∗
(0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0215) (0.0229)
More than High school 0.326∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0275)
North region 0.0207 0.0268 -0.00442 0.0320∗
(0.0144) (0.0172) (0.0156) (0.0173)
West region 0.0109 0.0404∗ 0.00672 0.0355∗
(0.0202) (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0210)
East region -0.0253 -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0196 -0.117∗∗∗
(0.0233) (0.0196) (0.0234) (0.0204)
South region 0.0435∗∗ -0.0456∗∗ 0.0421∗∗ -0.0566∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0181) (0.0208) (0.0190)
Went directly to the work place -0.00474 -0.0300 -0.00593 -0.0297
(0.0176) (0.0214) (0.0176) (0.0214)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online 0.127∗∗∗ 0.0685∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.0709∗
(0.0261) (0.0411) (0.0261) (0.0411)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job -0.0506∗∗∗ -0.0105 -0.0524∗∗∗ -0.00759
(0.0168) (0.0216) (0.0168) (0.0216)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job 0.0218 -0.0253 0.0269 -0.0281
(0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0198) (0.0213)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) 0.0116 -0.0505 0.00817 -0.0474
(0.0282) (0.0404) (0.0280) (0.0405)
Used other channels to find a job -0.00996 0.0141 -0.0120 0.0123
(0.0409) (0.0433) (0.0409) (0.0432)
imr2 -0.109∗∗∗
(0.0249)
imr3 -0.0732∗∗
(0.0360)
Constant 7.540∗∗∗ 7.131∗∗∗ 7.743∗∗∗ 7.227∗∗∗
(0.0633) (0.0644) (0.0791) (0.0801)
Observations 5956 10269 5956 10269
R2 0.168 0.085 0.170 0.086
Standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped with 500 replications
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Effect on wages controlling for selection bias by gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Male Male Female Female
Age 0.0380∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗
(0.00420) (0.00377) (0.00835) (0.0101)
Age squared -0.000368∗∗∗ -0.000473∗∗∗ -0.000274∗∗ -0.000578∗∗∗
(0.0000612) (0.0000509) (0.000133) (0.000146)
Secondary school -0.0219 0.0662∗∗∗ -0.0311 -0.0214
(0.0228) (0.0168) (0.0355) (0.0463)
High school 0.0282 0.0797∗∗∗ 0.0756∗∗ 0.0314
(0.0254) (0.0249) (0.0382) (0.0590)
More than high school 0.274∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0312) (0.0400) (0.0637)
North region -0.00599 0.0374∗∗ -0.00175 0.00918
(0.0183) (0.0188) (0.0303) (0.0426)
West region 0.0337 0.0421∗ -0.0471 0.0186
(0.0249) (0.0231) (0.0342) (0.0494)
East region -0.00283 -0.120∗∗∗ -0.0656∗ -0.0790
(0.0291) (0.0224) (0.0381) (0.0491)
South region 0.0616∗∗ -0.0445∗∗ -0.0170 -0.0631
(0.0247) (0.0206) (0.0377) (0.0470)
Went directly to the work place -0.00230 -0.0361 -0.0106 -0.0258
(0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0286) (0.0463)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online 0.162∗∗∗ 0.0424 0.0585 0.102
(0.0361) (0.0525) (0.0357) (0.0659)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job -0.0494∗∗ -0.0136 -0.0506∗ 0.00637
(0.0213) (0.0245) (0.0263) (0.0450)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job 0.0341 -0.0362 0.00275 -0.0328
(0.0240) (0.0237) (0.0342) (0.0498)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) -0.00273 -0.0921∗ 0.0302 0.0658
(0.0376) (0.0475) (0.0388) (0.0768)
Used other channels to find a job -0.0223 0.0135 0.0158 0.0278
(0.0527) (0.0497) (0.0632) (0.0843)
imr2 -0.0978∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0497)
imr3 -0.112∗∗∗ 0.170∗
(0.0393) (0.0900)
Constant 7.742∗∗∗ 7.535∗∗∗ 8.005∗∗∗ 7.050∗∗∗
(0.0890) (0.0808) (0.154) (0.199)
Observations 4214 8018 1742 2251
R2 0.164 0.043 0.161 0.057
Standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped with 500 replications
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
Duration of unemployment and
transitions into formal and
informal jobs in Mexico
2.1 Introduction
Compared to other OECD countries, Mexico’s unemployment rate is low (3.74% on av-
erage since year 2000). This can be explained by the presence of a large informal sector.
Having low rates of unemployment means that individuals do not remain unemployed for
long, as the alternatives to choose from within a dual labour market are plenty.
The duality of the Mexican labour market provides an interesting framework to analyze
the channels through which individuals exit unemployment into formal or informal jobs,
and to what extent these channels, in conjunction with personal characteristics, affect the
duration of unemployment. This type of analysis provides a greater understanding of the
dynamics of labour supply and how workers manage to secure jobs that presumably match
their personal characteristics and preferences. The literature has analyzed how different
search channels impact on exits out of unemployment, duration and the type of job se-
cured and have detected mixed results (Addison and Portugal, 2002; Woltermann, 2002;
Ma´rquez and Ruiz-Tagle, 2004; Caldero´n-Madrid, 2008; Meliciani and Radicchia, 2011;
Iriarte, 2017). This study contributes to this literature by examining the overall effects of
a set of personal characteristics, search channels and financial variables on the duration
of unemployment. Moreover, this analysis is undertaken for Mexico, a country where the
majority of workers are employed as informal, and hence do not have access to lump-sum
42
payments to finance long periods of job search.
Using micro-level labour market data for Mexico the overall effects of a set of personal
characteristics, search channels and financial variables1 on the duration of unemployment
are analyzed. The analysis is then enriched to account for individual-level heterogen-
eity in the estimation because its omission may lead to biased estimates (Jenkins, 2005).
Moreover, given the dual nature of the labour market in Mexico, where individuals exit
into formal or informal jobs, a multiple destination or a competing risks model is also
estimated.
Given the self-reported information of the survey I am able to address the following
research questions: What is the impact of different channels to find a job, as well as the
means by which a person finances job search, on the duration of unemployment? In par-
ticular, what is the impact on unemployment duration of a person that exits into a formal
or informal job?
Studies of similar nature, conclude that two of the most used search channels are going
directly to the workplace and asking friends or relatives to recommend a job. Frequently,
these are also the most effective channels for securing a job (Addison and Portugal, 2002;
Woltermann, 2002; Ma´rquez and Ruiz-Tagle, 2004; Caldero´n-Madrid, 2008; Meliciani and
Radicchia, 2011). However, the type of jobs that are secured through these channels do
not always match workers’ personal characteristics and lead to low paid jobs given their
temporary nature and that the jobs are targeted to low skilled workers (Addison and
Portugal, 2002; Iriarte, 2017). Also, there is negative duration dependence which might
be interpreted by employers as a “scarring effect”. The concept of a “scarring effect” or
“unlearning by not doing” can be interpreted as the longer an individual remains unem-
ployed, the less likely is a hire. This to some extent indicates that the individual’s skills
depreciate with time (Lockwood, 1991; Serneels, 2008).
Some interesting facts arise from the estimation of the duration of unemployment in
Mexico. Using a discrete duration model and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity,
1The financial variables as already noted in chapter 1 of this thesis, refer to having access to income
via government assistance (via training scholarships, aid from a government program and financial aid to
start a new business), receiving cash transfer from relatives either in Mexico or abroad and a lump sum
payment from a previous job.
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the duration of unemployment is found to be lower for those that were previously informal
workers compared to formal ones. Interpreting the result from a different perspective, it
can be concluded that there is presence of “wait unemployment”2 for those that are formal
workers.
The coefficients for the variables measuring the presence of a financial cushion yield
mixed results. On the one hand, those that had access to a lump sum payment from a
previous job, experience shorter unemployment durations. On the other, those receiving
support from a government program and support from friends and relatives experience
longer unemployment periods. The results of the multiple destination model allow us to
further understand that the shorter durations for those in possession of a lump sum pay-
ment happens when they exit into formal jobs. Also that government programs, via cash
transfers and training programs, reduce the time until job searchers exit the labour force,
this means that it increases the likelihood of this individual stopping active job search.
Similarly, the Mexican household structure permits longer period of job search.
Regarding the search channels, going directly to the workplace and searching for jobs
via newspaper reduce the unemployment duration for those exiting into a formal job. Ask-
ing friends and relatives helps job searchers to reduce the time unemployed before securing
an informal job for both male and female. The use of other channels rather than reducing
the time unemployed, seem to prolong it. Both the single and multiple destination model
permit us to conclude that search channels do not seem to be important determinants of
unemployment durations for analyzed sample. Duration of unemployment is determined
largely by personal characteristics and previous working experience. The results presented
here are robust after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.2 the existing literature on
search channels, job outcomes in developed and developing countries, and unemployment
duration is reviewed. In section 2.3, the data are described and summary statistics presen-
ted. In section 2.4 the econometric methodology is detailed and in section 2.5 the empirical
results are presented. Section 2.6 provides some conclusions.
2This is that formal workers decide to remain unemployed until a job considered by them as “good”
arrives, instead of taking an informal job. For a detailed discussion of this in the context of a job market,
where preference by highly skilled workers is given to jobs in the public sector in Pakistan, see Reilly and
Hyder (2006).
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2.2 Literature Review
Unemployment duration has been studied extensively in the labour economics literature,
efforts have been put in trying to understand the factors that allow an unemployed in-
dividual to escape unemployment faster and to what extent there is a “scarring effect”.
The more the worker remains unemployed the less likely it is to find a job.3 Long peri-
ods of unemployment may indicate low productivity due to the depreciation of skills that
unemployment spells bring about. Hence, the searcher is less likely to be hired by firms.
Employers often use this information to sort “good” from “bad” workers (Lockwood, 1991;
Arulampalam, 2001).
The conjunction of personal characteristics and the different channels and ways to fin-
ance job search and intensity have an effect on the time unemployed. Using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1969 to 1976, Bong Joon (1981) analyse
the duration of unemployment in the US and how the cost of job search impacts this. The
results of the estimation, confirm that increasing unit costs of search intensity leads to
longer unemployment duration. Although this study provides insights on the importance
of the intensity and costs of job search, it does not shed light on the type of search channels
used by unemployed individuals.
The nature of the job search process is endogenous, as a given person would choose the
best strategies or means to find a job in the least possible time and also without incurring
high costs. We can think of a situation where it is cheaper to send cv’s on-line than to
pay travel costs to deliver the document directly to the firm. Kuhn and Skuterud (2004)
test for the incidence and diffusion of internet job search by investigating who searches for
jobs online and the outcomes of looking for a job through this channel. The authors use
a probit model to control for observable characteristics in the outcome of job search and
with internet option as a search variable, they conclude that Internet job search is more
common among workers with observed characteristics that are usually associated with
more rapid re-employment (i.e., occupations with low unemployment rates, young and
well educated workers and persons that became unemployed after finishing school or had
previous job experience). They also use duration analysis to investigate whether internet
job search has an impact on diminishing the unemployment duration and find that it does
3See Narendranathan and Elias (1993) and Arulampalam et al. (2000) for a detailed analysis of the
“scarring effect” for the UK labour market.
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not appear to decrease search time. In fact, it appears to prolong the time of job search.
Addison and Portugal (2002) using Portugal’s Labour Force Survey, assess the effects
of different job search strategies on the escape rates from unemployment, and measure the
effectiveness of the job search strategies on obtaining a job. They find evidence indicating
that the most successful methods in finding a job are approaching directly the employer
and informal methods (i.e., friends and family networks). The authors use a discrete time
duration model where a discrete hazard function describes the conditional probability of
an individual exiting unemployment at interval t, given that a person remained unem-
ployed until time t. They find that direct applications to employers, taking examinations
and self employment decreases the time unemployed, compared to other channels used.
The channels used for job search can be further subdivided into formal and informal
ones. Presumably there are certain channels that would be more effective in ensuring
a job offer given a worker’s characteristics and the desire to access these type of jobs
and this is associated with shorter duration of unemployment. Ma´rquez and Ruiz-Tagle
(2004) suggest that workers who come from formal jobs are more likely to use more formal
methods relative to those originating from jobs in non-regulated segments of the labour
market. Using a logit model and the Venezuelan Household Survey, they analyze the im-
pact of a set of different search strategies in determining whether a worker will experience
a transition into employment. They conclude that previous job status (being employed or
unemployed) has a dominant impact on transitions into employment.
The study by Meliciani and Radicchia (2011) investigate if being recruited through
informal channels in the Italian labour market has both a wage penalty for job searchers
and affects the duration spells of unemployment, thus reducing search costs. They divide
these search channels into friends and relatives and professional ties. Estimating a Min-
cerian wage equation and controlling for observable characteristics, they find there is a
wage penalty for those hired through the friends and family channels and a wage premium
for those hired through professional ties. They use duration analysis to address search
cost reductions and find that the use of these search channels reduce the average spell of
unemployment.
For Mexico, the paper by Caldero´n-Madrid (2008) investigates the unemployment dur-
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ation of job searchers in the Mexican labour market and also analyses the effectiveness of
different search channels. Using survival models, Caldero´n finds that those that relied on
social and family networks were more effective in reducing the time until a worker secures
an informal job and the searching for a job via newspapers and the internet reduce the
time of unemployment for those securing a formal job. However, this paper does not ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation and imposes a Cox baseline hazard
which is a general way of modelling the unemployment duration of individuals.
The use of a combination of different search methods does not always result in shorter
unemployment spells. The main reason for this is that a worker must devote the time
and resources to this process, hence it becomes costly. In this sense, Keeley and Robins
(1985) findings for the US suggest that the most productive forms of job search are those
associated with direct employer contacts, as these measures are most strongly associated
with unemployment durations. But the more methods individuals use, the longer their
duration of unemployment. The latter suggests that unemployed individuals using few
channels of job search intensively have shorter durations of unemployment compared to
those who use many methods in a less intensive way.
The search intensity and search channels used can also vary depending on personal
characteristics and the type of job a worker is looking for. For example, Weber and
Mahringer (2002), find that, on average, unemployed individuals use two methods of job
search for case of Austria. They find that search effort decreases with age and that more
educated individuals search harder compared to lower educated ones. Going directly to
the workplace accounts for more than half of the jobs found. Moreover, they find no signi-
ficant effect on the hazard of leaving unemployment of increasing search effort and higher
wages offers.
The probability of securing a job and the duration of unemployment is also affected
by social and economic policy. In this way, unemployment insurance is the most common
of these programs but is not exclusive. However, it has been found that this prolongs job
search as individuals wait for better employment opportunities compared to not having
any sort of financial help. (see Meyer, 1990; Addison and Portugal, 2002; Caliendo et al.,
2013). However, unemployment insurance or any other type of government program must
be properly implemented to avoid creating a scarring effect. There is evidence that some
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programs might have a negative effect on employment and there might be gender effects
when these programs target women only Iturriza et al. (2011).
The empirical evidence to date of the duration of unemployment for formal and in-
formal job searchers is scarce. It is important to address this phenomena to understand
the dynamics and interaction between these two sectors. There is evidence for the case of
Bolivia a labour market which is characterized by having a larger share of informal workers
compared to Mexico. Canavire and Casazola (2006) suggests that informal workers with
higher schooling levels experience longer unemployment durations given their higher reser-
vation wages. On the contrary, indigenous workers with lower schooling levels experience
shorter unemployment durations because their reservation wage is lower.
For the case of Argentina Canavire and Lima (2009) presents empirical evidence that
the duration of unemployment for formal and informal workers is determined by the school-
ing level. More schooling level implies longer duration of unemployment. Moreover, the
lack of access to schools and universities explains the restriction to the mobility from in-
formal to formal jobs.
It is important to highlight that in developing countries often informal labour markets
are used as a transitory state to finance job search and ensure a better job match in the
formal labour market. Presumably duration of unemployment before entering this sector is
shorter compared to the formal sector given that, as explained above, reservation wages are
lower for informal jobs. This can contribute to the understanding of another dimension to
the segmentation or dualism of the labour market that has been discussed in the literature.
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the proportion of workers that have preferences
for informal jobs is not trivial (Alcaraz et al., 2012). Simultaneously, there is a propor-
tion of workers wanting to enter formal jobs and who use informal jobs to finance a longer
job search. It is hoped the empirical analysis presented here will shed light on these issues.
2.3 Mexican Labour market and Data
As noted in the previous chapter, the Mexican labour market is comprised of formal and
informal jobs. It is important in this context to differentiate between these two sectors.
A worker is formal if it has access to public social security and health services provided
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by the government. Otherwise, it is considered informal, even if it works for a formally
registered firm.
Being a formal worker in Mexico comes with fringe benefits that are partly financed
by payroll taxes. These are provided mainly by the two major health institutions IMSS
and ISSSTE and consist of health care, life insurance, housing loans, retirement pension
and severance payment.4 In contrast, workers in informal jobs do not have a legal right
to any of these fringe benefits. Their work conditions and wages are a matter of personal
agreement between the employer and employee in this case.
Although the benefits that come with being formally employed surpass those of being
informal, the majority of Mexican workers are informal. This topic is debatable and there
are many competing hypothesis of why this is the case. On the one hand, some ague that
being informal is simply a personal choice and reflects preference for the characteristics of
informal jobs. These are flexibility of working hours, proximity to the place of residence
or avoiding paying taxes (Maloney, 1999, 2004; Bargain and Kwenda, 2010; Alcaraz et al.,
2012; Gu¨nther and Launov, 2012). On the other hand, it is argued that the segmentation
of the labour market or the restrictions to access formal jobs, fuels the informal sector and
that this is a result of market inefficiencies (Serneels, 2008; Mondrago´n-Vele´z et al., 2010).
However, this analysis focuses only on the duration of unemployment before transition into
formal and informal jobs and contributes to this debate only in the sense that it provides
additional insights on the determinants of duration across these two sectors.
During the period of analysis here (2005-2015), there is no unemployment insurance
in Mexico at the national level. The lack of a way of financing job search creates the
conditions for the rapid transitions out of unemployment or into the informal sector to
secure an income whilst finding a suitable job. In this sense, figure 2.1 plots the duration
of unemployment for this period. The majority of job searchers do not spend more than
three months searching for a job and this holds true even during times of economic down-
turn. This can be observed in the graph for the period of the great recession in the late
2008, the proportion shrinks but it is still larger compared to workers who spend more
time searching for jobs.
4IMSS provides social security and health services to workers employed in the private sector whilst
ISSSTE provides these services to workers in the public sector.
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The fact that transitions into employment are relatively fast makes it worth analyz-
ing what are the factors contributing to these rapid transitions. The contribution of this
chapter then is to analyze the different factors that contribute to these quick transitions
between the unemployment pool and the formal and informal sectors.
To perform the analysis in this paper, a period of ten years (2005-2015) of the Mexican
National Employment Survey (ENOE in Spanish) is used. This survey constitutes a na-
tionally representative random sample of individuals. The National Institute of Statistics
and Geography (INEGI) asks respondents in this survey about different socio-economic
characteristics and their current and past employment status. Two types of questionnaires
are used in this survey: the basic and the extended version. The basic version is used in
the second to fourth quarters of each year and the extended version is only used in the
first quarter of each year. The questions reflect worker’s previous activity including job
search and the duration of their unemployment, which is central to the analysis here.
The extended version contains the duration of job search indicator, which reflects the
time the individual spent searching for a job prior to interview and is divided into 5 cat-
egories: up to one month, more than one but less than three months, more than three
but less than six months, more than six months but less than a year and more than a
year searching. Given that the duration variable categorizes the duration by months, the
variable is instead recoded to reflect weeks of job search. 5 The duration variable then
has a minimum of 4 weeks and a maximum of 53 weeks. It also contains questions on
issues such as financial and other types of support. The objective of this is to capture if
a person receives any form of financial aid from the government or from friends and rel-
atives regardless of their employment status. As the sample represents only unemployed
job searchers, it is of interest to determine if this aid (pecuniary or not) assist a person in
exiting unemployment. Given that both the unemployment duration and the information
on financial aid is only given in the first quarter of each year, the analysis is restricted to
the first two quarters of the period (2005-2015).
The survey includes questions regarding the job search channel used by individuals
prior to the interview.6 These questions are asked in both surveys (basic and exten-
ded) and they capture the alternative search methods used by job searchers. Answers
5This was done simply multiplying the month times four weeks.
6For the case of those that are in their second interview onwards this period becomes a quarter.
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are divided into 11 categories and are not mutually exclusive. The categories comprise:
directly, private placement agency, government placement agency, temporal job govern-
ment program, formalities to start a new business, on-line job advertisement, published
or answered a newspaper or other printed source advertisement, went to a union or guild,
asked relatives to recommend or inform about a job, check advertisements on newspapers
and others. Due to the broad similarity between categories the responses were merged
into six categories in the following way: Ask for job directly, on-line job advertisement,
Advertisement (printed, newspaper, radio, television), Friends and relatives, Allocation
service (public and private allocation service, went to union or guild), Other (temporal
job, arrangements to start a new business and other).
The survey contains questions that permits the identification of sources of income to
finance job search. According to the questions, income comes from three main sources:
financial aid from friends and relatives, financial aid from a government program and in-
come after employment (e.g. severance payment). Financial aid from friends can come
from: someone abroad, someone in another Mexican state or someone in the same state.
In the same way, aid from government may come from the following sources: fellowship,
financial aid to start a new business, financial aid from any other government program.
Finally, income after employment can come from, either a severance payment, sale of a
former business, a retirement pension, unemployment insurance7 or private unemployment
insurance.
As the number of people that did not have access to any of the three sources of income
to finance job search is relatively low, the categories are merged to create three binary
variables that capture whether they had access to the income or not. Hence, a zero cap-
tures if a person did not have access and a 1 if the person did.
Finally, the survey is a rotating panel of five interviews and for the purpose of the ana-
lysis I only considered those individuals that by the first quarter of 2011 were in their first
to fourth interviews, as this allows tracking them to the next quarter of the survey. These
individuals state that by the first quarter they were unemployed and actively looking for
a job. In this way I also exclude all those that appear only in one quarter of the sample
to get a balanced sample and only retain those cases that had previous job experience.8
7This applies to those living in Mexico City and that have access to this benefit.
8As in the previous chapter, I dropped those that stated that they did not have job experience because
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Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics for the sample. It has been divided by gender,
because it is of interest to view duration of unemployment separately and to compare dif-
ferences. From the table, the proportion of male job searchers that are head of household
is more than twice the proportion of woman. Half of the job searchers are married but
only 31% of the females are.
The sample is evenly distributed among educational categories, although it is worth
mentioning that on average the proportion of females with higher degrees is larger than
males. The proportion of job searchers receiving any form of financial support to finance
job search is quite low among all the categories. Those that were previously employed as
formal workers account for 43% of males and 49% of females.
Regarding the search channels, the most used channel for both male and female is
going directly to the workplace. However, for the rest there are some differences. Females
search more via the advertisements in newspapers and on-line. Males, on the other hand,
search more via friends and also via newspaper ads.
The indicator of duration of job search is also included in the table. Half of the job
searchers have been looking for a job for less than a month by the time of the first inter-
view and if we consider the second category, almost 90% of the job searchers have been
looking for a job for less than 3 months.
In this paper the dynamics of labour market transitions in the Mexican context are
explored. This analysis is necessarily descriptive as there is a lack of a exogenous variation
that impacts unemployment spells. Despite this drawback, understanding the dynamics of
Mexican worker’s transitions is useful to inform policy makers if the policies implemented
to promote certain types of search channels is reaching the target individuals and in what
magnitude this is helping them to secure jobs efficiently (and in a relative short period
of time). These results are further subdivided to analyse how the set of policies differ
between male and female job searchers.
I could not distinguish between those having no work experience and those that did not report whether
they had experience or not, this only constitutes 7% of the total sample.
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2.4 Econometric Methodology
2.4.1 Failure time distribution
Under the failure time data setting, T is always a nonnegative random variable that
represents the failure of an individual taken from an homogeneous population. Following
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), the probability distribution is specified in three ways that
apply to the survival setting: the survivor function, the probability density function and
the hazard function. The survivor function is defined by the probability that T exceeds a
value t and can be expressed as:
F (t) = P (T > t), 0 < t <∞
In order to analyze the transitions from unemployment into employment in the Mexican
labour market, and given that the information regarding job search is recorded in weeks,
a discrete time duration model is specified. Discrete duration modelling is particularly
useful in this context, as the responses from workers are grouped in a certain number of
weeks but the exact time of the week is unknown. With T being a discrete random variable
that takes the values a1 < a2 < ... and that has an associated probability function.
f(ai) = P (T = ai), i = 1, 2, ...,
The survivor function is
F (t) =
∑
j|aj>t
f(aj)
The hazard is defined as the conditional probability of failing at point ai conditioned
on the job searcher surviving until ai and can be expressed as:
λi = P (T = ai|T ≥ ai) = f(ai)
F (a−i )
, i = 1, 2, ...,
Where F (a−) = limt→a−F (t). Hence, the survivor function and the probability density
function are given by
F (t) =
∏
j|aj≤t
(1− λj) (2.1)
and
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f(ai) = λi
i−1∏
j=1
(1− λj) (2.2)
The discrete hazard function (λi = 1, 2, ...) uniquely determines the distribution of
the failure time variable T . Given that the interest of this analysis is to calculate the
duration of unemployment conditioned on remaining unemployed up to time t but also on
covariates x, following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), a proportional hazards model (ph) is
specified.
λ(t|x) = λ0(t, α)φ(x, β) (2.3)
The expression λ0(t, α) is commonly known as the baseline hazard which is a function
of t. And φ(x, β) is a function of x. Equation (2.3) implies that the hazard rate can be
factored into separate functions of that same type. Hazard functions λ(t|x) similar to
equation (2.3) are proportional to the baseline hazard with a scale factor φ(x, β) that is
not an explicit function of t.
2.4.2 Discrete-time Proportional Hazards Model
In this setting the hazard within the interval is assumed to be constant. For discrete time
data9 with grouping points ta, a = 1, ..., A, the discrete-time hazard function is defined by
λd(ta|x) = Pr[ta−1 ≤ T < ta|T ≥ ta−1, x(ta−1)], a = 1, ..., A. (2.4)
And the associated discrete-time survivor function is
Sd(ta|x) = Pr[T ≥ ta−1|x] =
a−1∏
s=1
(1− λd(ts|x(ts))) (2.5)
The discrete-time hazard is the probability of failure in [ta−1, ta) divided by the prob-
ability of surviving to at least time ta−1 and this can be written as
λd(ta|x) = S(ta−1|x)− S(ta|x)
S(ta−1|x) (2.6)
9For a detailed development of the discrete time duration model see Lunde et al. (1999) and Prentice
and Gloeckler (1978)
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Where S(t|x) is the survivor function. The (instantaneous) hazard rate function is
assumed to take the proportional hazards form
λ(t) = λ0(t)exp(x(ta−1)′β) (2.7)
For t in [ta−1, ta). Finally, the associated discrete-time survivor function is
Sd(ta|x) =
a−1∏
s=1
exp(−exp(lnλ0s + x(ts−1)′β)) (2.8)
The density for the ith job searcher is a result of the product of the survivor function in
each week that the individual remains unemployed times the hazard at the time of failure.
The likelihood then is written as
L(β, λ01, ..., λ0A) =
N∏
i=1
[
ai−1∏
s=1
exp(−exp(lnλ0s + xi(ts−1)′β))
]
× (1− exp(−exp(lnλ0ai + xi(ta−1)′β))), (2.9)
In equation (2.9) transition out of unemployment is assumed to happen at time tai
for the ith worker. And at least one failure is assumed to occur in each interval of time
[ta−1, ta).
2.4.3 Unobserved Heterogeneity
In the analysis of the duration of unemployment spells, one has to take into account the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity. More specifically, observed heterogeneity refers to
differences between job searchers that are measured by regressors and unobserved hetero-
geneity refers to factors that are not accounted for in the regression (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005). Ignoring this problem in duration analysis can lead to several issues: the non-frailty
model can over-estimate the negative duration dependence in the (true) baseline hazard
and underestimate positive duration dependence. According to Jenkins (2005) this is a
selection effect because, ceteris paribus, for the case of negative duration dependence,
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individuals with high values of unobserved differences fail faster, so the survivors are in-
creasingly composed of observations with relative low values of unobserved differences and
thence, lower hazard rates.
Another issue that can arise from ignoring unobserved heterogeneity in the regression
is that the proportionate effect of a given regressor on the hazard rate is no longer constant
nor independent of survival time. Finally, having unobserved heterogeneity attenuates the
proportionate response of the hazard to variation in each regressor at any survival time.
This is that the estimate of a positive (negative) βk derived from an incorrect non-frailty
model will under-estimate (over-estimate) the ‘true’ estimate. Following Rodrıguez (2005)
unobserved heterogeneity is introduced in the hazard via a random variable θ. This model
in its general form is called proportional hazards model with a frailty term as follows:
λ(t, x, θ) = θλ0(t)e
x′β
Where θ is the random effect with mean zero and a distribution that is independent
of the observed covariates x. t is the hazard at the time for an given individual. The
estimation of this model is done following Heckman and Singer (1984) which assumes a
non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE) of the distribution of frailty θ.
The model takes values θ1, θ2, ..., θk with probabilities pi1, pi2, ...pik for some value of k. In
this case with k = 2 and a non-parametric distribution of the baseline hazard.
2.4.4 Competing risk specification
Given the structure of the Mexican labour market, where individuals that experience a
transition into employment exit to either formal or informal jobs or simply exit the labour
force. It is of interest to expand the single risk analysis into a competing risk setting.
Measuring the different durations of unemployment before exiting into each of these la-
bour market states will shed light on the dynamics of the Mexican labour market and
the factors contributing to their hazard. Moreover, it is important not just to include the
unemployed but also the category “out of the labour force” because the motivations to
stop searching for a job completely that are implied here, are different from just remain-
ing unemployed. Often the motivation to choose one category over the other come from
the way the household is structured. For example, it is common to have more than one
family with its respective head of household living under the same roof and sharing the
same living expenses. Under this circumstance, if a member of the household becomes
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unemployed the economic burden for the household becomes less given that other member
of his family and the other family sharing the house can help finance a longer job search
or might even stop completely for the case of female workers.
The competing risk setting is of particular use in this context as job searchers either
remain unemployed or exit into three different labour market states: formal job, informal
job or out of the labour force. In this way, each destination-specific hazard rate is con-
sidered independent, because this follows the assumption that transition to other labour
market states is not possible. In this sense, hazard rates of every labour market state
are ‘latent’ rather than actually observed (Jenkins, 2005). Under this scenario, the dis-
crete hazard rate for exit at time j to any of the destinations, would be the sum of the
destination-specific discrete hazard rates.10
h(j) = hF (j) + hI(j) + hO(j)
Due to the nature of the weekly duration data (being intrinsically discrete), when an
individual experiences a transition into any of the labour market states in the second
quarter of 2011, the individual cannot experience a transition into another labour market
state in the same quarter. Following Jenkins (2005), the likelihood contributions for the
discrete time model in this particular setting, are of four types, each one corresponding to
every labour market state and those considered as censored (unemployed):
LF = hF (j)S(j − 1)
=
[ hF (j)
1− h(j)
]
S(j)
=
[ hF (j)
1− hF (j)− hI(j)− hO(j)
]
S(j)
10The subindices in the equation indicate if an individual experiences a transition into a Formal (F),
Informal (I) job or Out of the labour force (O).
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Similarly,
LI = hI(j)S(j − 1)
=
[ hI(j)
1− h(j)
]
S(j)
=
[ hF (j)
1− hF (j)− hI(j)− hO(j)
]
S(j)
LO = hO(j)S(j − 1)
=
[ hO(j)
1− h(j)
]
S(j)
=
[ hF (j)
1− hF (j)− hI(j)− hO(j)
]
S(j)
and finally,
LU = S(j)
Given that the common term among each of the likelihood contributions is Si(j). The
expressions can grouped in the following way:
S(j) =
j∏
k=1
[1− h(k)] =
j∏
k=1
[1− hF (k)− hI(k)− hO(k)]
This likelihood has the same form as the likelihood for a standard multinomial logit
model with re-organized data (Jenkins, 2005).
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Non-parametric duration analysis
The dataset has to be arranged to facilitate the analysis of discrete time duration, follow-
ing Jenkins (2005). For each person there are as many rows as there are time intervals at
risk of becoming employed per individual. If a person has been searching for a job for 4
weeks, the contribution to the dataset will be of 4 rows of data observations. Additionally
a spell week identifier has to be created, which is equal to zero for the weeks unemployed
and will be equal to one in the last week to indicate that the person exited unemployment.
If the person is still unemployed then the variable will be equal to zero in all the rows.
The failure estimates are now calculated with the discrete time duration dataset and
plotted to get a visual representation and compare between different subsamples. These
represent the probability of becoming employed conditional on the time unemployed from
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t to t + 1, without specifying any particular functional form or including any covariates
in the estimation (Dendir, 2006; Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles, 2010). This is to get
an idea of how the failure rates “behave” for the sample of job searchers analysed. It is
confirmed graphically in figure 2.2 that almost 50% of the initial sample of unemployed
becomes employed after 12 weeks and almost 74% just after 26 weeks of job search.11
The differences in failure rates dividing by groups of the subsample are now compared.
Figure 2.3a provides graphic evidence of the failure rates by gender. It can be observed
that a larger proportion of males become employed quicker than their female counterparts.
During the first four weeks of job search almost 30% of males become employed, whereas
just 24% of females become employed. During 26 weeks of job search, more than 75% of
males exit unemployment and approximately 60% of females have secured a job.
Figure 2.3b provides the estimates separated by formal and informal jobs. A majority
of unemployed individuals exit faster into informal compared to formal jobs.12 After four
weeks of job search, more than 50% exit into informal jobs but less than 20% secure a
formal job. Additionally after 12 weeks of job search of those unemployed more than 80%
transition into an informal job and less than 20% get a formal job. In figure 2.4a the failure
rates for females is plotted by type of job. The pattern shown now again is of a larger
proportion of unemployed exiting into informal jobs. Figure 2.4b plots the failure rates
for males and more males exit into informal jobs than formal ones. These graphs show
clearly that there are differences in the failure rates by gender and that these differences
are larger when dividing the sample by the type of job. Evidence is provided here of a
lower reservation wage for informal workers compared to those aspiring to secure a formal
job. Whether this is the result of barriers to entry to formal jobs or simply a choice of the
individual, cannot be identified from the results presented here.
The visual representation of the difference in failure rates can be confirmed formally
with a test of equality of survivor functions. Table 2.2 displays the Log rank test, the
Wilcoxon-Breslow and the Tarone-Ware tests. As the table shows, all three tests re-
11I use the term job search indistinctly to refer to unemployment in period t because respondents of the
survey were explicitly asked their duration of unemployment without job search interruption.
12This result is consistent with other studies for countries with a large presence of an informal sector and
which suggest that the lower reservation wage of informal workers reduces their duration of unemployment
see Canavire and Casazola (2006) and Canavire and Lima (2009).
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ject the null hypothesis of equality between the different groups tested.13 The difference
between average duration of unemployment by gender and the choice of sector motivates
our interest to estimate the discrete duration proportional hazards model dividing the
sample by gender and sector.
2.5.2 Non-parametric analysis under a discrete time framework
To undertake the econometric analysis of unemployment duration, a single spell, discrete
time proportional hazard (ph) model with non-parametric baseline hazard is used. The
model estimated is due to Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and uses a maximum likelihood
methodology following the method proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984). The non-
parametric baseline hazard is used as this is data coherent and widely used when estimating
discrete time models. It takes into account (weekly) duration and personal characteristics
such as age, head of household status, marital status and schooling.14
Specifically for our analysis, the model includes other factors that might influence dur-
ation dependence, such as the person having access to a lump sum payment that acts as
a financial cushion for job search, government aid to find a job, financial support from
friends or relatives, if the previous job was informal or not, reasons for quitting a former
job and regional controls.15 Finally, controls for search channels used during job search
have been included.16 The model yields the hazard probability of finding a job in time
t+ 1, conditional on remaining unemployed until time t.
Table 2.3 presents the results for the pooled sample and gender, and table 2.4 presents
the results by gender and sector of employment. Being married and being head of house-
hold increases the hazard of exiting unemployment. The result is consistent when dividing
the sample between formal and informal workers and gender in both tables 2.3 and 2.4.
13Given that the survivor function is the mirror of the failure function, the tests are conducted inter-
changeably on the survivor function.
14According to Jenkins (2008), given that there is no specific routine in stata to estimate the discrete time
proportional hazards model, the estimation is done rearranging the dataset and creating variables to define
the baseline hazard function and the estimation is done with a logit model. However, the interpretation is
in terms of a discrete time proportional hazards model.
15Five Mexican regions are taken into account here: North, West, East, Center and South.
16Such as Going directly to the workplace, On-line job advertisement, Advertisement in newspapers,
Social networks, public or private allocation services and other forms of job search
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It is common for the head of households to bear the responsibility of providers, and the
results suggest that this holds true even when they are married. Even when experiencing
episodes of unemployment, these individuals will try to find a job as quick as possible to
fulfil their role as main provider for the household.
Relative to the centre, workers living in a different region experience shorter unemploy-
ment spells, this result is consistent for both men and women but for the case of formal
and informal workers the results are mixed. In the north region, male and female workers
have shorter unemployment spells when exiting into formal jobs but longer unemployment
duration when exiting into informal jobs. The opposite effect takes place in the south
region where workers have shorter unemployment spells when exiting into informal jobs.
According to INEGI, if we look at the proportion of formal and informal workers per
region, in Nuevo Leon (in the north), informality accounts for approximately 40% of the
total workforce, this can explain why individuals experience shorter unemployment spells
when exiting into formal jobs. In contrast, in Oaxaca (in the south), informality accounts
for almost 80% of the total workforce, so it is expected that informal workers take less
time to get a job.
For the schooling category, relative to those that had completed elementary school, the
results suggest that schooling has a positive impact on the hazard of formal workers but
not for informal workers, where the more schooling the longer their duration of unemploy-
ment before exiting into informal jobs. The formal sector attracts more skilled workers
compared to the informal one, this means that the more qualified the less an individual
will wait until securing a job as formal. In contrast, higher schooling levels represent
longer duration of unemployment for workers when they exit into informal jobs. Highly
skilled workers have higher reservation wages, so they experience longer unemployment
spells before entering the informal sector, this result might also be signaling that highly
skilled workers prefer to be employed as formal so they will be hesitant to take informal
jobs and wait for a formal job offer instead. Empirical evidence for this selection bias was
presented in the previous chapter. It was found that workers do have a preference for the
formal and informal sector.
The indicator of being previously employed as a formal worker allows us to capture
the impact of previous experience in the formal sector on re-employment. The results
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of the estimation presented in table 2.4. Being previously employed as a formal worker
reduces the time unemployed before securing a formal job. However, it increases the time
unemployed for those exiting into informal jobs.
The remaining part of the table contains the variables of interest for our key analysis.
The financial variables that presumably act as a cushion for job searchers are divided into
three alternatives. Having a lump sum payment from a previous job, receiving aid from
the government and receiving financial aid from relatives either in Mexico or from abroad.
The results in table 2.3 and 2.4 reveal that receiving a lump sum payment reduces the
time unemployed for the whole sample and by gender. However, the effect is not statistic-
ally significant for formal workers and it increases the time unemployed for those exiting
to informal jobs. It was anticipated that the effect would be uncertain as financing job
search can both prolong the time unemployed or can intensify job search. For the case of
this analysis, having access to this type of financial support permits a more intensive job
search, making them exit the unemployment state faster compared to those that do not
possess it. Other studies have found a similar effect on the hazard rate of job searchers
for the case of Sri Lanka and Ethiopia (Dickens and Lang, 1991; Serneels, 2008).
On the other hand, having financial aid from relatives and aid from government pro-
longs the time unemployed and the effect persists after dividing the analysis by gender.
Those that receive money from relatives are financing longer periods of job search com-
pared to non-recipients. It is common in Mexico to have two households under the same
roof sharing living costs, it is also common for relatives to support each other in times of
financial hardship. These situations can impact differently the willingness of unemployed
individuals to actively engage in the job search process.
Receiving government support is also prolonging the time for job search. Even though,
the unemployment insurance program in Mexico at the national level was introduced in
Mexico in 2016, many other government cash transfer programs have comprehensive cov-
erage. Such is the case of the program “prospera”, which is a cash transfer program that
was originally designed to reduce poverty, but nowadays it covers more aspects such as
health and education and this does have an impact on the household income.
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Regarding the search channels, the results suggest that going directly to the workplace
and searching for jobs in the newspaper reduce the unemployment spell for formal work-
ers. Searching for jobs in the newspaper prolongs the time unemployed for those exiting
into informal jobs (for both male and female). On the other hand, asking friends and
relatives, helps workers reduce their time unemployed before exiting into informal jobs.
Using allocation services prolongs time of unemployment for informal workers when used
by men, but has no effect for women. Search channels might be effective in helping un-
employed individuals escape unemployment as previously found in the literature Addison
and Portugal (2002); Keeley and Robins (1985) and more specific for the case of Mexico
see the previous chapter. But some are not as effective to reduce the time unemployed.
This result is consistent with the findings by Caldero´n-Madrid (2008) in terms of the
hazard. There seem to be other factors that are more effective in reducing the time unem-
ployed for job searchers, such as personal characteristics or the means to finance job search.
Finally, time of job search was included in the model to measure the duration depend-
ence and if individuals are experiencing a scarring effect. The results suggest a negative
duration dependence, this is that the more time an individual remains unemployed, the less
likely it is to find a job. The signs of the dummies capturing different weeks of job search
suggest a that the negative duration dependence is monotonic. This effect is consistent
after dividing the sample for male and female workers both in the formal and informal
sector.
As a robustness check, the model was estimated using a continuous time setting. As-
suming different distributions for the baseline hazard. The distributions assumed are Ex-
ponential, Weibull, Gompertz, and Cox. The results are presented in table B.1. For males
by type of job in table B.2 and for females by type of job in table B.3 of the Appendix.
The results presented assuming different distributions of the hazard for a continuous time
setting are similar in magnitude and sign of the coefficient to the discrete setting. The
negative effect of the search channels on the hazard of unemployed individuals also holds.
The positive effect of the lump sum payment on the hazard rate of individuals is also
similar.
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2.5.3 Non-parametric analysis under a discrete time framework con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity
Survival models assume that individuals share the same risk of failing. This if course
can be a very strict assumption to make as there are factors affecting the hazard of some
individuals that do not affect others in the same way. Introducing covariates into the
estimation of the hazard rate controls for a source of heterogeneity that can be observed.
However, there is still a source of unobserved heterogeneity that we are not accounting
for. The model proposed by Heckman and Singer (1984) accounts for unobserved sources
of heterogeneity that can bias the results by assuming a non-parametric distribution of
the heterogeneity which is more flexible compared to imposing a distribution of the het-
erogeneity that can bias the results.17 In this subsection, as a robustness check, the model
just presented is re-estimated incorporating unobserved heterogeneity into the regression
model.
The results are reported in table 2.5 for the pooled sample and gender. In table 2.6
the results are presented by gender and sector of employment. The results reveal some
differences in magnitude and in some cases in sign compared to the previous results but
these effects are not statistically significant. The coefficients for the educational category
show a change in sign for the case of males that experience a transition to informal jobs,
compared to having elementary school, a higher educational level, prolongs the time unem-
ployed rather than decreasing it as shown in the model without the effects of unobserved
heterogeneity.
The impact of the means to finance job search remains the same in the sign of the coef-
ficient but not the magnitude. The magnitude is higher after incorporating unobserved
heterogeneity. Regarding search channels, the magnitude is also higher and the sign of the
effect remains. Not all channels are effective in helping workers secure jobs faster, thus
confirming the finding in the previous subsection.
Finally, time was included in the model in the same way it was included in the model
without unobserved heterogeneity. The dummy variables presented in tables 2.3 and 2.4
are computed but not presented here, at the bottom of the table the variable m2 reflects
17(Van den Berg, 2001) argues that estimates might be biased if the distributional assumption is incor-
rectly specified.
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the duration dependence, which in this case is negative, confirming the results in the pre-
vious section.
2.5.4 Competing risk specification
Until now, the focus of this research has been on the transition from unemployment to
employment. However, unemployed individuals in this context have at least three paths
out of unemployment, these are: exiting into a formal job, into an informal job and out of
the labour force. Analyzing these transitions is important because it provides a deeper un-
derstanding of Mexican labour market dynamics in the presence of a formal and informal
sectors, conditional on time unemployed and personal characteristics of job searchers.
The analysis of a single spell model does not allow to capture the specific destination of a
worker, instead a competing risk destination model is used.
To perform this analysis an important assumption is made and it comes from the spe-
cification in the paper by Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles (2010). The factors that make
a person choose one employment state impact differently the choice of another sector. This
assumption is not unrealistic as often workers choose the informal sector to avoid paying
taxes, the flexibility of working schedule or not having to respond to a boss when they are
informally self-employed. A person can also choose to remain unemployed and wait for a
better job or stop searching for jobs because there are household circumstances that allow
this, specially for women. All of these factors, in conjunction with personal characteristics,
are not affecting equally the employment decision. In this sense, the model is set to be
run as separate logit equations to analyze the different options rather than to perform a
multinomial logit analysis. In this way, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
test that is implicit in the multinomial logit setting is also avoided.
Table 2.7 presents the results of the competing risk specification. Being male reduces
the time unemployed compared to females. This implies that female job searcher are more
likely to experience a transition out of the labour force, which is not surprising, given
the traditional role of females in Mexican households, and even though this is changing
it is still common.18 The results presented here are also estimated dividing the sample
by gender in table 2.8. In the results by gender, conditional on time unemployed, being
18The percentage of women participating in the labour force has drastically increased in Mexico, from
19.4% in 1970 up to 42.3% in 2010 (Orraca et al., 2016).
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married increases the hazard of going out of the labour force for females as reported in
column (4).
The results in table 2.7 yield a positive effect of all schooling levels (taking elementary
school as the base category) on the hazard of formal jobs but it decreases the hazard for
those exiting into informal jobs, remaining unemployed or going out of the labour force.
Dividing this result by gender in table 2.8 it is clear that the effects hold, although for
females the impact is weaker than for males. In the same way, looking at the coeffi-
cients of the variable that captures if a worker was previously employed as formal, the
results are consistent with those in the single destination model and the coefficients by
gender. This reduces the hazard of going out of the labour force or remaining unemployed.
The remaining part of the table contains the variables that capture if the worker had
access to financial cushion and the variables that capture the search channels used by job
searchers. Having access to a lump sum payment from a previous job increases the hazard
of those exiting into a formal job, this is consistent for both male and female. This can be
explained by the fact that those having access to this type of support, are those that were
previously employed as formal workers and the likelihood of those securing a formal job is
high, compared to the informal ones. Receiving aid from government increases the hazard
of those going out of the labour force for both male and female as can be confirmed in
table 2.8. The support provided by the government, additional to cash transfer programs,
is mainly training to enhance worker’s skills and increase job opportunities.
From the results in the estimation, it seems that the training is stopping active job
search, perhaps unemployed individuals decide to stop and focus on their training instead
to enhance their employability and skills. Finally, receiving financial aid from relatives
reduces the hazard of those that exit into formal jobs, specially for males, for females it
is not statistically significant. It is possible that those receiving help from relatives might
relax the intensity of job search and thus remain searching for longer until an adequate
offer arrives, as previously discussed.
The last part of the table reports the variables that relate to the search channels used.
The results presented here are consistent with the ones presented in previous subsections.
The use of some of the search channels seems to lessen the hazard of individuals. This im-
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plies that rather than helping escape unemployment faster is prolonging it. Instead there
are other factors that are helping workers to secure a job, like personal characteristics,
schooling, age, and if the worker had access to any type of financial help to secure a job.
The results of the impact of duration of the hazard is similar to the models under a single
spell model, there is negative duration dependence in the model.
As a robustness check, the competing risk model is now estimated again including
unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation with the methodology proposed by Heckman
and Singer (1984). The results for the full sample are presented in table 2.9 and by gender
in table 2.10. The results reveal that similar to the model with a single destination,
not including unobserved heterogeneity leads to underestimate the impact of the different
covariates and the time on the hazard of job searchers. However, some if the effects for
females are not statistically significant after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. The
positive effect of government aid on the hazard of going out of the labour force is still
strong here.
2.6 Conclusions
The analysis undertaken here aimed to answer two main questions. First, it attempted
to explain what the impact of different search channels and the means by which a person
finances job search affects unemployment duration. Second, what is the impact of these
attributes on the duration of unemployment for workers obtaining a formal or informal job?
To address the questions of this analysis a discrete duration model was used. The
model also accounts for unobserved heterogeneity using the methodology proposed by
Heckman and Singer (1984). Furthermore, the model was also estimated assuming a mul-
tiple destination or competing risk set up. This allows us to understand the different
characteristics that have an impact on the duration of those workers exiting each of the
labour market states.
Some interesting findings arise from the analysis. The results provide evidence for
regional differences for workers when exiting into formal and informal jobs. In the north,
those that exit into formal jobs experience shorter unemployment spells. In contrast, in the
south those that exit into informal jobs have shorter duration of unemployment. Higher
schooling levels lessen the time unemployed when exiting into formal jobs but the effect
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is the opposite if exiting into informal jobs. The formal sector attracts a larger number
of formal workers and those highly skilled are willing prolong the time unemployed before
securing an informal job.
Regarding the financial variables, different ways of financing job search have different
implications for unemployment duration. For example, those that were receiving financial
support from the government and support from friends and relatives experience longer un-
employment periods. It is concluded that the structure of the Mexican household allows
workers to engage in longer job searches. It is common to have multiple families living
under the same roof and sharing living costs, this situation leads to workers to wait for a
more suitable job offer. Similarly, those receiving support from the government via cash
transfer programs or training, are spending more time unemployed before securing a job.
In contrast, those that had access to a lump sum payment from a previous job, experience
shorter unemployment durations.
Regarding the search channels and the impact they exert on unemployment duration,
the results suggest that going directly to the workplace and searching for jobs via newspa-
per reduce the unemployment duration for those exiting into a formal job. Asking friends
and relatives helps job searchers to reduce the time unemployed before securing an in-
formal job for both male and female. Only a few channels are effective in reducing the
time unemployed, instead, there are other factors that are determinant in lowering (or
increasing) the period of unemployment. These determinants have to do more with per-
sonal characteristics like age, schooling and previous working experience in a given sector.
All the results presented here are robust after controlling for the effects of unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimation.
The results of the multiple destination model allows us to understand further that
the shorter duration for those in possession of a lump sum payment occurs when workers
exit into formal jobs for both males and females. This effect holds and it is larger after
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the regression. This is anticipated because in
the Mexican context, formal workers have access by law to a lump sum payment after
finishing a labour contract relation. Hence, as the results show, previous formal workers
experience shorter duration of unemployment when the exit destination is to a formal job.
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2.7 Tables and figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for independent variables
Variable Male Female
Head 0.43 0.17
Married 0.50 0.31
Education
Elementary school 0.25 0.12
Secondary School 0.32 0.26
High School 0.21 0.24
More than high school 0.22 0.36
Financial cushion 0.07 0.05
Aid from government 0.01 0.05
Aid from friends or relatives 0.03 0.09
Previous job formal 0.43 0.49
Reason for job loss
Dismissed of finished previous job 0.65 0.49
Dissatisfaction with previous job 0.26 0.43
Left or closed previous business 0.06 0.05
other 0.03 0.02
Search Channel
Directly 0.75 0.72
On-line job advertisement 0.07 0.11
Advertisement 0.11 0.16
Social networks 0.15 0.10
Allocation service 0.04 0.06
Other forms of job search 0.03 0.04
Duration of job search
Up to 1 month 0.51 0.50
More than 1 but less than 3 months 0.36 0.37
More than 3 but less than 6 months 0.08 0.09
More than 6 months but less than 1 year 0.03 0.03
More than a year 0.01 0.01
Number of observations 23,190 10,591
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Table 2.2: Test for equality of Survivor Functions
Log-rank Wilcoxon-Breslow Tarone-Ware
χ2 = 537.30 χ2 = 461.86 χ2 = 513.05
Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
Formal-Informal
χ2 = 8836.62 χ2 = 6880.14 χ2 = 7894.17
Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
Female and type of job
χ2 = 3012.35 χ2 = 3012.35 χ2 = 2635.00
Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
Male and type of job
χ2 = 5544.17 χ2 = 4358.40 χ2 = 4990.50
Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
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Table 2.3: Estimates for logit hazard single risk model
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled sample Male Female
Gender 0.308***
(0.0219)
Married 0.196*** 0.212*** 0.211***
(0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0224)
Head of household 0.327*** 0.391*** 0.392***
(0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0255)
Age -0.0181*** -0.0186*** -0.0186***
(0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00107)
North region 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.136***
(0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0238)
West region 0.145*** 0.134*** 0.131***
(0.0321) (0.0321) (0.0321)
East region 0.156*** 0.146*** 0.145***
(0.0302) (0.0301) (0.0301)
South region 0.245*** 0.241*** 0.241***
(0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0282)
Secondary school -0.0750*** -0.0821*** -0.0809***
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0273)
High school -0.270*** -0.286*** -0.285***
(0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0302)
More than high school -0.456*** -0.500*** -0.499***
(0.0295) (0.0293) (0.0293)
Previous job formal -0.0661*** -0.0706*** -0.0713***
(0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0198)
Dismissed or finished previous job -0.00697 0.0287 0.0289
(0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0210)
Left or closed previous business -0.0317 -0.0129 -0.0126
(0.0437) (0.0436) (0.0436)
Other reason 0.0217 0.0481 0.0485
continued . . .
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. . . continued
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled sample Male Female
(0.0586) (0.0586) (0.0586)
Financial cushion 0.0923** 0.101*** 0.0993**
(0.0389) (0.0388) (0.0388)
Financial aid from government -0.147** -0.241*** -0.240***
(0.0640) (0.0641) (0.0641)
Financial aid from relatives -0.183*** -0.252*** -0.251***
(0.0431) (0.0426) (0.0426)
Went directly to the work place -0.126*** -0.123*** -0.124***
(0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0282)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online -0.193*** -0.195*** -0.194***
(0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0367)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job -0.00338 0.0124 0.0117
(0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0296)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) -0.228*** -0.241*** -0.240***
(0.0465) (0.0463) (0.0463)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job -0.126*** -0.137*** -0.138***
(0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0286)
Used other channels to find a job -0.126** -0.136** -0.137**
(0.0553) (0.0552) (0.0555)
Weeks of job search 4 -0.517*** -0.311*** -0.310***
(0.0538) (0.0517) (0.0517)
Weeks of job search 8 -3.333*** -3.124*** -3.122***
(0.0741) (0.0724) (0.0724)
Weeks of job search 12 -0.0406 0.164*** 0.165***
(0.0557) (0.0537) (0.0537)
Weeks of job search 16 -1.820*** -1.611*** -1.610***
(0.0710) (0.0692) (0.0693)
Weeks of job search 20 -4.953*** -4.741*** -4.739***
(0.230) (0.230) (0.230)
continued . . .
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. . . continued
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled sample Male Female
Weeks of job search 24 -2.700*** -2.489*** -2.488***
(0.0926) (0.0913) (0.0913)
Weeks of job search 26 -0.363*** -0.156** -0.155**
(0.0644) (0.0625) (0.0626)
Weeks of job search 28 -4.077*** -3.864*** -3.863***
(0.238) (0.237) (0.237)
Weeks of job search 30 -2.292*** -2.079*** -2.078***
(0.115) (0.114) (0.114)
Weeks of job search 34 -5.779*** -5.564***
(0.580) (0.580)
Weeks of job search 36 -6.180*** -5.967*** -5.965***
(0.709) (0.709) (0.708)
Weeks of job search 38 -2.523*** -2.310*** -2.308***
(0.132) (0.131) (0.131)
Weeks of job search 40 -6.770*** -6.554***
(1.002) (1.002)
Weeks of job search 42 -4.814*** -4.601*** -4.600***
(0.383) (0.383) (0.383)
Weeks of job search 50 -6.066*** -5.851***
(0.710) (0.710)
Weeks of job search 52 -0.431*** -0.219*** -0.218***
(0.0834) (0.0819) (0.0819)
Weeks of job search 53 -0.0801 0.127 0.128
(0.101) (0.0997) (0.0997)
Weeks of job search 56 -1.315*** -1.086*** -1.084***
(0.198) (0.197) (0.197)
Weeks of job search 57 -1.321*** -1.104*** -1.103***
(0.228) (0.228) (0.228)
Weeks of job search 60 -3.202*** -2.972*** -2.971***
(0.591) (0.591) (0.591)
continued . . .
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. . . continued
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled sample Male Female
Weeks of job search 62 -4.283*** -4.058***
(1.011) (1.009)
Weeks of job search 64 -0.743*** -0.519** -0.517**
(0.239) (0.236) (0.236)
Weeks of job search 65 -0.917*** -0.668** -0.667**
(0.313) (0.313) (0.313)
Weeks of job search 68 -1.687*** -1.423***
(0.528) (0.530)
Weeks of job search 72 -2.791*** -2.557**
(1.019) (1.023)
Weeks of job search 76 -2.835*** -2.602**
(1.028) (1.031)
Weeks of job search 77 -2.612*** -2.383**
(1.001) (1.004)
Weeks of job search 78 -1.009* -0.802 -0.802
(0.570) (0.576) (0.576)
Weeks of job search 79 -0.844 -0.643 -0.643
(0.640) (0.642) (0.642)
Weeks of job search 90 -0.165 1.275
(0.943) (1.421)
Weeks of job search 105 0.796 1.137
(1.336) (1.313)
Observations 98010 97882 93435
Log pseudolikelihood -37678.532 -37772.353 -37709.031
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Estimates for logit hazard single risk model by gender and sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Male Female Female
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Married 0.144*** 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.142**
(0.0501) (0.0393) (0.0459) (0.0601)
Head of household 0.273*** 0.396*** 0.271*** 0.368***
(0.0584) (0.0446) (0.0535) (0.0686)
Age -0.0270*** -0.00403** -0.0264*** -0.00470*
(0.00257) (0.00186) (0.00234) (0.00282)
North region 0.338*** -0.175*** 0.330*** -0.197***
(0.0536) (0.0440) (0.0492) (0.0660)
West region 0.0225 0.0145 0.0225 -0.0527
(0.0760) (0.0586) (0.0697) (0.0894)
East region -0.134* 0.276*** -0.149** 0.286***
(0.0761) (0.0547) (0.0700) (0.0805)
South region -0.122* 0.246*** -0.118* 0.242***
(0.0662) (0.0505) (0.0608) (0.0773)
Secondary school 0.413*** -0.236*** 0.431*** -0.238***
(0.0704) (0.0470) (0.0644) (0.0744)
High school 0.558*** -0.561*** 0.571*** -0.528***
(0.0763) (0.0540) (0.0697) (0.0832)
More than high school 0.497*** -0.623*** 0.513*** -0.609***
(0.0745) (0.0521) (0.0682) (0.0777)
Previous job formal 0.855*** -0.598*** 0.864*** -0.524***
(0.0473) (0.0365) (0.0432) (0.0546)
Dismissed or finished previous job 0.102** 0.143*** 0.0988** 0.155***
(0.0461) (0.0380) (0.0422) (0.0579)
Left or closed previous business -0.307** 0.338*** -0.287** 0.377***
(0.125) (0.0759) (0.116) (0.111)
Other reason -0.132 0.190* -0.161 0.221
(0.156) (0.104) (0.142) (0.168)
Financial cushion 0.0952 -0.199*** 0.116 -0.287**
(0.0784) (0.0740) (0.0717) (0.114)
Financial aid from government -0.384** -0.166 -0.363** 0.0453
(0.155) (0.117) (0.143) (0.174)
Financial aid from relatives -0.0328 -0.280*** -0.0767 -0.321***
(0.107) (0.0774) (0.0977) (0.114)
Went directly to the work place 0.214*** -0.0954* 0.210*** -0.0845
(0.0663) (0.0530) (0.0608) (0.0753)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online 0.116 -0.145** 0.115 -0.162*
(0.0800) (0.0709) (0.0738) (0.0960)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job -0.0751 0.159*** -0.0702 0.180**
(0.0714) (0.0548) (0.0658) (0.0790)
continued . . .
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. . . continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Male Female Female
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) 0.0927 -0.203** 0.107 -0.126
(0.102) (0.0899) (0.0937) (0.124)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job 0.233*** -0.201*** 0.220*** -0.192**
(0.0653) (0.0539) (0.0599) (0.0769)
Used other channels to find a job 0.0111 -0.0724 -0.00847 -0.178
(0.133) (0.103) (0.122) (0.149)
Weeks of job search 4 -1.795*** -0.0250 -1.821***
(0.121) (0.0923) (0.111)
Weeks of job search 8 -1.830*** -0.0655 -1.857***
(0.123) (0.0941) (0.113)
Weeks of job search 12 -1.839*** -0.0778 -1.866*** -0.0955
(0.123) (0.0942) (0.114) (0.138)
Weeks of job search 16 -1.875*** -0.154 -1.902*** -0.173
(0.128) (0.0974) (0.118) (0.141)
Weeks of job search 20 -1.934*** -0.138
(0.129) (0.142)
Weeks of job search 24 -1.915*** -0.117 -1.943*** -0.136
(0.129) (0.0985) (0.120) (0.142)
Weeks of job search 26 -1.926*** -0.142 -1.954*** -0.161
(0.130) (0.0990) (0.120) (0.143)
Weeks of job search 28 -2.055*** -0.0988 -2.083*** -0.118
(0.139) (0.105) (0.129) (0.146)
Weeks of job search 30 -2.055*** -0.0852 -2.083*** -0.104
(0.139) (0.106) (0.130) (0.147)
Weeks of job search 34 -2.042*** -0.0475
(0.141) (0.107)
Weeks of job search 36 -1.991*** -2.019***
(0.142) (0.133)
Weeks of job search 38 -2.059*** -0.0708 -2.087*** -0.0904
(0.142) (0.108) (0.133) (0.149)
Weeks of job search 40 -2.038***
(0.143)
Weeks of job search 42 -2.057*** -0.0464 -2.086***
(0.143) (0.109) (0.134)
Weeks of job search 50 -2.084***
(0.144)
Weeks of job search 52 -2.077*** -0.0418 -2.105*** -0.0614
(0.144) (0.109) (0.135) (0.149)
Weeks of job search 53 -2.007*** 0.00659 -2.034*** -0.0118
(0.168) (0.127) (0.160) (0.162)
continued . . .
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. . . continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Male Female Female
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Weeks of job search 56 -1.716*** -0.362** -1.745*** -0.375*
(0.205) (0.174) (0.200) (0.200)
Weeks of job search 57 -1.987*** -0.244 -2.015*** -0.259
(0.242) (0.193) (0.238) (0.216)
Weeks of job search 60 -1.957*** -0.0528 -0.0730
(0.261) (0.213) (0.234)
Weeks of job search 62 -0.0824
(0.236)
Weeks of job search 64 -2.170*** -0.0853 -2.201*** -0.0974
(0.282) (0.223) (0.279) (0.243)
Weeks of job search 65 -2.057*** -0.195 -0.223
(0.337) (0.288) (0.303)
Weeks of job search 68 -2.387*** -0.174
(0.491) (0.348)
Weeks of job search 72 -1.662***
(0.465)
Weeks of job search 76 -0.166
(0.446)
Weeks of job search 77 0.459
(0.449)
Weeks of job search 78 -2.189*** -0.268 -0.290
(0.586) (0.490) (0.495)
Weeks of job search 79 -1.687** -0.840
(0.679) (0.682)
Weeks of job search 90 -1.083
(1.887)
Observations 97820 88837 88521 44219
Log pseudolikelihood -46367.982 -54223.886 -42115.254 -26704.242
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Duration controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by gender
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Male Female
Gender 0.270***
(0.0247)
Married 0.181*** 0.319*** -0.0501
(0.0245) (0.0320) (0.0496)
Head of household 0.260*** 0.187*** 0.207***
(0.0276) (0.0342) (0.0630)
Age -0.0178*** -0.0193*** -0.0116***
(0.00115) (0.00128) (0.00271)
Secondary school 0.528*** 0.598*** 0.285***
(0.0327) (0.0383) (0.0746)
High school -0.137*** 0.443*** 0.307***
(0.0282) (0.0356) (0.0555)
More than high school -0.280*** 0.309*** 0.130**
(0.0323) (0.0384) (0.0563)
Previous job formal -0.0921*** -0.161*** 0.0987**
(0.0217) (0.0255) (0.0439)
Dismissed or finished previous job -0.0307 -0.0232 -0.0696
(0.0229) (0.0274) (0.0442)
Left or closed previous business -0.108** -0.103* -0.0802
(0.0470) (0.0540) (0.104)
Other 0.0527 0.0245 0.170
(0.0602) (0.0686) (0.126)
Financial cushion 0.127*** 0.116** 0.177**
(0.0404) (0.0462) (0.0851)
Financial aid from government -0.0363 -0.0563 0.0870
(0.0748) (0.110) (0.108)
Financial aid from relatives -0.173*** -0.236*** -0.0905
(0.0480) (0.0668) (0.0767)
Went directly to the work place -0.190*** -0.224*** -0.116*
(0.0321) (0.0379) (0.0648)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online -0.289*** -0.328*** -0.235***
(0.0449) (0.0559) (0.0777)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job -0.0696** -0.0899** -0.0695
(0.0340) (0.0390) (0.0744)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) -0.293*** -0.251*** -0.365***
(0.0554) (0.0681) (0.104)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job -0.174*** -0.223*** -0.0559
(0.0333) (0.0401) (0.0644)
Used other channels to find a job -0.109* -0.118 -0.0512
(0.0609) (0.0748) (0.114)
Constant -5.755*** -5.946*** -6.401***
(0.0787) (0.0889) (0.158)
m2 constant -2.742*** -2.643*** -2.938***
(0.0346) (0.0404) (0.0771)
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 98010 97882 93435
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Duration controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by gender and sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Male Female
Formal Formal Informal Informal
Married 0.568*** -0.146* 0.0812** 0.214***
(0.0566) (0.0780) (0.0370) (0.0602)
Head of household 0.283*** 0.0968 0.0909** 0.0958
(0.0609) (0.106) (0.0396) (0.0743)
Age -0.0401*** -0.0224*** -0.00981*** -0.00833***
(0.00244) (0.00441) (0.00145) (0.00322)
Secondary school 0.164** -0.143 0.368*** 0.274***
(0.0708) (0.132) (0.0463) (0.0849)
High school 0.356*** 0.167** 0.243*** 0.360***
(0.0566) (0.0837) (0.0451) (0.0716)
More than high school 0.330*** 0.0792 0.212*** 0.213***
(0.0577) (0.0815) (0.0496) (0.0742)
Previous job formal 0.496*** 0.774*** -0.203*** -0.126**
(0.0443) (0.0704) (0.0321) (0.0564)
Dismissed or finished previous job -0.0489 -0.0643 -0.0374 -0.0979*
(0.0454) (0.0656) (0.0332) (0.0557)
Left or closed previous business -0.377*** -0.712*** -0.173*** -0.133
(0.124) (0.244) (0.0582) (0.111)
Other -0.301** -0.150 0.0426 0.253*
(0.144) (0.241) (0.0730) (0.136)
Financial cushion 0.242*** 0.228* 0.0909 0.264**
(0.0705) (0.122) (0.0625) (0.122)
Financial aid from government -0.201 -0.260 0.145 0.170
(0.184) (0.201) (0.128) (0.115)
Financial aid from relatives -0.469*** 0.0150 -0.0828 -0.0252
(0.117) (0.120) (0.0747) (0.0920)
Went directly to the work place -0.109* 0.0839 -0.193*** -0.352***
(0.0641) (0.0937) (0.0451) (0.0864)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online -0.194** -0.0496 -0.373*** -0.244**
(0.0860) (0.104) (0.0767) (0.111)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job -0.117 -0.0636 0.107** 0.301***
(0.0712) (0.114) (0.0451) (0.0967)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) -0.165 -0.0797 -0.241*** -0.556***
(0.104) (0.131) (0.0849) (0.143)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job -0.0617 0.0626 -0.157*** -0.197**
(0.0620) (0.0921) (0.0518) (0.0893)
Used other channels to find a job -0.458*** -0.0913 -0.0516 -0.214
(0.148) (0.190) (0.0828) (0.138)
Constant -6.048*** -7.119*** -5.332*** -5.078***
(0.155) (0.241) (0.107) (0.202)
m2 constant -2.669*** -3.291*** -2.348*** -2.137***
(0.0748) (0.121) (0.0494) (0.0925)
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97820 88837 88521 44219
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Competing risk specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Formal Informal Out of the labour force.
Gender 0.220∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ -0.881∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0304) (0.0256) (0.0299)
Married 0.170∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0322) (0.0258) (0.0311)
Head of household 0.271∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0379) (0.0291) (0.0380)
Age -0.0165∗∗∗ -0.0289∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ 0.00377∗∗
(0.000994) (0.00164) (0.00116) (0.00162)
Secondary school -0.0761∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0450) (0.0283) (0.0410)
High school -0.245∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0478) (0.0333) (0.0440)
More than high school -0.457∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0476) (0.0330) (0.0443)
Previous job formal -0.0787∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0296) (0.0234) (0.0298)
Dissatisfaction with prevoius job 0.0233 0.0444 0.000755 0.273∗∗∗
(0.0195) (0.0291) (0.0245) (0.0298)
Left or closed previous business -0.0339 -0.357∗∗∗ 0.0218 0.0217
(0.0377) (0.0843) (0.0413) (0.0595)
Other reason for unemployment 0.0381 -0.281∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(0.0506) (0.0957) (0.0570) (0.0725)
Financial cushion 0.105∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ -0.00391 0.00276
(0.0357) (0.0466) (0.0498) (0.0633)
Financial aid from government -0.0853 -0.218∗∗ -0.0221 0.350∗∗∗
(0.0597) (0.104) (0.0708) (0.0749)
Financial aid from relatives -0.154∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0635) (0.0496) (0.0568)
Went directly to the work place -0.135∗∗∗ 0.0134 -0.206∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(0.0264) (0.0399) (0.0333) (0.0429)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online -0.221∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0501) (0.0470) (0.0566)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job -0.0257 -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0171 -0.0817∗
(0.0272) (0.0445) (0.0333) (0.0460)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) -0.231∗∗∗ -0.0457 -0.355∗∗∗ -0.329∗∗∗
(0.0440) (0.0638) (0.0583) (0.0727)
Used advertisement to get job -0.121∗∗∗ 0.0371 -0.209∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0394) (0.0348) (0.0441)
Used other channels to find a job -0.153∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.103∗ -0.287∗∗∗
(0.0516) (0.0830) (0.0624) (0.0799)
Constant -2.598∗∗∗ -3.991∗∗∗ -3.068∗∗∗ -3.355∗∗∗
(0.0502) (0.0805) (0.0612) (0.0817)
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 363620 363620 363620 363620
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.031 0.032 0.034
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Competing risk specification adding Unobserved heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment Formal Informal Out of the labour force
Male 0.255∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ -1.072∗∗∗
(0.0246) (0.0389) (0.0317) (0.0379)
Married 0.195∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.0818∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0419) (0.0313) (0.0406)
Head of household 0.262∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗
(0.0277) (0.0485) (0.0353) (0.0500)
Age -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0354∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ 0.00680∗∗∗
(0.00115) (0.00215) (0.00144) (0.00199)
Secondary School -0.111∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0570) (0.0355) (0.0537)
High School -0.260∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0606) (0.0417) (0.0579)
More than high school -0.518∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ -0.791∗∗∗ -0.649∗∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0603) (0.0414) (0.0574)
Previous job formal -0.0977∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ -0.676∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0372) (0.0290) (0.0380)
Dissatisfaction with previous job -0.0336 -0.0449 0.00183 -0.353∗∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0373) (0.0301) (0.0384)
Left or closed previous business -0.106∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ 0.000134 -0.376∗∗∗
(0.0471) (0.107) (0.0561) (0.0822)
Other reasons for unemployment 0.0573 -0.307∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.143
(0.0598) (0.121) (0.0792) (0.102)
Financial cushion 0.105∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.00108 -0.0352
(0.0405) (0.0630) (0.0576) (0.0812)
Financial aid from government -0.0148 -0.272∗∗ 0.0685 0.493∗∗∗
(0.0745) (0.128) (0.0889) (0.0962)
Financial aid from relatives -0.189∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗
(0.0479) (0.0836) (0.0613) (0.0741)
Went directly to the work place -0.201∗∗∗ -0.0117 -0.310∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗
(0.0322) (0.0528) (0.0420) (0.0571)
Uploaded or replied to a job offer online -0.281∗∗∗ -0.0931 -0.420∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0661) (0.0614) (0.0749)
Asked to relatives and friends to recommend his job -0.0750∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.0664 -0.119∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0595) (0.0433) (0.0604)
Used allocation services to get job (public of private) -0.304∗∗∗ -0.0991 -0.511∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗
(0.0554) (0.0807) (0.0759) (0.0916)
Used advertisement in newspaper or classifieds to get job -0.201∗∗∗ 0.0325 -0.317∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(0.0334) (0.0514) (0.0440) (0.0586)
Used other channels to find a job -0.105∗ -0.385∗∗∗ -0.0462 -0.437∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.112) (0.0762) (0.108)
Constant -5.731∗∗∗ -7.269∗∗∗ -5.833∗∗∗ -5.663∗∗∗
(0.0785) (0.139) (0.0982) (0.139)
m2
Constant -2.727∗∗∗ -3.205∗∗∗ -2.845∗∗∗ -3.086∗∗∗
(0.0345) (0.0626) (0.0457) (0.0679)
Regional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 363620 363620 363620 363620
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 2.2: Kaplan-Meier failure estimates
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Figure 2.3: Kaplan-Meier failure estimates by gender and job
(a) Failure estimates by gender
(b) Failure by type of job
86
Figure 2.4: Kaplan-Meier failure estimates separate by gender and job
(a) For female
(b) For male
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Chapter 3
The impact of the criminal
presence and violence on wages:
Evidence from Mexico
3.1 Introduction
In 2006, after Felipe Calderon became president, the government of Mexico launched an offensive to tackle organized
crime in what was the beginning of the so called ‘War on Drugs in Mexico’. The government pursued an intensive
policy of containment of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) and this led to a dramatic increase in violence and
the presence of criminial organizations in Mexican municipalities measured by homicide rates and the presence of
DTOs respectively. Violence in a country, if persistent, has costly and profound negative effects on economic and
social outcomes, promotes illegality and discourages investment in infrastructure.
The literature on conflict has pointed out that crime “taxes” the economy and increases the cost of doing
business (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008; Detotto and Otranto, 2010; Enamorado
et al., 2014) not just in the formal but in the informal sector as well(Camacho and Rodriguez, 2013; BenYishay and
Pearlman, 2014). The impacts of crime go beyond factor accumulation and also have negative effects on economic
diversification, increasing sector concentration and diminishing economic complexity (R´ıos, 2015).
On the other hand, the effects of violence on socioeconomic aspects range from inequality (Fajnzlber et al., 2002;
Enamorado et al., 2016) to migration (Kondylis, 2010; Caldero´n et al., 2011; Go´mez, 2012; Lozano and Aleman,
2013; R´ıos, 2014; Atuesta and Paredes, 2015; Caldero´n-Mej´ıa and Iba´n˜ez, 2015), human capital accumulation and
school performance (Barrera et al., 2004; Shemyakina, 2011; Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2012; Leon, 2012; Justino et al.,
2013; Brown and Vela´squez, 2015; Orraca, 2015), labour productivity and other labour outcomes (Bozzoli et al.,
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2013; Robles et al., 2013; BenYishay and Pearlman, 2013; Ferna´ndez et al., 2014; Vela´squez, 2014; Cabral et al.,
2016). However, the literature has generally neglected the effect on wages in a developing economy setting. The
only two studies that analyse the effect on the wage of high levels of crime are Smith Kelly (2011) and Braakmann
(2009) but within a developed country setting. The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, it
offers an explanation of the impact that the presence of DTOs in Mexican municipalities and violence have on the
wages of individuals. Second, it offers an explanation of the impact for both formal and informal workers as this
sector functions differently to the formal sector. To my knowledge, these are issues in the literature that remain
unexplored to date.
Given the availability of individual information from the Mexican Family Life Survey (2005-2010), data on
municipal homicide rates and a unique dataset that reflects the presence of drug cartels in Mexican Municipalities
(see Coscia and R´ıos (2012)), I am able to address how the violence associated with the ‘War on Drugs’ and the
presence of DTOs in Mexican municipalities impacts wages. The effect is unknown ex ante as the impact of violence
and criminal presence on labour markets is multidimensional and can vary depending on the sector the worker is
employed (i.e. formal or informal). For example, the presence of such groups can signal the absence of the rule of
law in Municipalities pushing firms to re-locate to avoid the risk of attacks, extortion or theft, thus pushing wages
down. It can also mean that because these groups inject illegal money into the local economy, this could create
employment opportunities and thus push wages up.
The estimation results of the preferred specification after instrumenting violence and the presence of DTOs to
address reverse causality, yields a positive effect of the presence of DTOs, but no effect of violence. More specifically,
an additional DTO per municipality increases wages by 5.7%. On further dissagregation, wages are found to increase
by 4.9% and 3.4% for informal and formal workers, respectively. This chapter is divided as follows: In section 3.2
the context behind the war on drugs in Mexico is detailed, section 3.3 reviews the current literature on the causes
and effects of the increase in violence, and section 3.4 details the data used and the empirical strategy. Results are
discussed in section 3.5 and some conclusions are detailed in section 3.6.
3.2 The Mexican context: Drug trafficking,
violence and the War on drugs
Mexico’s geographic location is crucial for terrestrial smuggling of drugs to the US. Ensuring the safe passage of
drugs and its commercialization is the raison d’etre of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) in Mexico and their
existence goes a long way back in Mexican history.1 It is argued that these criminal organizations are so deeply
1An example of how long this trafficking has existed in Mexican Society is that after the period of opium
Prohibition in 1914, the U.S. customs officials recorded that the Governor of Baja California (1916-1920)
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rooted in society that they entered into pacts with the Mexican Government. Arrangements between Officials and
DTOs were possible because there was official complicity with some corrupt officials of the Institutional Revolution-
ary Party (PRI), an hegemonic party that ruled the country for a protracted period after the Mexican Revolution of
1910. The PRI used its “great patronage machine” to establish a patron-client relationship with the DTOs (O’Neil,
2009).
The PRI allowed these organizations to operate following a strict code of conduct and enforced its compliance
using “extra-official mechanisms”, as explained by Ricardo Monreal, former Governor of the State of Zacatecas and
ex-PRI official. The most important rule to follow was respect for DTO territories. The size and borders were
granted by the ruling party and all DTOs had to respect them(R´ıos, 2010).2 All this control over such groups was
possible because the PRI had a strict centralized control over state and municipal governments. The outcome was
a win-win situation in which the government received a “tax” via bribes, information about dealings, associates
and competition (specially from those that traffic without permission)3 and, as a quid pro quo the DTO would be
permitted to operate without being systematically prosecuted (R´ıos, 2010).
In the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico underwent a process of political opening at the state level. This slowly weakened
the PRI’s compacts with DTOs. Electoral competition ended understandings and pushed the DTOs drug lords to
negotiate with parties at different levels of government (O’Neil, 2009; R´ıos, 2010). This encouraged rival traffickers
to bid for new market opportunities. Mexico’s drug related violence rose first in states where the opposition ruled,4
because the incoming political parties had relatively less ruling experience and this created information asymmetries,
hence increasing the cost of negotiations. The increased violence in states governed by the opposition was capitalised
on politically by the party in the Federal Government. Governors that didn’t belonged to the PRI had almost no
support from the President relative to those that did. (Astorga, 2001)
The weakening of the DTOs-government agreement was coincidental with two other important aspects: First,
the increase demand for marijuana which became quite popular among U.S. consumers in the 1970s and then shifted
to cocaine in the 1980s. Second, an increasing involvement of the Mexican DTOs with their Colombian counter-
was implicated as being responsible for the control of opium trafficking (Astorga, 2001).
2There were other rules that had to be strictly followed by the DTOs. Such rules included keeping the
visibility of DTO operations to a minimum (from media scandals to dead people in the streets), periodic
seizure of illegal drugs and imprisonment of lower level traffickers, generation of economic revenues for
small, poor communities, among others. To see the full details of the rules see R´ıos (2010).
3This helped officials in the Government in gaining credit, praise and promotion(Snyder and Duran-
Martinez, 2009).
4For example, after the PRI lost its first governorship in Baja California in 1989, drug-related violence
surged there. The same happened in 1992 in Chihuahua. For a full discussion see O’Neil (2009).
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parts. Colombian DTOs moved cocaine into Miami, via the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. Later, with the
disintegration of the major Colombian DTOs in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their Mexican counterparts gained
entire control over smuggling routes into the US. By 1991, Mexico reportedly accounted for an estimate 300-350
tons of cocaine and roughly 30 percent of all heroin and marijuana that entered into the US (Astorga, 2001; Astorga
and Shirk, 2010).
In the 2000 presidential elections, Vicente Fox, the right wing opposition candidate was elected President. This
event resulted in the termination of the arrangements between the PRI and DTOs. The DTOs strategy then shifted
towards gaining autonomy and ending their subordination to the government. This was accomplished by buying
off or intimidating local authorities to secure the safe passage of drugs to the US (O’Neil, 2009; R´ıos, 2010). Given
that the number of border crossings and ports of entry are limited, the competition between DTOs became fierce
and violent. Gaining control over such ports of entry ensures a more profitable business for drug trafficking (Robles
et al., 2013).5
Despite the fact that agreements between government and DTOs were weakening, violence (as measured by
homicide rates) remained relatively stable over time as shown in figure 3.1. However, there is a period when the
violence increased at levels never seen before.6 Soon after taking office in 2006, President Felipe Calderon changed
the strategy towards DTOs. Calderon’s government pursued an intensive policy of containment of DTO, this in-
volved the use of security forces at all three levels of government, including the Army and Navy. The War against
drugs, which involved the deployment of over 45,000, troops officially began in December 2006, when the Army was
sent to Michoacan. This was the launch of the first “Joint Operation”.7 Soon after, the Army also arrived in Nuevo
Leon, Guerrero and Tijuana(O’Neil, 2009; Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011; Robles et al., 2013).
The increasing competition among Mexican DTOs created an atmosphere of violence. The use of violence
became the way these groups demonstrated they were in control (Castillo et al., 2014). This implied operations to
create fear, such as recruiting members in the streets, leaving messages in the open that could be widely broad-
cast on the media (Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011). Bodies were left mutilated in the streets with messages directed at
5Skaperdas (2002) defines this as localized competition, where geography, transportation difficulties and
communication costs makes warlords use violence to establish control over a limited area.
6There are alternative hypothesis as to why the homicides increased so dramatically, which are worth
mentioning here. Dube et al. (2013) argues that the expiration of the U.S. Federal Assault Weapon Ban
in 2004 exerted a spillover of gun supply in Mexico, thus fueling the violence between groups and against
the Government. Castillo et al. (2014), on the other hand, argue that violence increased as a consequence
of cocaine supply shortages as a result of a change in the Colombian Government strategy towards DTOs,
which focused more on the interdiction of drug shipments rather than targeting coca crops.
7In total, nine “Joint Operations” have been enacted (Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011).
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politicians, citizens and fellow criminals. Heads were thrown into the doors of primary schools and mass executions
replaced targeted murders (R´ıos, 2014).
The government military strategy targeted the drug hierarchy in a non-selective way in what is commonly
known as the “Kingpin Strategy”.8 It is reported that after the offensive began, approximately 23 criminal leaders
were arrested or shot. Lindo and Padilla-Romo (2015) find that the capture of a DTO leader in a municipality
increases its homicide rate by 80% and that this effect holds in the short-run for up to a period of 12 months.9
In this operation, major DTOs such as Beltran-Leyva, La Familia Michoacana, and the Cartel del Golfo were
weakened. The fragmentation of DTO created conditions for second and third generations of criminal leaders to
compete for territory, control and power. Soon, other groups emerged such as Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion
and Caballeros Templarios. Violence emerged because many of their aspiring leaders worked as ‘hitmen’ for the
major DTOs and were accustomed to using violence (O’Neil, 2009; Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011). One group recruited
former military officials and became widely known as Los Zetas, characterized by the use of extreme, high profile
violence (Astorga and Shirk, 2010).
Figure 3.1 shows the national homicide and drug-related homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants from the period
of 2000 until 2013.10 The homicide rate had remained broadly constant prior to Calderon’s period, then it increased
dramatically from around 9 per 100,000 in 2006 up to almost 24 per 100,000 in 2011. It is clear that the sudden
increase in homicides after 2006 is largely attributed to drug-related homicides. Furthermore, figure 3.2 shows the
rate per 100,000 by municipalities for different years before and after 2006.11 Violence is concentrated in areas that
are close to the border and where marijuana is planted and grown. Finally, it can be visually confirmed in figure
3.3 that the presence of one DTO or more in a municipality is highly correlated with the homicide rate in figure 3.2
for a set of selected years.
The proliferation of new groups created the conditions for the foray into other illegal activities such as kid-
nappings, human trafficking, petroleum theft, money laundering and arms trafficking. Perhaps, extortion was the
most widespread of these activities. It first targeted illegal business such as prostitution and casinos, in which the
8It has been documented that municipalities where elections were closely contested and where eventually
the PAN won, violence increased, as these mayors were more likely to support the President’s strategy to
combat crime in a direct way (Dell, 2015).
9This study confirms that the strategy caused destabilization within organizations after the capture.
10This is based on data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and data from
the National Security Commission (CNS). Data for drug-related homicides is only available after 2006,
when the government officially launched its operation against DTO.
11In Mexico, there are three different levels of government. National level, state level and Municipality
level.
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probability of being denounced by the owners to the authorities was low. Soon, extortions also extended into the
legal setting, creating an atmosphere of fear that affected local businesses. High protection fees and intimidation
forced many to close (R´ıos, 2014). Violence increased more in municipalities with DTO presence and especially in
those that had more than one DTO (as shown in figure 3.3) as there is no monopoly of violence and such groups
engage in competition to win power (see Castillo et al. (2014)). In addition, violence and DTOs proliferated more
where illegal crops are grown and where there was trading and the transit of drugs, money laundering and potential
markets for consumption (O’Neil, 2009).
3.3 Literature review
The analysis of how violence affects economic and social aspects is not new. There are a number of studies which
have found that crime has negative effects on economic performance. The presence of crime acts like a tax on the
whole economy, as it increases the cost of doing business and creates uncertainty (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003;
Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008; Detotto and Otranto, 2010; Enamorado et al., 2014). It also affects firms, harming
their competitiveness and pushing them to close in locations that lack the institutions to enforce the Rule of Law
and property rights.12 The incentives to invest or to expand operations of a firm are thus low. This negative effect
is stronger in areas where the fear of victimization is high. Operational costs increase due to the additional costs
on security infrastructure incurred by the firms. This affects both formal and informal sector, manufacturing or
services (Camacho and Rodriguez, 2013; BenYishay and Pearlman, 2014). The impacts of crime go beyond factor
accumulation and also exert negative effects on economic diversification, increasing sector concentration and dimin-
ishing economic complexity (R´ıos, 2015).
Alternatively, there are studies analyzing the effect of crime on foreign and direct investment. Results are mixed
and depend on the context and more specifically, the industry. Ashby and Ramos (2013) find that in Mexico crime
deters foreign direct investment in financial services, commerce and agriculture but not in oil and mining sectors,
for which they found the opposite. The latter is consistent with the findings for Colombia by Maher (2015), which is
that the presence of crime in certain industries such as oil creates conditions that facilitate foreign direct investment
flows. This could occur because, according to Driffield et al. (2013), countries with weaker institutions and less
concern about corporate social responsibility are more likely to invest in conflict regions.
The literature on the impact of crime on socioeconomic aspects range from inequality to migration, human
12Firms that are exposed to violence may not always close, but instead shrink and go through a process
of “forgetting by not doing”, which has negative effects on productivity. This process has important
implications in the long run as the post conflict economic recovery of countries is slow and in some cases
stagnates (Collier and Duponchel, 2013).
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capital accumulation, labour productivity and labour outcomes. A number of studies have pointed out that high
inequality creates the conditions for the proliferation of violence and illegal activities (Fajnzlber et al., 2002; Enam-
orado et al., 2016). To some extent, the population in a given locality normalizes violence and learns to live with
it.13 However, when violence becomes extreme, it disrupts the life of the population and changes their behaviour.
The first natural response to the presence of high levels of violent crime on the place of residence (and one which
has been widely documented) is displacement. Both internal and external due to the fear of victimization or threats
by the groups causing the violence (Kondylis, 2010; Caldero´n et al., 2011; Go´mez, 2012; Lozano and Aleman, 2013;
R´ıos, 2014; Atuesta and Paredes, 2015; Caldero´n-Mej´ıa and Iba´n˜ez, 2015).
One of the aspects that has received particular attention is the investment in education. A number of studies
have found that in the short run, exposure to high levels of violent crime, reduces school attendance and increases
dropout rates (Barrera et al., 2004; Shemyakina, 2011; Rodriguez and Sanchez, 2012). This affects negatively child
performance in school and increases failure rates (Orraca, 2015). The effects are largely visible in the long run,
where it has been found that individuals exposed to violence have, on average, less years of schooling (Leon, 2012;
Justino et al., 2013; Brown and Vela´squez, 2015).
Violence can also alter the equilibrium in labour markets. The literature has documented that in areas affected
by high levels of violence, productivity, the proportion of employed and working hours fall (Robles et al., 2013;
Cabral et al., 2016). This reduction in working hours is largely attributed to the self employed as the flexible nature
of their jobs allows them to devote less time to work and minimize their exposure to risk. This effect is stronger for
women, as they not only cut the number of hours worked but they also leave the labour market and devote more time
to household chores and caring for their family. This results in a loss in hourly and total earnings (BenYishay and
Pearlman, 2013; Ferna´ndez et al., 2014; Vela´squez, 2014). Men, on the other side, spend more time on other types
of activities, which are often informal, to mitigate significant loss of income, increasing the share of self employed
and informal individuals in the labour market (Bozzoli et al., 2013).
Another way of measuring how violence affects the labour market is looking at how it influences wages and
earnings. The effect here can be either positive or negative depending on the context. The impact can be positive
in violent areas if the displacement of individuals to non-violent areas results in a reduction in labour supply, thus
pushing wages up. This is commonly known in the literature as a compensating wage differential effect, where firms
13It has been documented that individuals change their behavior when their perception of risk is high.
They stop using public transport services, change commuting routes, stop going to restaurants and coffee
shops. In more extreme cases they arm themselves and even suffer from sleep deprivation (Becker et al.,
2004; Braakmann, 2012).
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offer a pay premium for risk to attract workers (Rosen, 1986).14 Smith Kelly (2011) analysed the compensating
wage differential effect of crime in Miami and found that a rise in crime rates led to high-crime-risk workers earning
a higher per hour relative wage than high-crime-risk workers in other cities. But often the effect cannot be identified
clearly as there might be unobservables that affect wages which make it difficult to isolate the impact. For example,
Braakmann (2009) using three way component estimators to control for individual and regional heterogeneity found
that wages are not affected by changes in both violent and non-violent crime rates. Alternatively, high levels of viol-
ence can have a negative effect on wages and earnings in non-violent areas as a result of displacement of individuals
from violent ones, which creates an oversupply of labour (Atuesta and Paredes, 2015; Caldero´n-Mej´ıa and Iba´n˜ez,
2015).
Mexico is a country that has a dual labour market, with almost 60% of workers employed in the informal sector
of the economy, according to most recent statistics from the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI).15 Analysing
if violence and the presence of criminal groups affects these sectors differently is an interesting question. One can
think that given the flexible nature of informal jobs, this sector would be more responsive to any external influence,
workers would simply reduce working hours to reduce exposure. This mechanism is clear in the case of self-employed
individuals (see Ferna´ndez et al. (2014); Vela´squez (2014)), but not for wage earners. On the other hand, formal
wage earners would not be able to reduce working hours as formal firms are less likely to respond to episodes of
violence in this way, but rather increasing wages when the supply of labour decreases.
Finally, an alternative way of thinking about the impact of the presence of Drug Trafficking Organizations is
that these groups hire from the local labour force. According to R´ıos (2010) two of the main DTOs in Mexico,
Sinaloa and Golf, opened their recruitment process to outsiders in the early 2000s.16 Such groups transmitted radio
adds and posted messages in the main border cities of Mexico, encouraging “brave men” to join their organization.
This could have a positive spillover effect on wages that would most likely be reflected in the informal sector of the
labour market.17
The contribution of this chapter then is to measure and explain the differential impact of violence and the
presence of Drug Trafficking Organizations on wages within both the formal and informal labour market and to
what extent the presence of criminal groups affect the wages and working hours of individuals.
14According to Rosen (1986) the actual wage under these conditions can be also considered a negative
price for the job paid by the firms to workers.
15Informal workers possess no social security or any of the fringe benefits that come with being formally
employed.
16Before this, DTOs membership was reserved only for family and close friends of the leaders.
17This can be possible even if this is not directly expressed in the self-reported information of wages in
the household survey.
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3.4 Data and empirical strategy
3.4.1 Homicides, Drug Trafficking Organizations and the Mexican Fam-
ily Life Survey
Data for the empirical analysis was obtained from three sources: First, individual level information is taken from
the three waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). Second, the number of monthly deaths by intentional
homicides at the municipal level available from 1990 to 2013 are provided by the National Institute of Statistics
and Geography (INEGI). Third, the number of drug trafficking organizations by year per municipality is obtained
directly from Coscia and R´ıos (2012).
The MxFLS is a longitudinal panel survey that covers different aspects of household activity and is represent-
ative at the municipal level and conducted for the years 2002, 2005 and 2009.18 It includes information for 8,400
households and almost 35,600 individuals for 16 states throughout Mexico.19 The survey contains individual and
household information, the type of job, monthly wages, position in the job, industry, number of co-workers and if
the person has access to social security. It also contains information on personal characteristics such as if the person
is the head of household,their schooling level, age, gender and marital status. Information at the household level is
also collected such as household size, number of children under 14 years and number of elderly in the household.
It also to this it contains information on community size and location which makes it possible to construct the
identifier to merge with the dataset on homicides and number of DTOs.
The timing of the MxFLS survey is particularly apposite for the purpose of this analysis as the first and second
waves were conducted in 2002 and 2005, well before President Calderon took office, which is also a period of relative
stability in terms of violence. The third wave was conducted between 2009 and 2010, the period where the homicide
rates reached its highest point as observed in figure 3.4. The analysis is carried out on the extensive margin rather
than the intensive one (i.e. focusing on both formal and informal wage earners). Excluding non-paid workers, the
self-employed, owners or employers, retired or those working on agricultural activities for self-consumption. Table
3.1 contains the descriptive statistics for the years of analysis. It is worth pointing out several things from this
table. On average, 65% of the sample is comprised of male workers, with elementary or secondary schooling. The
18Some of the topics being covered are health, education, migration, labour, income and access to
government programs. One of the main characteristics of this survey is the low attrition rate from one
wave to the next. Almost 89% of individuals were re-contacted from 2002 to 2005 and 85% of individuals
from 2005 to 2009. This was possible because the design of the survey allowed interviewers to track
individuals if they moved out of their original place of residence after the first wave in 2002.
19The total number of States is 31 plus Mexico City or Federal District.
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share of informal workers is large compared to their formal counterparts, although decreasing over time.
The information for homicides is taken from INEGI sources. This is based on a detailed monthly report of
intentional homicides for all 2,457 Mexican municipalities from 1990 to 2015. The rate per 100,000 is calculated
using yearly population figures from the Mexican Census. This information is used to measure the presence of
violent crime in the place of residence as it has less issues of under-reporting compared to other types of crime. The
total number of homicides is not just a result of the war on drugs and this information might not be providing the
most accurate effect of violence related to this phenomena, but given that this information has been used in other
studies, it is also used here as it is disaggregated at the municipal level. Given that this information spans 1990 to
2010, an average has been constructed covering 1990 to 2001, and this would be used as an instrument for current
levels of homicides. More details of this are reported in subsection 3.4.3.
The information regarding illegal activities carried out by Drug Trafficking Organizations is either non-existent,
restricted by the authorities or unreliable. For this reason, often researchers rely on the homicide rates as a proxy
for the violence caused by the confrontations between different criminal groups and as a way to measure the impact
that these groups have on several aspects of interest. However, the media reports the activities of such groups when
this implies a violent event. This reporting of activities has led some researchers to quantify the presence of DTOs,
based on the content found on the web. This is the case of Coscia and R´ıos (2012). This unique dataset is the result
of a text analysis algorithm designed to obtain information from the web to identify where criminal groups operate.
It is possible as it extracts information reading digitalized news, blogs and Google-News indexed content. Google
is used as it organizes reliable sources of information such as newspapers and blogs that belong to the media. This
database is entirely extracted from digital sites that belong to local and national newspapers.
The objective is to identify a number of hits or mentions per actor. The actors are municipalities and DTOs,
so the algorithm yields different combinations of hits of the actors (i.e. when a local newspaper reports the presence
of a DTO in a given municipality). The outcome of the rigorous analysis is a dataset containing information for 13
DTOs in Mexico for the period 1990-2010, disaggregated down to the municipal level. According to Coscia and R´ıos
(2012) DTOs only operate in 713 of 2,441 municipalities in Mexico. Leaving large areas of the country practically
without the presence of these criminal groups. There is temporal variation in the data, as some DTOs appear in
municipalities for most of the years in the period analyzed which is the case for the large DTOs and others only
appear until recently and these groups were created when the fragmentation of the DTOs occurred. In addition,
according to Coscia and R´ıos (2012) there appears to be a clustering of the areas of operation for DTOs and as
a result, many municipalities of the country remain untouched by the DTOs throughout the period of analysis.
Another important aspect of the data is that it is precisely after 2006 that a growth in the number of mentions
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takes place, approximately 10,000 articles to 100,000 articles in just four years (until 2010), which is consistent with
the sudden increase in homicide rates in Mexico over the same period.
Another aspect that is worth highlighting in this data is that as of 2010, 62% of the municipalities that have
a presence of DTOs, have more than one group operating simultaneously. Information on the number of DTOs
per municipality allows us to draw conclusions on the effect of the presence of these criminal organizations on the
labour market. The effects are not limited to the violence brought about by these organizations but more about the
presence of more than one group per municipality, compared to the presence of just one or indeed none. In addition,
an indicator of the average presence of DTOs per municipality is constructed covering the period 1990-2001, and it
is used to control for the current presence of these criminal organizations per municipality. This will be discussed
in more detail in section 3.4.3.
3.4.2 Understanding how the fragmentation of DTOs
spreads violence
It is important to highlight that the presence of DTOs does not necessarily mean violence. In fact, a municipality
that has the presence of only one DTO tends to have relatively less homicides compared to those that have more
than one.20 One of the main assumptions made in this analysis relates to the way DTOs behave before 2006 and
after. According to Robles et al. (2013), DTO can behave as stationary or roving bandits. The stationary bandits’
main characteristic is to retain control over a certain area in the long term. The rationale behind this is that such
groups pursue long term goals that favour the growth and expansion of the criminal organization. In the Mexican
context, these groups are commonly those that are large in membership and have an important presence throughout
the country. These are groups that have made historical pacts with the government and were abiding by the rules
establisehd from the beginning.21
Roving bandits on the other hand, have just a temporary domain. They extort, kidnap and murder to enhance
short term gains.22 They behave this way because they are interested in gaining immediate territorial power and
20See Castillo et al. (2013) for a detailed analysis of the increase in homicide rates in Mexican municip-
alities when comparing the presence of one DTO against more than one. In fact, they conclude that the
presence of one DTO does not predict homicide rates whereas for more than one the effect is strong and
positive.
21These are major DTOs such as Cartel de Sinaloa, Cartel del Golfo, Cartel Beltran-Leyva. Also defined
by Castillo et al. (2013) as the traditional groups.
22These are commonly new groups such as Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacio´n, Los Caballeros Tem-
plarios and Los Zetas, to mention a few. Also defined as Castillo et al. (2013) as the competitive and
expansionary groups.
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violence is their tool to acquire this (O’Neil, 2009; Dıaz-Cayeros et al., 2011).23
In this analysis it is assumed that until 2006 before the army’s deployment on the streets, DTOs behave like
stationary bandits as the equilibrium of power is kept by those involved in the traffic of drugs to the United States.
However, after the year 2006, they behave like roving bandits, as the confrontation against the government and the
consequent fragmentation of major DTOs brought about a sharp increase in violence. There is empirical evidence
by Osorio (2015) arguing that the government’s strategy weakened major DTOs and motivated the invasion of
neighboring ones. This effect is particularly strong in areas with a high density of these groups. More specifically,
both the intensification of the government strategy and the increasing number of DTOs are positively associated with
the severity of violence between groups. This evidence is consistent with findings by Lindo and Padilla-Romo (2015)
who suggests that the capture of a DTO leader increases the homicide rate in a municipality by 80%. However, the
presence of many groups per municipality also implies that these groups are in need of labour and these communities
can supply it.
3.4.3 Identification Strategy
The empirical analysis starts by estimating an OLS regression to measure the impact of homicides and the presence
of DTOs on wages in a given municipality. This is specified in equation (3.1).
LnWit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Sit + uit (3.1)
Where LnWit is the log of the real wage in municipality i in period t
24 and it is regressed on Xit which contains
personal characteristics such as age, schooling level, gender, the industry classification of the worker and Sit is a
control for five Mexican regions in Mexico.25 uit is the error term.
The main concern when identifying the impact of violence and the presence of DTOs on wages as specified
in equation (3.1) is reverse causality. It can be argued that the presence of criminal groups is not exogenous to a
23In their study, Robles et al. (2013) argue that there is evidence that DTOs behave one way or the
other, citing the case of the Cartel de Tijuana in 2010 which split into two factions. One faction was led
by Teodoro Garc´ıa Simental (aka El Teo), who favoured kidnappings in Tijuana. The other faction was led
by Luis Fernando Sa´nchez Arellano (aka The Engineer) who wanted to focus more on the traffic of drugs
fearing that other types of crime such as kidnapping local businessmen would attract too much attention
from the government. After the arrest of El Teo, the faction led by Arellano, regained control of the group
and peace was reestablished in Tijuana after multiple confrontations between the two factions.
24The wage is deflated using the Mexican consumer price index for 2010.
25The regions were classified based on the INEGI’s classification: north, south, centre, east and west.
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municipality. The location of DTOs is potentially correlated with unobservables that also affect wages. Instead,
DTOs locate in municipalities with better economic performance as this would allow for more extraction of rents.
These conditions would then attract more criminal groups. On the other hand, homicide rates would increase only
in those municipalities where DTOs are located which are also the municipalities with better economic performance.
However, homicides and the presence of DTO remained relatively stable throughout the years at the national
level (as can be observed in figure 3.1). Moreover, the location of DTOs rather than being determined by the eco-
nomic prosperity of a municipality is determined by access to entry points to the United States.26 Additionally, after
the Mexican government launched its offensive to tackle such criminal groups in 2006, the confrontations between
the government and criminal groups, on the one hand, and the fragmentation of the large DTOs and the consequent
fight to gain territorial power, on the other, brought about a sharp increase in violence and in the number of DTOs
trying to access power and control drug trafficking routes. As a result, many groups engaged in other activities such
as kidnapping and extortion, affecting the local population.
To overcome this potential issue of reverse causality, the instrumental variable adopted originally by R´ıos (2015)
is used here. This is estimated by a Two-Stage Least Squares estimation strategy (2SLS). The presence of DTO and
the log homicide rate in a municipality i is instrumented using the average presence of DTOs and average homicide
rate per municipality; both instruments are for the period of 1990-2001.27 The logic behind these instruments is that
criminal groups historically locate in municipalities that are important in terms of the traffic of drug regardless of
economic conditions. To access such positions, the new groups that flourished as a consequence of the war on drugs
in 2006, had to fight and violence subsequently increased. The exclusion restriction holds if the historical location of
DTO correlates with the current presence of more than one criminal group per municipality i, but it is uncorrelated
with unobserved factors affecting wages in the current period t. The same criteria applies to the homicide rates, as
the average homicide rates in a municipality would be correlated with the current rate in a municipality, but is not
with the current level of wages for an individual or unobserved factors affecting it.
Additionally, the instrument proposed by Castillo et al. (2013) is also used in this exercise, which is the result
of the interaction between two variables: negative supply shocks of cocaine (which provides the temporal variation)
and distance to the nearest point of entry of cocaine to Mexico or point of exit to the US (which provides the spatial
variation), the major consumer of this product. Cocaine supply shocks are measured by the amount of cocaine
seized by the Colombian Government, which shifted its drug interdiction strategy from 2006 as already noted, and
this affected the value of the amount of cocaine supplied to the intermediaries or the DTOs in Mexico. According to
26See Castillo et al. (2013) for a detailed explanation of location of DTOs in Mexican municipalities.
27The average is taken from 1990 until 2001, as this is a year before the first wave of the MxFLS was
conducted.
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Castillo et al. (2013) the Colombian government shift in strategy targeted less the eradication of coca crops, which
are considered low value added, but instead focused on the interdiction of drug shipments and destruction of coca
processing labs. Under the assumption that the demand for drugs is inelastic,28 a contraction of supply derives in
an increase in drug trafficking activities because the DTOs will try to access the product even if it is scarce and
costs more. This ultimately affects the levels of violence. In figure 3.5 the homicide rate in Mexico is plotted against
cocaine seizures in Colombia, it can be observed that there is a positive correlation between cocaine seizures and
homicide rates, specially after 2006.
The increase in drug trafficking activities and levels of violence as a result of the reduction of supply of cocaine,
happens only in localities that are valuable for the smuggling of cocaine into Mexico and to the United States. These
localities are the ones close to the northern and southern border and ports in the Pacific Ocean and Gulf of Mexico.
These localities provide a comparative advantage for the trade of drugs, so these locations are valuable for the DTOs.
Figure 3.6 shows the geographic coordinates of such points of entry in the southern border, ports in the Pacific Ocean
and Gulf of Mexico and the exit points to the United States. Comparing this map with the location of DTOs in
figure 3.3 specially in the year 2010 and the homicide rates shown in figure 3.2 it can be observed that there is a
correlation between the location of these points and the location of DTOs and homicide rates. Identification of the
effect of supply shocks on the number of DTOs and homicide rates comes from the interaction of these two variables.
The first stage reduced form regression is then specified in equation (3.2).
Vit = pi0 + pi1Z1990−2001 + pi2gi × st + pi3Xit + εit (3.2)
where V it is the variable of primary interest and represents either the log of homicide rates per 100,000 inhab-
itants, (as used commonly in the literature) plus one or the number of DTOs, both at the municipality level.29 The
historical average of violence is measured by Z1990−2001, gi is the distance of a municipality to the entry and exit
points in the borders and ports and st is the cocaine seizure rate in Colombia. Finally εit is the error term.
28As detailed in Castillo et al. (2014) there is enough evidence to support the claim that demand for
drugs is inelastic, this assumption is central to the use of this instrumental variable.
29Rios (2015) also uses the log of homicide rates and details that because the many zeros in this variable
are important in the estimation to compare between municipalities where there is high presence of violence
versus those that have almost none, a transformation is made; where the measure is calculated as the log
of homicide rate plus one.
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The second stage then is estimated via equation (3.3).
LnWit = δ0 + δ1V̂it + δ2Xit + υit (3.3)
where LnWit is the log of the wage and it is regressed on the predicted values of V̂it from the first stage and
Xit which contains personal characteristics such as age, schooling level, gender and the industry classification. υit
represents the error term.
Instrumenting current levels of violence with historical average and the interaction variable described above,
should yield non-biased estimates of the violence and presence of Drug Cartels on wage levels. All of the regressions
are clustered at the municipal level.
3.5 Empirical Results
When analyzing the impact of violence on local wages, our primary interest lies in the the impact on those that
remain in a municipality and absorb the violence shock by adapting to the new circumstances. In a way it can be
perceived as a supply and demand problem. This would be true if the movement of workers out of the municipalities
with high levels of violence is enough to push wages up for those that remain. Since the survey is successful in
following individuals from the first to the last wave, those that move to a different municipality from one wave to
the next are dropped from the sample, which only accounts for 1.4% of the total sample. In this way it is ensured
that the analysis is done on the stayers. It is also acknowledged that limiting the analysis to the three waves of
the MxFLS (2002, 2005 and 2009) rather than having yearly information posses a limitation to the analysis done
here as we might not be capturing enough variation to analyze the impact of the increase in homicide rates and the
presence of DTOs from year to year.
3.5.1 Instrumentation of violence and presence of Drug Trafficking Or-
ganizations
Following equation (3.2), violence is instrumented combining the historic average from 1990-2001 and the instrument
from Castillo et al. (2013) which interacts the supply shock with the location of entry points in the south border and
for the entry ports in the Pacific Ocean and adding controls for state income per capita and region. It is expected
that the negative shock to the supply of cocaine after 2006 will affect those municipalities that are closer to the
entry points more compared to those that are further away. Also, given that crime and the location of DTOs is not
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random, the historic average is used to predict current levels of these two variables.
The results of the first stage are presented in table 3.2. Columns (1) and (4) present the results for the pooled
sample, columns (2) and (5) for formal workers and columns (3) and (6) for informal workers. The results show
that instruments are strong predictors of the presence of DTOs but not when the log of homicide rates is used as a
dependent variable. The log of state income per capita does not seem to be have any effect on the log of homicides,
but it affects negatively the presence of DTOs. Holding everything else constant, an increase of 10 percent of state
income per capita decreases the number of DTOs by 1.7 percent for the pooled sample. States with larger income
per capita are less likely to have presence of DTOs at least in this context. This might be possible because bet-
ter economic performing states have better functioning institutions and more effective enforcement of the rule of law.
Moreover, these results are consistent with the literature on the relationship between crime and economic per-
formance which has found that this relationship is negative. Detotto and Otranto (2010) suggest that the effect
is stronger during recessions. Enamorado et al. (2016) show that this effect might be larger when analyzing drug-
related crimes compared to more ‘common’ types of crime.
The results of the second stage of the 2SLS regression are presented in table 3.3. Columns (1) to (3) show that,
after the instrumentation of the average homicides per municipality, the effect of homicides on wages is not statist-
ically significant. There is no evidence at least under this setting that high levels of homicides have any significant
effect on individual wages. Comparing this result with the literature, Braakmann (2009) finds no significant impact
of crime on wages for Germany for both violent and non violent types of crime. In contrast, Vela´squez (2014) has
found that the effect of homicide rates is heterogeneous among individuals and it depends factors such as the sector
of employment, if the person is self-employed or wage earner and the gender. Moreover, she finds weak evidence
that self-employed females living in municipalities with high levels of homicide rates experience a reward in their
hourly earnings but this effect is not significant for wage earners. On the other hand, males’ hourly earnings are
affected negatively by this variable.
After the instrumentation, the effect of the presence of DTOs remains robust to the specification. Holding
everything else constant, an additional DTO per municipality increases the monthly wages of workers by 5.7%. A
word of caution must be inserted here and it relates to the interpretation of this coefficient. This variable does not
explicitly measure violence related to DTOs, it is merely representing a count of the number of these organizations
per municipality. However, it can be assumed that it is only after 2006 when these groups engaged in confrontation
with the government and with other groups and other external factors mentioned before. The proliferation of DTOs
in Mexican municipalities can have spillover effects on the local economy as an expanding organization needs to hire
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a labour force or simply exert an influence on the economy via consumption. For this reason, the interpretation of
the effect of this variable must be undertaken with caution.
Further dividing the sample between formal and informal workers, columns (5) and (6) of table 3.3 present the
results for this specification, it can be observed that an additional DTO per municipality increases wages of formal
workers by 3.4% and the wage of informal workers by 4.9%. The estimated coefficient is larger for informal workers.
However, the statistical difference between the mean of the coefficients between formal and informal workers is
formally tested. The χ2 test for the difference is computed and the result yields a value of prob > χ2 = 0.1694,
which means that we fail to reject the null of equality between the effect of DTOs on formal an informal workers.
Moreover, this implies that even though the point estimate is larger in magnitude for informal workers, the effects
are not statistically different.
Contrary to what was expected, there is no differential impact of the presence of DTOs on the wages of in-
formal workers compared to formal. If we believed that the effect is indeed true, both sectors benefited to a similar
magnitude from the presence of DTOs in a municipality. This can be attributed to the fact that we are only ana-
lyzing wage earners rather than self-employed workers, which have shown to respond to external shocks differently
compared to other sectors as found in Vela´squez (2014). The positive effect of DTOs on wages can be attributed
to the economic effect these groups introduce when they take control over a certain municipality. It is possible
that the groups, that are well known for handling large amounts of cash, manage to have spillover effects on the
local economy via consumption and even hiring from the local labour force. This would eventually push wages up
assuming supply remains constant (or even falls).
Values for the F-statistic are displayed at the bottom of the table and all are well above 10, for the model using
DTOs as a dependent variable, confirming that the instruments have relevance. The test for underidentification
and overidentification are presented at the bottom of the table. All the values for the Kleibergen-Paap test suggest
that the models are not underidentified. In addition, the values for the Hansen-J statistic and its respective p-value,
suggest that the identifying instruments are orthogonal to the to the error term in the log wage equation. Results
are also presented for the full sample, and for both formal and informal workers.
Additionally, the results of the OLS are presented in table C.1 of the appendix. The results yield a positive
impact of DTOs of 3.7% on wages for the case of the pooled sample, which is similar in magnitude and sign to the
5.7% found in the 2SLS estimation. Not correcting for reverse causality leads to a slight underestimation of the
effect of DTOs presence on the log of wages.
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3.5.2 Robustness check
We can argue that the decision of individuals to participate in the formal or informal sector can impact on the
estimated effect on the log wage equation. If we do not account for the unobservables that influence the decision of
individuals to choose the sector of employment we are leaving out factors that can have a potential effect on their
earnings. Some workers might prefer to be formal as often the wages and benefits associated are higher compared
to informal jobs. This also implies having access to health services provided by the state. On the other hand,
individuals might prefer informal jobs due to the flexibility of working hours, the proximity to their homes even if
this means sacrificing income or simply to avoid paying taxes. Finally, individuals might simply choose to remain
unemployed, which is not uncommon in Mexico, given that often many families live in the same house and share
living expenses.
To correct for the selection bias a two step procedure will be estimated. In the first step, a multinomial logit
will be estimated to calculate the probability of attachment to a given labour market state. In the second step, the
estimated probabilities will be introduced in the wage equation in the way proposed by Lee (1983). We can specify
the first stage equation as follows:
Pj =f(Age,Gender, Schooling level,Marital status,
Number of children under 14 years in the HH,HH size,
Number of older that 65 in the HH), j = 1, 2, 3
(3.4)
The second stage is then:
ln(wages) =g(Age,Gender, Schooling,
Violence corrected, regional controls, occupational controls,
Correction terms), iffj = 3,
(3.5)
Where equation (3.4) represents the first stage of the estimation and is the employment selection function. It
contains variables that are commonly used in the literature to predict employment decisions such as the number
of children under 14 years of age in the household, the household size, the number of adults over 65 years of age
that are unemployed, the marital status, age, and gender. Equation (3.5) is the wage equation, this specification
includes the variable violence instrumented from equation (3.1) and the correction term from the first stage and
personal characteristics. The use of a multinomal logit model implies the testing of the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) assumption. The result of the Small-Hsiao supports the use of the multinomial logit model.
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Results for the first stage of the estimation are presented in table 3.4. It can be observed, that age and schooling
all have the expected sign. From the controls used, only being married and living in a household with elderly people
have a negative impact on the probability of being informal. The coefficients for age indicate that the probability of
being informal is negative for younger individuals at early stages of their working career and then becomes positive
with age. Being married, head of household and the household size have a positive effect on the probability of
occupational attachment.
The results for the wage equation after controlling for selection bias into either formal or informal jobs are
presented in table 3.5. The coefficient of the selection terms at the bottom of the table (imr2 and imr3) yield a
negative effect of selection of individuals into informal jobs. The interpretation of this coefficient follows Gyourko
and Tracy (1988) and Reilly (1991) and it refers to the effect of the selection variable on the wage. This is obtained
multiplying minus the selection variable coefficient by the mean value of the selection variable. For the case of in-
formal jobs, the calculation suggests that those self-selecting into the informal sector earn on average 18.0% higher
wages that an individual drawn at random from the labour force with identical observable characteristics would be
expected to earn.
Given that the focus of this section was to see if selection leads to a biased estimation of the effect of DTOs
on wages, we now focus on the coefficient of the number of DTOs. The sign of the coefficient of the impact of the
presence of DTOs holds. The magnitude of the coefficient, on the other hand, is marginally higher after correcting
for selection bias, meaning that if we do not account for this we are underestimating the effect of the impact of
DTOs on the wages of individuals. Ceteris paribus, an additional DTO in a municipality, increases the wages of
individuals by 8.7% for the pooled sample.
For the case of formal workers, the presence of DTOs increase their wages by 6.1% and for informal workers,
their wage increase 9.5% We again test for the statistical difference for the mean impact for both sectors and the
result with a value of prob > χ2 = 0.2317 suggest that the effect is not statistically different for both sectors.
The results just presented here must be interpreted with caution. Even though the analysis of the available
data was done in a rigorous way to try to establish a causal relationship between the presence of both the DTOs and
the violence that they bring about. The concern about the causality of the DTOs on wages still persists. Given that
the homicides were not statistically significant leads to conclude that DTO’s location is correlated with wages. Here
the analysis has been conducted as rigorous as possible to try to identify the true effect of DTOs presence and wages.
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3.6 Conclusions
It has been the aim of this analysis to measure to what extent episodes of high levels of violence and the presence
of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) affect the wages of individuals in Mexican municipalities. Studying this
effect became specially important after 2006 when the homicide rates increased at unprecedented levels. It has been
argued that two factors influenced this increase. On the one hand, the government deployed the army into the
streets to combat DTOs. On the other hand, a shift in the drug interdiction strategy by the Colombian government
created a shortage of cocaine in the market which led to confrontations between DTOs to gain access to the product.
After instrumenting the presence of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), the effect is to raise wages of
workers by 5.7% Further dividing the sample between formal and informal workers The results yield an increase of
4.9% for informal workers and 3.4% percentage points for formal workers. However, after testing we find that the
effect for both formal and informal workers is not statistically different. If we believe that the effect is true, both
sectors are benefited from the presence of DTOs in a municipality in a similar magnitude. This can be attributed to
the fact that we are only analyzing wage earners rather than self-employed workers, which have shown to respond
to external shocks differently compared to other sectors. The positive effect of DTOs on wages can be attributed
to the economic effect these groups introduce when they take control over a certain municipality. It is possible that
these groups, that are well known for handling large amounts of cash, manage to have spillover effects on the local
economy via consumption and even hiring from the local labour force. This would eventually push wages up.
On the other hand, after correcting the model for the presence of self-selection that results from the occupational
choice of individuals using a Lee (1983) two step procedure, the results show that there is evidence of selection into
informal jobs. However, the sign of the coefficient presented after instrumenting DTOs presence holds after the
correction. Hence the results presented here are robust to the selection of individuals into formal and informal jobs.
The statistical difference for the effect of DTOs on the log of wages for formal and informal workers is also tested and
the result yields that the effects are not statistically different. The labour market for salaried employees reacts in the
same way regardless of the sector of employment contrary to other types of employment, such as self-employment,
that have shown to be more affected by high levels of violence Vela´squez (2014).
3.7 Tables and figures
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Figure 3.1: National Homicide rate per 100,000 (2000-2013)
Source: Elaborated using data from INEGI and CNS
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Figure 3.4: National Homicide rate per 100,000 and MxFLS (2000-2013)
Source: Elaborated using data from INEGI and MxFLS
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Figure 3.5: Homicide rate in Mexico and cocaine seizures in Colombia
Source: Elaborated using data from INEGI and ODC
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Figure 3.6: Geographic coordinates of entry and exit points in the Mexican borders
Source: Elaborated using data from INEGI and World Port Source
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the sample of workers by year (means)
Variable 2002 2005 2009
Log of monthly wages 8.11 8.25 8.25
(0.85) (0.78) (0.76)
Age 34.0 36.0 36.0
(13.04) (13.47) (13.41)
Male* 0.66 0.66 0.62
No education* 0.06 0.06 0.05
Elementary school 0.34 0.32 0.30
Secondary school 0.32 0.32 0.33
High school 0.13 0.15 0.17
More than high school 0.16 0.15 0.16
Share of informal* 0.72 0.65 0.58
Number of DTOs 0.15 0.97 2.28
(0.41) (1.13) (1.78)
Homicide rate per 100,000 8.34 9.45 19.19
(7.56) (10.96) (26.46)
Cocaine seizures (mt) 95.27 162.66 186.09
Observations 3,103 4,925 5,361
Additional Variables
Mean homicide rate (1990-2001) 14.58
(13.51)
Mean DTOs (1990-2001) 0.093
(0.17)
Distance to the US (km) 630.83
(252.97)
Distance to South (km) 1,254.07
(602.47)
Distance to Atlantic (km) 523.80
(454.56)
Distance to Pacific (km) 309.62
(201.62)
*These values refer to shares of the total. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Table 3.2: First stage reduced form regression for IV
Log of Homicide rates Number of DTOs
First stage: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violence on instruments Pooled Informal Formal Pooled Informal Formal
Average homicides 1990-2001 0.0338*** 0.0293*** 0.0578***
(0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0093)
Average number of DTO p/municipality 1990-2001 2.8139*** 2.8701*** 2.8143***
(0.6832) (0.6651) (0.7459)
Cocaine seizures and south border 4.61e-06 *** 4.73e-06*** 4.84e-06*** 0.0000105*** 0.000011*** 9.78e-06***
(1.44e-06) (1.56e-06) (1.48e-06) (2.00e-06) (1.94e-06) (2.29e-06)
Cocaine seizures and pacific border -1.37e-06 -2.43e-06 2.04e-06 0.0000158*** 0.0000145*** 0.0000168***
(2.19e-06) (2.34e-06) (2.73e-06) (2.82e-06) (2.64e-06) (3.57e-06)
Log of state income per capita -0.0073** -0.0042 0.0011 -0.1780*** -0.1566*** -0.2271***
(0 .0179) (0.0177) (0.00210) (0.0266) (0.0230) (0.03844)
Constant 1.0400*** 1.1592*** 1.211*** -1.4225*** -1.4104 -1.1600**
(0.4224) (0.4110) (0.349) (0.2875) (0.2364) (0.5140)
Regional controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
F-statistic 9.12 9.51 18.64 23.75 25.39 17.06
Observations 13269 8550 4717 13269 8550 4717
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Impact of Violence on Wages (2SLS Estimation)
Log of Homicide rates Number of DTOs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Second Stage Pooled Formal Informal Pooled Formal Informal
Male 0.314*** 0.211*** 0.380*** 0.318*** 0.214*** 0.381***
(0.0181) (0.0230) (0.0213) (0.0190) (0.0233) (0.0221)
Elementary School 0.149*** 0.102 0.129*** 0.154*** 0.114* 0.129***
(0.0301) (0.0629) (0.0348) (0.0290) (0.0660) (0.0344)
Secondary School 0.354*** 0.317*** 0.285*** 0.351*** 0.329*** 0.279***
(0.0367) (0.0639) (0.0413) (0.0341) (0.0665) (0.0406)
High School 0.466*** 0.437*** 0.323*** 0.460*** 0.447*** 0.316***
(0.0417) (0.0695) (0.0464) (0.0405) (0.0725) (0.0460)
More than High School 0.835*** 0.736*** 0.737*** 0.842*** 0.752*** 0.744***
(0.0492) (0.0688) (0.0568) (0.0459) (0.0717) (0.0552)
Directors & Chiefs 0.938*** 0.767*** 0.951*** 0.913*** 0.754*** 0.932***
(0.0530) (0.0817) (0.0697) (0.0517) (0.0818) (0.0690)
Manufacture &Industry 0.401*** 0.259*** 0.385*** 0.386*** 0.248*** 0.375***
(0.0319) (0.0533) (0.0327) (0.0301) (0.0515) (0.0315)
Commerce & Sales 0.338*** 0.267*** 0.303*** 0.284*** 0.227*** 0.264***
(0.0376) (0.0599) (0.0417) (0.0377) (0.0582) (0.0433)
Services 0.342*** 0.295*** 0.307*** 0.316*** 0.285*** 0.282***
(0.0350) (0.0554) (0.0366) (0.0346) (0.0521) (0.0374)
Professional Services 0.666*** 0.543*** 0.619*** 0.612*** 0.512*** 0.574***
(0.0318) (0.0502) (0.0404) (0.0329) (0.0509) (0.0425)
Log of homicide rates -0.0122 -0.0117 0.00105
(0.0239) (0.0195) (0.0254)
Number of DTOs 0.0573*** 0.0347** 0.0496***
(0.0141) (0.0137) (0.0173)
Constant 6.223*** 6.968*** 6.217*** 6.166*** 6.904*** 6.194***
(0.0912) (0.121) (0.0961) (0.0796) (0.0998) (0.0906)
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.317 0.304 0.257 0.314 0.299 0.256
F-statistic 9.12 9.51 18.64 23.75 25.39 17.06
Kleibergen-Paap 16.753 10.839 17.299 19.178 19.697 21.531
Hansen J statistic 1.894 0.98 1.503 2.036 1.964 3.713
p-value 0.388 0.6128 0.4716 0.3614 0.3747 0.1562
Observations 13269 4717 8550 13269 4717 8550
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Multinomial Logit Estimation to predict selection of individuals
Employment Status
Unemployed Informal Formal
Age 0.00242∗∗∗ -0.00256∗∗∗ 0.000138
(0.000329) (0.000250) (0.000200)
Male -0.355∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.0802∗∗∗
(0.00974) (0.0111) (0.00814)
Elementary school -0.184∗∗∗ 0.0686∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0105) (0.0195)
Secondary School -0.320∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0129) (0.0331)
High School -0.335∗∗∗ -0.0540∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0134) (0.0468)
More than High school -0.528∗∗∗ -0.0442∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0183) (0.0441)
North Region 0.0310∗ -0.0461∗∗∗ 0.0151
(0.0179) (0.0101) (0.0127)
West Region 0.0252 -0.0211∗ -0.00407
(0.0205) (0.0127) (0.0167)
East Region 0.0168 0.0110 -0.0278∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0150) (0.0131)
South Region 0.0605∗∗ -0.0551∗∗∗ -0.00542
(0.0249) (0.0139) (0.0204)
Married -0.0405∗∗∗ 0.000207 0.0403∗∗∗
(0.00658) (0.00517) (0.00529)
Head or household -0.335∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0107) (0.0112)
Children under 14 years in the HH 0.0152∗∗∗ -0.00930∗∗∗ -0.00588∗∗∗
(0.00391) (0.00301) (0.00225)
Household size -0.0187∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.00512∗∗∗
(0.00200) (0.00148) (0.00147)
Elderly in the HH 0.0139∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.00127
(0.00438) (0.00326) (0.00265)
Observations 26211 8550 4717
Pseudo R2 0.191 0.191 0.191
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: Effect on wages of violence and DTOs on wages correcting for self-selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log of homicides log of homicides log of homicides DTO DTO DTO
Pooled Formal Informal Pooled Formal Informal
Age 0.0484∗∗∗ 0.0314∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0464∗∗∗ 0.0303∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗
(0.00317) (0.00392) (0.00300) (0.00311) (0.00382) (0.00299)
Age squared -0.000548∗∗∗ -0.000295∗∗∗ -0.000576∗∗∗ -0.000531∗∗∗ -0.000286∗∗∗ -0.000561∗∗∗
(0.0000342) (0.0000467) (0.0000361) (0.0000334) (0.0000453) (0.0000361)
Male 0.244∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0396) (0.0426) (0.0417)
Elementary School 0.0656 0.0609 0.106∗∗∗ 0.0708∗ 0.0685 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0402) (0.0667) (0.0368) (0.0383) (0.0681) (0.0358)
Secondary School 0.186∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0785) (0.0418) (0.0623) (0.0789) (0.0416)
High School 0.258∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.0855) (0.0928) (0.0470) (0.0854) (0.0938) (0.0476)
More than High School 0.578∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗
(0.0970) (0.105) (0.0575) (0.0932) (0.102) (0.0563)
Directors & Chiefs 0.920∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0832) (0.0699) (0.0507) (0.0809) (0.0654)
Manufacturer & Industry 0.391∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.0552) (0.0324) (0.0312) (0.0522) (0.0331)
Commerce & Sales 0.333∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0606) (0.0425) (0.0417) (0.0565) (0.0519)
Services 0.333∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.0348) (0.0561) (0.0369) (0.0353) (0.0525) (0.0405)
Professional Services 0.664∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0505) (0.0408) (0.0379) (0.0505) (0.0533)
Norrth Region 0.0698∗ -0.0133 0.130∗∗∗ 0.0350 -0.0367 0.0979∗∗
(0.0384) (0.0350) (0.0408) (0.0415) (0.0359) (0.0423)
West Region 0.0862∗∗ 0.00218 0.110∗∗ 0.0813∗∗ -0.00656 0.114∗∗∗
(0.0421) (0.0455) (0.0460) (0.0383) (0.0433) (0.0429)
East Region -0.186∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ -0.0958∗ -0.0621 -0.135∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0530) (0.0515) (0.0508) (0.0475) (0.0519)
South Region -0.208∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗ -0.116∗ -0.139∗∗
(0.0582) (0.0785) (0.0618) (0.0570) (0.0657) (0.0643)
imr2 0.0491 -0.122∗∗ 0.0657 -0.122∗∗
(0.0639) (0.0499) (0.0645) (0.0491)
imr3 -0.200∗∗∗ -0.0887 -0.218∗∗∗ -0.0946
(0.0574) (0.0630) (0.0579) (0.0632)
Log of homicides -0.0426∗ -0.0425 -0.0189
(0.0243) (0.0401) (0.0235)
Numbert of DTOs 0.0907∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0953∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0156) (0.0300)
Constant 6.901∗∗∗ 7.342∗∗∗ 6.476∗∗∗ 6.786∗∗∗ 7.222∗∗∗ 6.388∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.246) (0.130) (0.149) (0.209) (0.118)
Observations 13269 4717 8550 13269 4717 8550
R2 0.319 0.305 0.258 0.322 0.307 0.261
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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General Conclusions
The aim of this thesis was to contribute to the understanding of a labour market that is characterized by having two
sectors out of unemployment (i.e. formal vs. informal). In specific, the difference between the decision of individuals
to engage in formal vs informal jobs and their duration of unemployment was disentangled. It was also analysed
how the labour market adjusts wages under the presence of high levels of violence in Mexican municipalities and if
the magnitude of the adjustment differs for formal vs. informal jobs.
In general, the findings lead to conclude that the decision of individuals to engage in formal and informal jobs
in Mexico do not differ substantially. However, there are some difference in the personal characteristics of workers
that are worth mentioning. On average, formal workers are more educated and earn higher wages than informal
workers, when the sample is further divided by gender, it is clear that a male worker earns higher wages in formal
jobs compared to informal jobs. This is also true when we compare female workers. However, the magnitude of the
adjustment for both sectors when experiencing high levels of violence is not statistically different.
In particular, in the first chapter it is found that more educated individuals have a lower probability of securing
a job compared to those with less education. The relevant literature has defined this as “wait unemployment”
and this is explained by the fact that more educated workers have higher reservation wages, this means that they
would experience longer unemployment spells before securing a job that matches their personal characteristics and
preferences. On the other hand, less educated workers have a higher probability of exiting unemployment given that
their reservation wages are lower compared to highly educated individuals.
Additionally, there are gender differences in the use of search channels. In specific, although both male and
female women have higher returns from search channels when searching for formal jobs but they do not benefit from
search channels when accessing informal ones. Male job searchers have higher returns to job search for informal jobs
when asking friends and relatives for recommendations.
Empirical evidence was found of selection bias in this sample of analysis. Specifically, women that self-select into
informal jobs experience a wage penalty, which is consistent with the hypothesis that informal jobs offer character-
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istics that are valuable even if this implies sacrificing income. This fact is not surprising because the traditional role
of Mexican women as housewives is still valid nowadays and spread throughout the country. If such characteristics
(i.e. proximity to home or flexibility of working schedule) enables them to continue with the household chores, then
the loss in earnings is justified. On the other hand, there is a clear preference for the sector of employment from
workers in both the formal and informal sectors and this preference leads them to earn higher wages compared to
those randomly allocated. This applies to both male and female workers in the formal sector but only for males in
the informal sector.
Regarding the wage returns to the use of different search channels, the results suggest that those searching
online for jobs experience a wage premium and those searching for jobs in the newspaper exhibit a wage penalty.
These results can be explained by the type of jobs that are secured via these channels. On the one hand, jobs
advertised online correlate positively with the schooling of the individual and thus are better paid. On the other
hand, jobs advertised through the newspaper are temporary and low paid.
From the results of the second chapter, we can conclude that highly skilled formal workers have longer unem-
ployment duration. This is reflected by the positive coefficients of the variable indicating if a worker was previously
formal in conjunction with the schooling level. Workers with higher educational levels have a higher reservation
wage, they are willing to prolong the time unemployed until a suitable job comes along. Regarding the means to
finance job search, the evidence is mixed. Those that receive financial support from the government and from friends
and relatives, experience longer unemployment periods. On the other hand, those that had access to a lump sum
payment from a previous job, experience shorter duration of unemployment.
With regards to the impact of search channels on unemployment duration, the results suggest that going dir-
ectly to the workplace and searching for jobs via newspaper reduce the unemployment duration of formal workers.
Asking friends and relatives help reduce the job search time for informal workers. The use of other channels rather
than helping workers reduce their time unemployed, seems to prolong it, instead there are other factors that decrease
the unemployment spell of job searchers. These factors relate to personal characteristics like age, schooling level
and previous working experience in a given sector.
In order to understand unemployment duration of individuals that have more than one exit out of unem-
ployment, a multiple destination model was estimated. The results of the competing model helps to understand
that the shorter duration for those in receipt of a lump sum payment occurs when workers exit into formal jobs
for both male and female workers. This effect is robust to the inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation.
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Finally, the results presented in the third chapter suggest that there is no effect of high levels of violence on
wages for the period 2002-2009. Alternatively, the presence of DTOs in a given municipality increase wages of
workers by 5.7%. After dividing the sample to differentiate the impact for formal and informal workers the results
yield a positive impact of 4.9% for informal workers and 3.4% for formal workers. As one of the main interests of
this chapter was to analyze if formal and informal sectors react differently to the presence of DTOs, the statistical
difference for both formal and informal wage earners was tested and it is concluded that the wages in both sectors
increase in the same magnitude. There is no evidence suggesting that the wage for informal workers adjusts differ-
ently to formal ones.
The non-differential impact for both formal and informal sectors to the presence of DTOs can be partly ex-
plained by the fact that the focus of this analysis is wage earners, leaving the self-employed, employers and workers
for self-consumption out of the analysis. In specific, self-employed have shown to respond to external shocks differ-
ently compared to other sectors as shown in other studies (Ferna´ndez et al., 2014; Vela´squez, 2014).
On the other hand, the positive effect of DTOs on wages can be attributed to the economic effect introduced by
such groups when they take control over a municipality. It is well known that such groups handle large amounts of
cash and this could potentially have spillover effects on the local economy via consumption and perhaps even through
the hiring of the local labour force. This spillover effect would eventually push wages up. The effects presented in
the third chapter are robust after correcting for the problem of selection bias that arises when individuals explicitly
choose their sector of employment.
Even if the decision to engage in one sector vs. the other does not vary among individuals, there are large
differences in the type of firms they are employed in. According to McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), although
the informal sector employs an important number of workers in Mexico, most firms are small in size, with no more
than 10 employees and these are the ones creating the most jobs. These firms are often characterized by having low
levels of productivity, lack of access to credit, low technology and under-reporting of income to avoid paying taxes.
Moreover, in the period 1999-2009 their productivity fell by 6.5%. In contrast, large modern corporations, which
are often formal, increased productivity by 5.8% in the same period. This is an indicator of the large productivity
gap in Mexico’s labour market and has important repercussions in the economy as both type of firms grow in the
opposite direction.
The disparity in the productivity growth of both types of firms ultimately has an impact on economic growth.
Efforts must be oriented to reconcile both sectors and promote the integration of small firms into the more competit-
ive sector by facilitating their access to credit and technology. Moreover, this integration must be done in conjunction
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with a wide formalization strategy to tackle informal practices, particularly in states where informality is high. Ac-
cording to the International Labor Organization (ILO) although the national average proportion of informal workers
is important in magnitude, within states, the situation is heterogeneous and in some cases, worse. In Oaxaca, in
the south of the country, this accounts for around 80% of the total workforce, whereas in Nuevo Leon, in the north,
it is 40% of the total workforce, which is below the national average. Achieving the formalization the large pro-
portion of informal workers and firms would benefit the economy by increasing productivity and the tax income base.
There are some programs already in place which promote formalization of firms and jobs, such as the one
promoted by the ILO in several states such as Mexico City, Quere´taro, Hidalgo and Chihuahua. The effectiveness of
programs such as this one is very heterogeneous and depends on the quality of local institutions and the infrastruc-
ture in each state. Perhaps a coordinated effort from all levels of government would be more effective in achieving
a large formalization of jobs and firms.
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Table A.1: Multinomial Logit Estimation, first stage
Outcome Employment status
(1) (2) (3)
Unemployed Formal Informal
Married -0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0420∗∗∗
(0.00706) (0.00543) (0.00693)
Head of household -0.139∗∗∗ 0.0438∗∗∗ 0.0952∗∗∗
(0.00812) (0.00668) (0.00809)
Age 0.00588∗∗∗ -0.00420∗∗∗ -0.00168∗∗∗
(0.000347) (0.000271) (0.000319)
Gender -0.132∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.00670) (0.00489) (0.00633)
Secondary school -0.0132 0.0701∗∗∗ -0.0569∗∗∗
(0.00899) (0.00805) (0.00760)
High school 0.0540∗∗∗ 0.0846∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.00926) (0.00776)
More than high school 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.0724∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.00957) (0.00871) (0.00735)
Previous job formal 0.00581 0.151∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.00646) (0.00513) (0.00588)
Dismissed or finished previous business -0.0253∗∗∗ 0.00286 0.0225∗∗∗
(0.00674) (0.00494) (0.00655)
Left or closed previous business -0.0207 -0.0456∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗
(0.0149) (0.0117) (0.0142)
Other reasons for unemployment -0.00851 -0.0449∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0127) (0.0176)
Financial cushion 0.00215 0.0227∗∗ -0.0248∗∗
(0.0129) (0.00905) (0.0125)
Financial aid from government 0.0483∗∗ -0.0325∗∗ -0.0158
(0.0190) (0.0140) (0.0183)
Financial aid from relatives 0.0395∗∗∗ -0.0255∗∗∗ -0.0140
(0.0137) (0.00969) (0.0129)
Region controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30320 30320 30320
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.078 0.078
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.1: OLS regression for the effect of violence and DTOs presence on wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of Homicides Log of hom Log of Hom DTO DTO DTO
Pooled Formal Informal Pooled Formal Informal
Male 0.311*** 0.210*** 0.375*** 0.313*** 0.210*** 0.376***
(0.0184) (0.0230) (0.0223) (0.0187) (0.0231) (0.0225)
Elementary school 0.163*** 0.101 0.146*** 0.160*** 0.0981 0.142***
(0.0321) (0.0655) (0.0382) (0.0325) (0.0655) (0.0384)
Secondary school 0.383*** 0.320*** 0.318*** 0.375*** 0.316*** 0.309***
(0.0399) (0.0663) (0.0453) (0.0397) (0.0659) (0.0453)
High school 0.483*** 0.433*** 0.342*** 0.474*** 0.429*** 0.335***
(0.0443) (0.0722) (0.0503) (0.0448) (0.0718) (0.0504)
More than high school 0.852*** 0.732*** 0.757*** 0.851*** 0.730*** 0.760***
(0.0507) (0.0715) (0.0592) (0.0501) (0.0716) (0.0582)
Log of homicide rates 0.0317** 0.0193 0.0353**
(0.0134) (0.0141) (0.0166)
Number of DTOs 0.0375*** 0.0101 0.0426***
(0.00871) (0.00722) (0.0127)
Constant 6.111*** 6.899*** 6.133*** 6.174*** 6.940*** 6.199***
(0.0833) (0.117) (0.0936) (0.0800) (0.0966) (0.0905)
Age Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.297 0.299 0.232 0.301 0.299 0.236
Observations 13269 4717 8550 13269 4717 8550
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
